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ABSTRACT.
In the past decade researchers began to remedy a literature deficit in the study of
broadcasting institutions – addressing in particular the issues of labour process, restructuring
and industrial relations. This thesis which considers management change, industrial relations
and restructuring within the United Kingdom (‘UK’) broadcasting industry employs a case
study format with a view to highlighting the variations of industry (macro) and firm (micro)
based restructuring. Organizational change was not a uniform process throughout the UK
broadcasting industry and significantly different strategies were developed by management
within the two main terrestrial broadcasters – in particular in attempting to fundamentally
alter the organization of programme production. The labour process and experience of
employees and owner-managers within the independent production sector was also
distinguishable as between the two main UK terrestrial broadcasters.
In order to provide a theoretical underpinning to the empirical studies which form the
centrepiece of this thesis, the four themes of contemporary labour process theory are
explored. These contributions are included because examinations undertaken of labour
processes have resulted in critical insights as to the nature of management and labour
relationships. Together with firm based organizational restructuring of the broadcasting
industry, the past 25 years have seen very significant regulatory change consequent on a
variety of legislative initiatives and which are set out.
The case studies begin with the wide-scale restructuring of industrial relations within the
Independent Television (‘ITV’) sector since 1979 (Chapter 4). The second case study
(Chapter 5) is concerned with the implementation of a set of managerial strategies aimed at
reshaping the labour processes within the Central Scotland ITV franchise – Scottish
Television Ltd. (‘STV’). Chapter 6 deals with the implementation of new working practices
and what might be described as an attack on employee identity within BBC Scotland. The
restructuring of the Corporation along quasi-commercial lines with specific reference to the
employment of the directorate (distinct business units) system is examined. The final case
study (Chapter 7) is an examination of the independent production sector tracing the
emergence of a group of Producer Owners (independent production company owners) who
emerged during the first half of the 1990s and who have since become a significant force in
British television production. This study also traces the development of the career and
networking labour of the group of individuals employed on short-term contracts by the
independent production company owners.
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iIntroduction.
It is a fact that television studies risk becoming a scholarly ghetto – simply because the
subject is so complex, powerful and, indeed, quite often profoundly mundane. Television
research has tended to merge into ‘conceptual self-sufficiency’ and to become a minor
concern for those engaged in media research (Born, 2000:407). Born’s description of the
increasingly trivial nature of much of what purported to be television research, offers
inspiration to persons seeking to assist in understanding the complex labour processes
within the industry. Those who had concentrated exclusively on critiquing the output of
media institutions – and who referred to texts, readings and resistance – have started to
consider institutions, industry and labour in a much more pragmatic manner (Oswell,
1998:93).
The broadcasting industry has been in a state of almost constant flux since the early
1980s and the oligopolistic market (which existed until the late 1980s) has been replaced
by a market where some 700 channels currently operate. In tandem with the technological
and channel delivery system developments – which occurred during the 1980s – there
were many protracted and sustained attacks on organized labour. The situation largely
arose from the fact that from the mid 1980s, the various commercial operators within
Independent Television (‘ITV’) were exposed to increasing levels of competition and
which threatened to undermine advertising revenues. The British Broadcasting
Corporation (‘BBC’) also suffered a significant threat to its revenues as a result of
political pressure to both its cost base and funding arrangements (see Goodwin,
1997:165). The emergence of a substantial independent television production sector (both
in terms of size and quality of programming) in the period after the introduction of
Channel 4 in 1982, had a profound effect upon the economics of the broadcasting
industry (Collins et al, 1988).
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During the 1980s and 1990s a prolonged process evolved (within the wider economy) in
the social and economic restructuring of relationships between the private realm of
economic activity and the public sphere of politics and the State (Picciotto, 2002:1-2).
Within the private sector, in particular, such restructuring had followed a clearly defined
path – namely, that large-scale (Fordist style) production had been re-organized with
individual firms adopting post-Fordist (i.e. pared-down) production arrangements. While
the UK broadcasting industry broadly mirrored these changes, organizational
transformation throughout the industry was not a uniform process. There were significant
stylistic and organizational differences in the way the industry was restructured during
the 1980s (these are detailed in Chapters 4 to 7 inclusive). It is a fact that the UK
broadcasting industry experienced a revolution in employment and organizational
practices during the second half of the 1980s (Brown & Walsh, 1991; Haskel &
Szymanski, 1994). The industry had traditionally offered lifetime employment, structured
careers with controlled entry and high levels of staff jobs together with paternalistic
welfare-orientated personnel policies (Paterson, 2001). This pattern was to change
beyond recognition. While one can, and must, look to the terrestrial broadcasters and the
emerging independent sector as being emblematic of organizational change and
restructuring, it would be a mistake to ignore the contextual theoretical contributions to
workplace change.
Changes in employer practices and work organization were paralleled by a renewal of
Marxist inspired scholarship – the labour process approach. The emergence of labour
process theory (‘LPT’) involved a return to Marxist theory and provided industrial
sociology with the analytical and empirical tools necessary to maintain and develop its
interest in the connections between the workplace and the wider capitalist global
economy (Ackroyd, et al, 2005:5). The application of LPT is particularly suited to a
study of individual broadcasting firms’ experience of organizational change since it
brings a commitment not just to a simple insistence upon the centrality of work
relationships but, rather, to the ‘…contours of a restructured world of work’ (Pahl,
1988:1).
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In Chapter 1, (1.1) the main theoretical developments in LPT are outlined together with
four essential themes of contemporary LPT which have a particular relevance to the case
studies in Chapters 4-7 inclusive. Individual themes are introduced in Chapter 1 and are
developed in the case studies within Chapters 4 to7. The first theme identifies the move
away from collective bargaining (or top-down regulation) within the ITV sector to a
bottom-up or individual firm based approach, (1.2)
Within 1.3 the second theme of LPT is considered and which is concerned with the
impact of de-skilling and up-skilling upon creative and technical workers within the
broadcasting industry, (this issue is considered empirically in Chapter 5). De-skilling/up-
skilling is a fundamental tenet of the labour process debate. Since the publication of
Braverman’s hugely influential Labour and Monopoly Capital, the question of skill has
been at the forefront of LPT (Braverman, 1974). Having initially ceded control of the
labour process to skilled workers, ITV firms began to recognize and attack the concept of
skill as a defensive refuge for employees. Managers’ use of new technology and work
organization to challenge established conceptions of skill was a fundamental part of the
ITV Networks’ strategy of corporate change from the 1980s onwards. A case study of
Scottish Television Ltd (‘STV’) is used to trace the significant pressures placed on skilled
workers through the application of new technology and which held the promise of de-
skilling for management as industry-wide restructuring began to be implemented from
1986 onwards.
Questions of skill were central to the labour process within the UK commercial television
sector during the 1980s. The BBC would also adapt to corporatization (i.e. moves to
impel public organizations to act as though they were commercial operations) and this
had a profound impact upon the Corporation (Murdock, 2003:20). The most significant
consequence for the BBC was the development of structural reform so as to promote a
new, more market responsive culture. One of the central issues for the Corporation – after
the introduction of the internal market for the provision of services – was the
management of occupational identity and, in particular, attempts to control identity as a
central management objective. The conflict between managerial strategies and employee
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identities is a critical element of contemporary LPT. Labour process theory of work and
identity is considered in Chapter 1, (1.4) and empirically in Chapter 6 – this latter
Chapter also examines marketization within BBC Scotland.
The final theme of LPT outlined in Chapter 1 reflects attempts to understand the
relationship between networking, the workplace and the labour market. Networking is a
critical factor in securing employment for television workers within the independent
production sector and became a pivotal form of labour for workers. Theoretical
contributions to networking and LPT are examined in Chapter 1 (1.5) and considered
empirically in Chapter 7. Networking is also essential for Producer Owners seeking
commissions. These Producer Owners have a controlling stake in independent production
companies (‘IPCs’) and are often former BBC or ITV employees. As already indicated,
Chapter 1 introduces the four theoretical themes of LPT and which inform the case
studies of the restructuring of the broadcasting industry after 1979. Chapter 2 is a short
and concise Chapter setting out the details of the interviews which contributed to the
empirical Chapters. In Chapter 3 the essential pieces of legislation enacted since the
1950s are set out with a particular emphasis on the period after 1979 when legislation
contributed very significantly to the way the industry was (and continues to be) regulated.
Chapter 4 – the first of the four industry case studies – explores the establishment and
move away from collective bargaining within ITV. It will be seen that in the past 25
years a series of attacks were perpetrated on the highly regulated broadcasting production
process. Workers and trade unions were forced to reorganize and reconsider their
established positions regarding the notion of career and work and the once conservative
layers of management within the ITV franchises began to employ labour reduction as a
critical cost saving device. The old-fashioned and almost paternalistic structure of many
ITV franchisees was replaced by a new hard-nosed business approach. The ITV
companies would later move to a variant of the flexible model of employment where
many of the production departments and centres within the individual companies were
pared down in favour of buying-in programming. In simple terms, the traditional
regulatory structure of industrial relations within the ITV Network moved from being a
vtop-down process based on National Agreements between employers and trade union, to
a bottom-up re-regulating of the employment relationship. This new approach was
apparent in distinctive ways amongst the various ITV franchises. By the mid-1980s ITV
managers were determined that local bargaining should take precedence over national
bargaining. The results of the restructuring of the ITV sector in the period 1979-2000 are
traced using internal documents and archival records. It is noted that these shifts in
management strategy and practices were well underway before the Thatcher
government’s decision to deregulate the industry following the 1989 Monopolies and
Merger Commission Report on trade union restrictive practices.
The changes in the regulatory basis of the ITV Network were particularly significant and
an individual firm based approach to the study of organizational change is undertaken.
The objective in Chapter 5 is to explore the relationship between corporate strategy, the
reshaping of the labour process and the issue of the re-regulation of workplace
relationships – STV was the ITV franchise chosen for examination. The progression is
traced from a highly regulated work environment in the period until the mid 1980s
(within which managers would not attempt any fundamental restructuring of the labour
process) to one in which management considered control of the labour process
fundamental to continued profitability and the legitimation of a new managerial regime.
In Chapter 6 the organizational restructuring in the BBC is examined – and, in particular,
BBC Scotland. It was here, from the mid 1980s, that a series of initiatives aimed at
maintaining audiences and revenues in an increasingly complex and competitive market
were introduced (Traquina, 1998). Various factors contributed to the position in which
the Corporation found itself after the relatively low-key organizational changes resulting
from the McKinsey (management consultancy) reforms of the 1970s. The intensification
of competition from the growth of satellite, cable and digital television together with a
deep antipathy of the various Conservative administrations to the Corporation, had utterly
changed the landscape (Born, 2004:6). During the 1990s the BBC underwent a vigorous
management campaign to restructure and reduce labour costs – the single biggest element
in their production budgets (Wegg-Prosser, 1998:119). Producer Choice was a response
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to the surrounding political, economic and technological environment which echoed the
theoretical turn to ‘flexible-specialization’ and an ‘anti-bureaucratic’ public sector (Perri,
1995:2-8). It sought to change the culture of work within the Corporation by splitting up
the organizational structure into directorates. Producer Choice questioned the validity of
the large centralized bureaucratic structure and no longer would individuals consider
themselves as ‘BBC people’ but, rather, as employees of the various directorates.
The marketization of the Corporation had the direct effect of shifting the concentration of
those employed by the BBC from conceiving of themselves as, simply, BBC employees
to individuals who needed to adapt personal, occupational and management strategies in
order to survive the ‘new capitalism’ of the knowledge economy (Fenwick, 2002:704). In
Chapter 6 an examination is undertaken of how internal restructuring of BBC Scotland
impacted upon the labour process of those employed within the two predominant
directorates of the restructured BBC, namely Broadcast Scotland and Resources Scotland.
The final case study (Chapter 7) explores the emergence of two groups of television
professionals within the independent production sector and where independent
productions acheived a significant foothold in the television programme market after the
passing of the Broadcasting Act, 1990 (Barnatt & Starkey, 1994). No examination of
these companies which act as sub-contractors for the broadcasting industry would be
complete without an empirically based study of the role played by Producer Owners. The
development of a further group of television workers, Broadcast Professionals, is also
considered here – these are skilled technical and creative research personnel who are
either self-employed or submit to periods of irregular employment. They are invariably
required to move from one employment contract to another and depend on networking in
order to maintain something akin to reasonably continuous levels of employment. This
Chapter also draws upon the role of networks and labour markets which were introduced
in Chapter 1.
A shift had taken place in the organization of programme production – power remains in
the hands of a relatively few large IPCs, while the two main broadcasters retain very
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significant production departments. In contrast, loosely based networks of television
professionals had to develop ever more sophisticated strategies in order to maintain
employment in an increasingly fragmented labour market.
Chapter 8 offers a review of the association between the four themes of contemporary
labour process theory identified in Chapter 1 and their relationship with the four case
studies in Chapters 4-7. This Chapter provides a context and helps to link the theoretical
themes identified in Chapter 1 with the empirical case study findings offered in Chapter 4
to 7 inclusive.
Each case study contains only the empirical material gathered for that particular case with
the exception of some brief references within Chapter 5 which are a direct result of
interviews conducted for the preceding Chapter – however there is no replication of
material.
1Chapter 1.
Core Theoretical Underpinnings.
Introduction to Labour Process Theory and the
United Kingdom Broadcasting Industry.
Introduction.
Cultural industries are typically understood in terms of consumption – not production
(see inter alia, Hesmondhalgh, 1996:113-114; Beck, 2003:1). The concern here is to
examine the management of work organization across the broadcasting sector by drawing
upon the main theoretical developments in LPT. One of the difficulties in achieving such
an objective has been the substantial fragmentation of LPT since the 1980s.
This Chapter will outline four themes of LPT which provide a theoretical structure for the
case studies which follow in Chapters 4-7 inclusive. In 1.1 here the development of LPT
is outlined and its appropriateness to the study of labour and organization within the
broadcasting industry is examined. In 1.2 the regulation of the broadcasting industry is
considered and how the end of collective bargaining (as a form of State based regulation)
impacted on management, work and industrial relations after 1979 within the ITV sector.
The subject is then considered empirically in Chapter 4. The process of negotiating the
introduction of new broadcasting technologies into the independent television sector and
its consequent impact on skill (the de-skilling/re-skilling debate) is further considered in
1.3 and the topic is returned to empirically in Chapter 5 through a case study examination
of Scottish Television (‘STV’). Pressures on notions of Public Service Broadcasting
(‘PSB’) /BBC occupational identity within LPT are specifically addressed in1.4 and are
considered empirically in Chapter 6. While LPT paid only limited attention to labour
market activities (or networking) as a form of work, it is a central experience of both
freelance employees and the owners of production companies within the independent
television production sector – see 1.5. Finally the incorporation of networking into LPT is
a theme considered empirically in Chapter 7.
2The examination of labour process has produced three important perspectives on the
fundamental nature of management labour relationships. These are the likelihood of
conflict, the difficulty of maintaining control of the labour process, and finally, the
contingent nature of control mechanisms for suppressing conflict (Brown, 1992). The
highly technical nature of television production within the UK witnessed little conflict
over the labour process in the period up until the 1980s and the complex and unreliable
broadcasting technologies meant that control over the labour process rested with skilled
workers. Since the very inception of television broadcasting in 1926, until the mid-1980s,
groups of skilled workers held strong bargaining positions within both ITV and the BBC.
In particular production was controlled by two groups until the mid 1980s – highly
skilled engineers and creative workers and, as Burawoy (1979:38) noted, when workers
became actively involved in the labour process they developed stakes in particular rules
and objectives. However, by the late 1980s management had successfully regained the
right to manage and regulate the workplace – a right which had ceded to employees for
decades. As a direct result of this change in power relationships, employees would now
be required to create complex forms of resistance in order to soften the reality of a
management buoyed up by changes in technology and by a supportive political and
regulatory environment which sought to marginalize the role of, inter alia, established
skill and trade unions (Smith & Morton, 1993).
Changes in the UK television industry since 1979, and the intensification of change in the
mid-to-late 1980s, contributed to a radical alteration in the working lives of those
employed by the two main terrestrial broadcasters. Orthodox treatments of the
restructuring of the broadcasting industry have largely concentrated on the importance of
new media technologies together with slimmed down production teams and the
contracting-in of services and programming which acted as triggers in the emergence of
the independent sector and which bypassed the established suppliers (BBC and ITV)
(Hazelkorn, 2001). These organizational changes eventually created new opportunities
for the provision of programming through the independent television sector. As
previously indicated, little attention has been paid to the way in which work organization
3and labour process was remade within the cultural industries. Broadcasting labour had
developed an identity which was based on its creativity, innovation and originality and
these qualities were the principal reasons ascribed to the ability to attract audiences
(Jones et al, 2005; Delmestri, 2005:976). It was because broadcasting was included under
the broad umbrella of cultural industries that notions of management monitoring and
control, efficiency, productivity and the individual performance of technical labour were
deemed to be anathema to British broadcasting until the mid 1980s.
At first glance, the proposition that there are insufficient studies of the
creative/broadcasting industry seems at odds with the increasing fashion for studying the
industry’s cultural dimension. However, analysis of the cultural industries has been
overwhelmingly centered upon the study of the consumption of cultural output – it is a
fact that most studies of broadcasting have focused on the quality or otherwise of the
content of programming (Lawrence & Philips 2002:431). In contrast, this thesis seeks to
place at its core, the economic regulation of broadcasting production and the actual
experience of labour. In an introduction to a recent collection of essays in the field of
work and organizational studies it was noted that researchers who shift focus from a
concern with production to one based upon a desire to analyze consumption are, in fact,
excluding employees and questions of employment relationships from their gaze
(Ackroyd et al, 2005:7). The trend to analyze cultural output can be partly understood by
the difficulty in applying traditional labour process theories to the cultural/broadcasting
arena. The cultural industries tend to be treated differently within labour process
literature and it has been noted that labour practices in the cultural industries do not
conform to the routines which are typical of work in the contemporary capitalist economy
(Toynbee, 2003:39).
If the study of work within the broadcasting industry is overwhelmingly dominated by
considerations of the cultural then, what progress can those researchers from the broad
labour process perspective make in the field? LPT can usefully be applied to broadcasting
and the tendency to treat output of broadcasting institutions (and the manner in which
programming is produced) as intrinsically different from, say, the production of cars or
4steel is mistaken. Employees of both the main broadcasting institutions and the growing
independent production sector were, and continue to be, exposed to the same pressures
upon their working lives as workers in other sectors. As will be established – particularly
through the aegis of case studies undertaken here – the broadcasting industry in the
period up until the mid 1980s relied upon technical and specialist knowledge to maintain
delicate equipment. Skill and discretion, bottom up regulation, a strong set of
occupational identities together with networking experiences were vital components of
the labour process of broadcasting employees. The attacks on labour process included
deregulation, de-skilling and occupational identity change directives. The four themes of
LPT outlined track the changing manner of labour regulation after 1979 and how labour
responded to such change. A brief history together with an exploration of the
application(s) of LPT, will be developed in 1.1
1.1
Situating Labour Process Theory (LPT).
Much of the early work on LPT was written within a Marxist framework with Braverman
concentrating upon the degradation of work triggered by scientific management
(Braverman 1974: 86). After Marx’s death an orthodox view of the production process
gained acceptance (Carchedi, 1991). In short, production was viewed as being based
upon technologies which were class neutral, i.e. technological development was due to its
essential laws of development and did not carry any class content of the society in which
it was produced. According to this view a particular type of technology can be misused
for the benefit of a small number of individuals. Braverman’s work was the starting point
for those interested in critical perspectives on work and organization (Braverman, 1974).
Although a view exists that LPT died with Braverman, it arguably remains the dominant
theoretical method for studying workplace relations. Here, Thompson & Newsome,
(2004:33) argued that LPT contributed to industrial relations theories in two ways; firstly,
in providing a body of rich qualitative studies and, secondly in establishing a set of
perceptive theoretical insights into behaviour at work. For, as capitalism and work was
5changing, LPT offered the analytical and empirical tools required to examine the
relationship between the workplace and the broader economy (Ackroyd et al, 2005:5).
Several core themes can be found in the work of Braverman (1974) and the first, and
perhaps the most influential, was the de-skilling thesis (Littler, 1990). Remaining loyal to
Marx’s analysis of the erosion of skills resulting from the introduction of modern
industrial production techniques, Braverman accepted this as his starting point but then
went further. Initially he modernized the theory by applying the de-skilling thesis to the
white-collar or office based environment. He then went on to sketch a transition from
production dominated by scientific knowledge and craft abilities of workers to a situation
where managers could exercise complete control over the knowledge and design of the
production process. Later he considered the notion of control – viewing the concept as
being central to all management systems. It was, he suggested, ‘essential for the capitalist
that control over the labour process pass from the hands of the worker into his own’
(Braverman, 1974:58).
Braverman concluded that Taylorism was not, simply, a particular managerial method
but, in fact, became the general method for the organization of the labour process in
monopoly capitalism. In general terms he outlined a trend of proletarianization with
skilled labour being reduced in size and importance within industries which were
adopting new mechanized technology, while increased numbers were being employed in
the service industries. In a critique of those who view the work of Braverman as being the
sole theoretical basis, Thompson and Newsome attacked a narrow understanding of LPT
concerned exclusively with de-skilling and a detailed division of labour. Complete
accounts of LPT contained two essential and intertwined research agendas. The first
sought to understand and measure changing patterns of labour utilization while the
second produced contemporary and historical accounts of the employment of managerial
control within a particular workplace (Thompson & Newsome, 2004:134).
Subsequent developments of LPT –second-wave theory – were required to move on from
an over emphasis upon de-skilling and Taylorism. Second wave LPT made an effort to
6provide more complex accounts of changes in labour, work and organization (Thompson
& McHugh, 2002:369). The objective of LPT theory was , and continues to be, concerned
with examining structures and actors at different levels without reducing the workplace to
a mirror expression of Taylorism (Thompson, et al, 2000). In addition, the tendency to
provide overarching theories, it is argued, should be resisted. Third-wave LPT theory
emerged in the 1990s and sought to encourage the assimilation of ‘Lean Production’ and
other new management techniques (Womack, et al, 1990; Puligano, 2002:2). Terms such
as the ‘Japanese Management Model’ (Graham, 1995), ‘Total Quality Management’ and
‘Continuous Improvement’ (Deming, 1986) were not macro social theories but, rather,
reflected broader workplace transition. The changes identified varied from positive and
optimistic accounts of the introduction of, inter alia, teamwork, while other qualitative
accounts emerged casting a negative perspective of the impact of lean production
(Bradley et al, 2000). This form of analysis is of particular value because it restores
employees’ experience as the central concern. For, as was briefly noted earlier, the
distinctive contribution of LPT lay in its capacity to recognize that the ‘rationality of
technique’ in the modern industrial enterprise was not neutral in respect of class
domination (O’Doherty & Willmott, 2001:4)
So what would this more sophisticated and broader interpretation of LPT look like and
how would it fit around a study of work and organizational change within broadcasting?
While the agency of consumers has been dissected in detail, the agency of cultural
producers was, until recently, largely ignored within the area of broadcasting inquiry. The
application of LPT is utilized here to provide a framework for a comprehensive research
programme consisting of historically informed empirical studies focused on managerial
control strategies and practices (Thompson, 2004:136; Reed, 1992). The employment of
LPT as a way in which to understand the structure of workplace relationships is explained
through an appreciation of task and work regulation together with the employment
relationship itself.
There is no shortage of studies on the areas of creative endeavour and career within the
film/media industries (Greenfield, 1989;White & White, 1992; Abbott and Hrycak,
71990). A question which remains relatively unexplored, however, is whether there is
anything fundamentally industrial about the cultural industries? (Ackroyd et al, 2005:7).
As noted earlier, product performance is evaluated within most cultural industries in a
quite complex way because cultural goods have a twofold nature; simultaneously ‘artistic
creations and economic products’ (Delmestri, 2005:975). In part, because of the
particular way in which the broadcasting industry has reflected broader UK work and
labour trends, the industry represents an interesting case study of industrial change and
one which can direct attention away from the social and cultural margins in favour of a
move to the centre of professional cultural production (Born, 2000:406). A difficulty for
a LPT perspective on broadcasting labour (even second and third wave variants) is the
view that they were too often locked within particular workplace case studies – i.e. a
point-of-production focus. Successful attempts to link labour process studies to wider
societal and political changes have been limited in number (Thompson & Findlay, 1999).
In a determined effort to link what have been seen as disparate strands of research
inspired through Braverman’s work, Thompson (1990) outlined four key elements which
suggested a theoretical core of LPT.
 The function of labour in generating surplus in capitalism and the centrality of
production to the system – the privileged insight this affords labour for a
theoretical and political challenge to the system.
 The necessity for renewal and change in methods of production and the skill base
of labour because of the discipline of profit and the accumulation of capital.
 The role and imperative of control within the labour process in order that capital
may secure profit and the translation of its legal purchase of labour power into a
‘surplus’.
 Finally, although it is a given that social relations between capital and labour in
the workplace are structurally antagonistic, in order to constantly revolutionize
the production process capital must seek a level of cooperation from labour.
Worker responses within the workplace range across resistance, accommodation,
compliance and consent.
8Other recent contributions to LPT praised for providing detailed descriptions of micro
firm analysis have, conversely, been criticized for not providing any encouragement to
those seeking to understand global capitalism. However, the theoretical principles of LPT
combine analysis of the structural constraints and imperatives which derive from
capitalist labour processes together with particular firm based situational scope where
managerial and employee actors shape outcomes (Newsome & Thompson, 2004:156).
LPT has adopted a workplace position or orientation, based on qualitative case studies
allowing the theory itself to explore the informal dynamics of workplace control and
labour bargaining while simultaneously locating those relationships within the broader
political economy of individual economies. Indeed, this final point neatly explains the
way this thesis is structured.
Critics of LPT argue that its core theory has become managerialist and methodologically
deficient (Jaros, 2005:8). By suggesting that the theory is managerialist such critics
contend that it is crediting managers with having more discretion in the workplace than is
actually the case. The managerialist criticism is located in the belief that the Thompson
core LPT theory is flawed because it tends to take the position that Braverman’s work –
based, as it was, upon a study of monopoly capitalism – is unhelpful in understanding
conditions under contemporary global capitalism.
LPT is further criticized as methodologically deficient for progressive research (Tinker,
2002: footnote vi). Tinker predominantly attacks what he has termed, ‘postmodernist
LPT’, but does attempt a forensic de-layering of the Thompson core LPT position. His
argument is that the criteria for the selection of the core theory appears without
appropriate reasoning, and that it is in fact, a social decision. He proposes that the very
structure upon which this analysis is built is, at best, questionable – namely, that an
understanding of worker subjectivity is not missing but is, rather, placed further down the
list of theoretical concerns. (This is largely because the politics of the era in which
Braverman was writing was monopoly capitalism). Recent LPT approaches to employee
subjectivity emphasized how employees devise strategies to either resist or cope with
managerial efforts to restructure the workplace. However, employees did not always
9passively accept such change. Ackroyd and Thompson’s (1999) development of the
concept of employee misbehaviour is important. Their argument begins from the position
that employees and management continue their struggle over four essential areas; worker
identity, worker effort, working time and the product or output of that work. This reform
meant restructuring tasks and occupations undertaken by employees, and reforms along
these lines were much in evidence across the public sector, for example within the civil
service (Fairbrother, 1994), the National Health Service (‘NHS’) (Seifert, 1992) and local
government (Gill, 1994; Gill et al 2003).
That schema is broadly adopted here but with some important stylistic and theoretical
differences. The work will emphasize the importance of four themes of contemporary
labour process. Firstly, the attempts to reshape work through regulation by management
from the mid 1980s, including attempts to de-collectivize industrial relations and the
development of strategies of resistance and, later, of internal restructuring by trade unions
within the ITV sector. Secondly, an appraisal of the de-skilling/up-skilling debates and
how they fit into studies of the broadcasting industry in the period during the
restructuring of the ITV franchise, STV. Thirdly, the attempts by employees to maintain
occupational, organizational and craft identities in an era where management signalled
that occupational identity was a factor in contributing to unacceptably high production
costs. Finally, the engagement in networking by two groups of programme makers – the
self-employed entrepreneurs of the independent production sector (who are defined
throughout this work as ‘Producer Owners’) to secure programming contracts and to
remain informed about industry wide developments – and groups of freelance production
workers (defined here as ‘Broadcast Professionals’) to secure employment contracts.
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1.2
Regulation of the Broadcasting Industry and
Management of Work and Industrial Relations Change.
Studies of industrial relations have emphasized the importance of the State in shaping
distinctive patterns of industrial relations. Edwards (1994:31) stressed the role of State
actors in ‘..trying to handle the contradictory needs of accumulation and legitimation and
having to respond to specific demands, which may conflict with other demands,
stemming from particular groups within the ranks of capital and labour’ (Edwards,
1986:177). Strinati (1990:210) further argued that there was a need to integrate analyses
of the State’s role as opposed to treating the State as merely an ‘appendage’ and a party
not directly linked to the labour process. The most appropriate method of approaching the
role of the State (in relation to the formation of industrial relations policy) is, perhaps
through an examination of both the development and challenges to national collective
bargaining policy which underscored ITV (and broader broadcasting industry)
organizational change.
Organizational change is shaped by how the competing interests of the different actors
are articulated and understood. For as Thomas (1994) argues, organizational change is
structured by managerial orientation and approach, including the types of change
attempted and how they are implemented. As earlier indicated in 1.1, modern working
practices are designed to shape the nature of work and employee behaviour, and in recent
years organizations have witnessed a significant increase in the existence of such
processes including, Total Quality Management, Lean Production and Knowledge
Management (Clegg, et al , 2002; Waterson, et al, 1999; Wall et al, 2005). As a partial
response to increased organizational restructuring, trade union influence within the
broadcasting workplace has declined markedly since 1979. A plethora of legislative
initiatives together with significant changes in the cultural and economic make-up of the
UK contributed to the increasingly marginalization of trade unions during the 1980s
(Edwards, 2004). Across the advanced capitalist world, trade unions lost members on an
unprecedented scale – while workplaces changed quickly because of, inter alia, new
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technologies, changing market conditions and revised conceptions of the worker-
employer relationship (Deetz, 1998:151). A further cause in the shift in the constitution
of the labour market was the growth in the numbers of highly qualified, flexible
employees, as an older workforce gave way to a largely University educated workforce.
The UK broadcasting industry, and in particular the ITV sector, reflected and paralleled
these changes. The revolution in the way labour was regulated (within the ITV sector in
particular) requires a rigorous theoretical and empirical assessment rather than a mere
glib assertion of the impact of flexibility. While it is a fact that fundamental regulatory
policy (in terms of the awarding of broadcasting licenses) remained in the hands of the
State, regulation of the ITV sector was delegated, in part, through the development of
structures of national collective bargaining. The lead union which represented the
interests of ITV employees during collective bargaining was the Association of
Cinematograph Television and Allied Trades (‘ACTT’.). This union developed
comprehensive structures for industrial relations policy while pursuing a highly
centralized and aggressive national bargaining strategy. From the high-water mark of
trade union influence within the industry – during the late 1970s – the ACTT would
suffer a hemorrhaging in its position as a critical contributor to the regulation of the ITV
sector. While it is tempting to attribute the ending of the national collective bargaining
and the system of National Agreements solely to the political ideology of neo-Liberalism,
this should be resisted. As will be shown in Chapter 4, (4.3), individual firm based shifts
in employer strategy which sought to undermine the labour process of skilled workers
were well underway in the ITV sector before Thatcherism. It is now proposed to place in
context the moves undertaken within the ITV sector to change a highly regulated
production environment to an innovative, flexible dynamic workplace.
1.2.1
Regulation and Fordism.
The contention that organizational actors tend to understand work in terms of ‘sub-goals’
– even when they are in conflict with the goals of the organization or institution in
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question – is particularly apposite in respect of the UK broadcasting industry in the
period before deregulation. According to Dohse et al (1985); Forrant (2000), Fordism
encouraged a number of sub-goals for employees which were not directly related to the
economic performance of the institution. Fordism contributed – through the development
of these sub-goals – to the development of highly regulated and wide-ranging work rules.
One of the most important contributing elements to the success of work-groups in
defending territory was the strength of trade union activism within the broadcasting (ITV)
workplace. However, by the mid 1980s the influence of trade unions within the
workplace declined as employers moved away from joint regulation of working
conditions towards unilateral managerial control (Kelly, 2005:283).
The percentage of workers whose pay was fixed by union-management negotiation fell
dramatically during this period. Within the UK, the figures showed a fall from 83 per
cent coverage in 1980, to 41 per cent in 1998 (Cully et al, 1999:242). While over 40 per
cent of the workforce was still a very substantial minority, the proportion of employees
involved in negotiated agreements was in continuous decline after the early 1980s (Heery
et al, 2003). Union membership was in constant decline since 1980 (although this trend
reversed slightly in 2002-2003), and by 2001 union density was just one in four of the
working population (Waddington, 2003:220). National collective bargaining (or top-
down regulation) was challenged by the individual (but centrally organized) firm based
strategies of the ITV franchise holders during the 1980s. For the ITV employers, any
radical restructuring of the labour process and contracts of employment would
necessarily involve breaking with national collective bargaining. A fundamental appraisal
of these changes is undertaken in Chapter 4 where it will be seen how these substantial
organizational transformations were aided, inter alia, by modifications in the institutions
of social regulation and by the ending of institutionalised Fordism. Katz & Darbishire
(2000) demonstrated that it was necessary (in order to adequately trace these changes) to
re-think industrial relations theory from the bottom upwards. To do so was not to argue,
pessimistically, that such a view was based upon the end of organized industrial relations,
but, rather, that it represented a move away from macro-wage bargaining towards job
regulation and individual firm based bargaining (Marsden, 2002: 2).
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The concept of regulation (or structures of industrial relations) is a critical component in
any attempt to understand the restructuring of the broadcasting industry from the period
before and after 1979. Regulation of labour and the management of work within the
broadcasting industry can be understood in, at least, two ways. Firstly by direct
government intervention and legislation in the form of specific broadcasting policy (see
Chapter 3) and, secondly, by forms of top-down regulation – essentially the processes of
national collective bargaining which maintained a very clear (and relatively peaceful)
relationship between the State, employer, trade union and employee. Traditionally
governments have (and had) a unique ability to assist in the process of providing
assistance in one form or another to institutional or firm development. The State can have
a critical role in enforcing institutional change while explaining and eliminating industrial
relations’ crises. Governments regularly attempted to resolve difficulties between
employers and trade unions and to manage and devise alliances among private
industrial/firm actors. It is true that while economic restructuring, instability and crisis are
virtual permanent features of the capitalist economy – lengthy periods of secure growth
have occurred notwithstanding.
For ease of analysis periods of economic development are identified here as either Fordist
or post-Fordist in nature. While labeling of this kind can often obscure subtle changes in
economic circumstances, some shorthand description for the very significant change
which took place in both the global and national economy (and within the UK
broadcasting economy) is required. As Fordism and post-Fordism had no solid empirical
basis, empirical evidence is provided in Chapter 4 so as to explain the evolution of the
regulatory environment of ITV (from its Fordist or top-down regulatory structure) to a
form of post-Fordist or bottom-up management (Muller-Jentsch, 2004:11).
Early literature in the field of labour/occupational regulation showed how specific work
positions quickly became defensive mechanisms for workers (see, Crozier, 1963;
Slichter, 1960). As detailed in 4.2, ITV managers could not identify individual and
specific costs pertaining to the production of programming but, rather, had to focus only
on the total cost of programming. Work management was largely about the organization
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and movement of blocks of employees from one task to another irrespective of the size or
budget of a particular programme. Under Fordism, skilled workers set out the boundaries
– with management acquiescence – of work rules, which together with collective
bargaining emerged as the most efficient way to regulate work (Regini, 2002:4). The
underlying logic for the appropriateness of this method of bargaining was the relative
homogeneity of the work force. As will be shown in Chapter 4, skilled employees (up
until the 1980s) dictated the pace of organizational change and the timing of the
introduction of new technologies. Governments also played a central role in the
construction and restructuring of industrial relations’ institutions and engaged in a
process of managing industrial relations systems – the social and economic consequences
of large-scale industrial relations failure (strikes, unemployment and political instability)
made State intervention inevitable. Chapter 4 traces the way employers’ organizations
and the State contributed to a very substantial change in the critical relationships within
the industry. The balance of power would shift – through the 1980s and beyond – to
reside with employers and who with government assistance moved to restructure the
broadcasting labour process (within ITV in particular) and which contributed to an
enhanced employers’ capacity for collective action. Such an outcome – while seeming to
emerge painlessly in the favourable political climate of the 1980s – involved complex
and wide-ranging negotiations between the ACTT and the employers’ association, The
Independent Television Association (‘ITVA’).
A Fordist regulatory paradigm denoted the supply-driven production of standardized
products – organized in long productions runs to achieve cost reductions through
economies of scale and employing a Taylorist division of labour which attempted to
separate conception and execution through standardization and de-skilling (Vidal,
1996:5). While such a definition is problematic in terms of its appropriateness to the
broadcasting industry, the Fordist inspired regulatory structure of industrial relations is a
useful starting point in identifying the end of the collective bargaining era within the ITV
sector. While, as noted previously, the employment of Fordist/ post-Fordist schemas are
very general in nature, they can provide insights into the pressures which resulted in the
traditional top-down nature of the UK regulatory environment in the period after 1945,
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together with the emergence of a form of bottom-up re-regulation throughout the
commercial broadcasting sector of the UK economy in the period after 1979.
Before 1979 the primary objective of industrial relations policy in the UK was to secure a
quiet and peaceful industrial relations environment. As will be shown empirically in
Chapters 4 and 5, industrial relations policy from the late 1960s onwards was no longer
functioning in the manner which had been intended with the result that ITV management
had – as will be seen – largely ceded control of day-to-day regulation to the shop-floor.
Bottom-up regulation which emerged through specific firm based strategies would later
be used as an antidote to the control of production by groups of skilled workers. A firm-
by-firm approach to the break up of the National Agreements which had regulated ITV
employment relations is utilized in Chapter 4.
While it is may be possible to interpret from the empirical evidence provided in Chapter
4 that bottom-up regulation largely replaced top-down regulatory policy, the lack of
comprehensive and industry-wide studies of this change in power relationships should be
seen as a warning against employing ahistorical depictions of a painless transition from a
form of Fordism to flexibility. To do so would be to fail to adequately address the
difficulties faced by ITV management in tackling what they perceived to be an inefficient
form of labour process and organizational structure. One must also be careful not to
adopt, unchallenged, the thesis that new work systems emerged to invert the Taylorist
labour process which was based upon de-skilled work and rigid authority hierarchies
(Vidal, 1996:1). In place of de-skilling a post-Fordist or lean-production paradigm would,
it is suggested, witness a highly skilled work organization reflecting extensive employee
involvement and new systems of individual bargaining together with a commitment to the
employment of advanced Human Resources practices (including employee involvement
(MacDuffie, 1995)). As will be detailed in Chapters 4-7 inclusive, there was little de-
skilled about most work within UK broadcasting before the mid 1980s. To argue that new
work systems would invert the Taylorist labour process failed to adequately describe the
move from the high skill/high cost production base within ITV to something akin to the
flexible firm model. Further, the post-Fordist idyll noted above is only partially accurate
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in describing the deregulated production environment within the ITV sector during the
1990s. As Chapters 4 and 5 will show, de-skilling increased during the 1990s with
investment in new production technologies and the development of very
individual/employee based HR policies which targeted expensive long-serving employees
for early retirement.
1.2.2
Post-Fordism and De-regulation of Work.
As indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, management within ITV would move to devise and
employ new management techniques – in the course of the mid 1980s in order to
capitalize upon employee commitment while at the same timemarginalizing trade union
influence (Taylor & Ramsay, 1998:127). The newly defined role of the customer was one
of the most significant alterations to the regulation of work within the ITV sector and
beyond (Harley et al, 2005:10). In practice, this new regulatory principle meant devising
programming to attract audiences – and not simply to satisfy the creative impulses of
programme makers. During the 1980s and ‘90s, advertising revenues would be
determined by the level of audience figures achieved by an individual ITV franchise – the
ITV advertising customer overtook skilled broadcasting professionals as a key regulatory
factor. The combination of individualistic management practices and the employment of
networking/team-working and other creative and non-standard employment practices,
contrived to put extreme pressure on the established notions of organizational
occupational identity and the relevance of skill (Bacon & Storey, 1996). As the
restructuring of the broadcasting industry progressed during the 1980s, new trade union
strategies based upon co-operation with management came to be seen by many unions as
the way forward (Danford, 2005:173). The most common interpretation of new or post-
Fordist workplace practices was that they represented a radical move away from the
workplace of old – characterized as they were by hierarchical bureaucracies (Holman et
al, 2005:5). In terms of a more micro or firm level analysis, researchers were urged to
look beyond the limited conceptions of employment relations and HRM in search of new
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models which rejected the restrictions of collective bargaining (Burns, 1964; Marsden,
2002:77).
Post-Fordism increasingly demanded that ITV firms employ teams of functionally
flexible, polyvalent workers able to adapt to new production technologies. As a
consequence, ITV employees were beginning to be encouraged to pursue a commitment
to continuous improvement and innovation while responding quickly to the requirements
of the customer – a notion itself alien to established labour process within the ITV sector.
As 4.4 (Chapter 4) details, the ACTT rejected any significant reappraisal of its traditional
strategy (where national collective bargaining established wage rates and working
conditions for all labour) until after the National Agreements had been dismantled. As
will be seen (4.5) the ACTT was prepared to loose a majority of its workforce in order to
maintain the integrity of its memberships’ craft skills and the specific challenges to the
ACTT [and later to Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union
(‘BECTU’)] are further outlined in this Section.
In contrast to the highly regulated ITV environment pertaining until the early 1980s, post-
Fordist type institutions – in applying market-forces to the domains of highly skilled
craftsmen – required that individual employees be ‘committed’ and ‘motivated’ to the
individual firm and not to their trade union (Crouch, 1999:206). Employees should, such
theories propounded, continuously acquire new process skills including problem-solving
and initiative development. The high-performance workplace was recognized as being
the latest manifestation of post-Fordism and its introduction was generally associated
with both downsizing and increasing workloads, together with a loss of control and
autonomy for individual employees (Thompson & McHugh, 2002:151). These moves to
de-regulate the economy and workplace provided trade unions with a substantial set of
challenges. Post-Fordist regulatory policy tended to view the role of unions within the
workplace and associated labour regulation as a contributing factor to rigidity in the
workplace; the adversarial nature of unions was seen as a cause of disappointing levels of
innovation within firms (Addison & Hirsch, 1989).
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It is important to note that the ITV franchises were, in part, social constructions (Daft &
Weick, 1983). This is particularly the case within the broadcasting industry where,
increasingly, technicians were a part of the creative process of programme production
and where, before the advent of extremely reliable technology, producers depended on
the goodwill of technicians. Their opinions were sought by producers on a variety of
technical and creative matters. While emotions (or what as managers within both the
BBC and ITV referred to as, ‘the ability to go the extra mile’) were always an important
element of skilled work within the broadcasting industry – the rise in flexible work
processes placed very significant pressure on identities, and emotions became part of the
regulatory process (Lange, 2002). Jessop (1990) noted that capitalism rested on the
separation of the economic and the extra-economic. Within firms which reflected some of
the core organizational traits of post-Fordism, the extra-economic was concerned with
extracting total commitment from employees to the firm and to the customer in particular.
Further, the breaking up of the industry-wide Fordist production structure of television
production – which had a commitment to vertical integration – meant that ITV
management could, and did, move directly to reshape the labour process. (This practice is
detailed in 4.3.).
Within the United States’ (‘US’) film and television industry, empirical evidence of the
transition to a post-Fordist economy – or deregulation of the sector – may be accessed
through the work of Christopherson & Storper (1986; 1989). They argued that the US
film and television industry was not simply an example of the post-Fordist organization,
but was the first fully documented transition of an entire industry from the classic
bureaucratic, hierarchical, strictly functional and tightly defined job design of the Fordist
era, to the organizational and labour flexibility of post-Fordism. In her work on the US
media entertainment industries, Christopherson (1996:88) noted that the US film industry
had combined oligopolistic control of distribution with production organization and
which encompassed both substantial vertical integration through the studio system and
production outsourcing. The outsourcing she refers to can be adapted here in order to
provide a reading of institutional and economic regulatory change within the UK
broadcasting industry.
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Post-Fordism provided the theoretical backdrop to the dramatic decline in the influence
of the corporatist national and sectoral institutions with a shift in activity from the State
to the firm level (Marsden, 2002:2). Within the UK broadcasting industry, the position of
trade unions was impacted by wider trends in employment relationships. National
collective bargaining gave way to a peculiarly British variant of individualization (Brown
et al, 1998; Edwards, 2004). The essence of this individualization was the widespread
withdrawal of employers from collective bargaining. Although individualization was not
utilized to any significant degree within the UK industrial sector, there was evidence of
‘procedural individualization’, with core groups of trade unions excluded from the
process of detailing the content of contracts of employment (Brown et al, 1998). This was
not the case within the ITV sector until after the abolition of the National Agreements
within ITV during the late 1980s. Indeed prior to the decision taken by individual
franchises to remove themselves from National Agreements, working groups had been set
up (superficially at least) to manage change in the procedures for the implementation of
the National Agreements. Trade union negotiators (in an ironic development) would
return in the latter 1990s to individual franchises to negotiate individual contracts on
behalf of employees. Individualization, for the most part, did not exclude trade unions
from the workplace but offered incremental action by employers to reduce the scope and
influence of collective bargaining while retaining, on the surface at least, some general
commitment to the principle of trade union activity (Brown et al, 1998).
Over the last 25 years trade unions have been placed under enormous pressure through,
inter alia, the prevalence of what is described as anti-trade union legislation (Brown &
Walsh, 1991; Haskel & Szymanski, 1994; Edwards, 2003). However, as late as the early
1980s (and as noted in 4.1) ITV employers’ bargaining strategy was one which sought to
buy peace in return for minimal productivity improvements. [The employers’
association’s (ITVA) limited strategic ambitions will be outlined in 4.2/4.3]. In essence,
negotiations between employers’ associations and the main trade union (ACTT) were to
marginalize each other’s effectiveness. Workplace bargaining was characterized as
‘largely informal, largely fragmented and largely autonomous’ (HMSO, 1968; para: 65).
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By the middle part of the 20th century, technical change and the increasing complexity of
industrial production meant that employers were beginning to direct control over the
labour process. Managers sought a form of open-ended employment contract from
employees and such processes appeared to offer little but open-ended exploitation for
workers. The compromise was the emergence of transaction-rules (work rules), which
sought to limit managerial authority and employee obligations.
In addition to work rules and the emergence of National Agreements, the commercial
ITV sector provided for highly developed shop steward organizations. These actively
involved themselves in day-to-day negotiations with managers about the minutiae of shop
floor change in terms of work planning and the implementation of incremental new
technology. The development of the shop-steward system helped to define the way work
was regulated in the ITV sector. In reality industrial relations for the ITV Network
operated largely at shop-floor level and were concerned about micro, firm based changes
to the National Agreements. In addition to the highly developed shop-floor trade
unionism within ITV and which had dominated debate about the future direction of the
industry (during the 1960s and ‘70s), the employers’ organizations would begin to re-
assert themselves from the early 1980s. In 4.3 moves made after 1979 are set out – the
emergence of new strategies devised by the ITVA inorder to question employer
compliance with collective bargaining and the ACTT’s approach to work organization
and which was subsequently defined as defensive and unfocused (Terry, 1995:208;
Thompson & Wallace, 1994:50).
The crisis in the Fordist experiment lay not in the limits of the paradigms’ perspective on
work organization but, rather, in the levels of success which trade unions had in
regulating work (Tomaney, 1990). The move to learning or post-Fordist work
organizations was not achieved for the four key actors (the State, trade unions,
management and employees) in a seamless transition from one era to another. It was
through a series of political and economic struggles caused by the redundancy of the old
mode of development which determined the process. Despite the emergence of strong
industry regulation in the form of the National Agreements, there were, however, few
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opportunities provided by such agreements for comprehensive mechanisms to regulate
industrial conflict. This deficit provided space and opportunity for governmental attempts
at regulating this situation through, initially, the formation of a commission of inquiry
into the state of industrial relations.
The Donovan Commission noted that the UK manufacturing economy lacked firm-level
regulatory institutions. The Trade Union Congress (‘TUC’) had almost no influence
within individual firms or, indeed, over the actions of trade union members at firm level.
Both employer and trade unions concentrated their bargaining policy at national level
despite the prevalence of local deals as add-ons to National Agreements. Donovan
insisted that ‘managers had lost control over the workplace and could only regain control
by sharing it’ with trade unions (Kessler & Bayliss, 1998:36). The legislation which
emerged as an indirect result of the Donovan Report encouraged the development of a
number of workplace institutions, including, the ‘closed-shop’ and the ‘check-off’
systems which were both adopted by ITV and the unions. However, the desired aim of a
revolution in workplace relationships – in essence a quieter period of industrial relations’
history – is now widely understood as a failure (Millward et al, 2000). As will be
detailed, the ITV sector saw the development of a critical role for shop stewards in terms
of local bargaining. The initial movement to develop strategies within the ITV sector, to
put industrial relations back on an even keel by utilizing employment legislation, would
be seen by employers as being inherently vulnerable from non-compliance on their part.
As new technologies within the broadcasting sector emerged in the US and Japan in the
late 1970s, employers began to question the regulatory status-quo. The results of rigorous
efforts by an empowered management within the sector which aimed at challenging the
skilled-craftsman domination of production would result in devastating consequences for
a generation of ITV employees.
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1.3
De-Skilling and Up-Skilling; the changing nature of work within
broadcasting.
Braverman (1974) considered skill to be synonymous with knowledge embodied within
the craft or skilled trade. He saw successful de-skilling as occurring through
implementation of scientific management where a restructured labour process would
depend on managerial practices (as opposed to the workers’ abilities). Blauners’ (1964)
contribution to the study of skill assumed that work would continually improve in terms
of both the satisfaction derived by workers and in the quality of product delivered for the
firm. New technology was seen as facilitating the eradication of routine and de-skilling.
Conversely, Thompson & McHugh (2002) would later argue that de-skilling remained
the major presence within the development of the capitalist labour process. It is evident
(see Chapter 5) that elements of both de-skilling and up-skilling of labour took place
within the ITV franchise, STV. In order to fully trace these apparently contradictory
tendencies it is necessary to provide a full explanation of the two terms and their
relevance to the study of LPT and the UK broadcasting industry. Braverman (1974:3-4)
foretold the conflict between what he felt was the ‘mounting dissatisfaction with the
conditions of industrial and office labour’ (de-skilling) and the more optimistic accounts
of labour (up-skilling) Aron (1962), Bell (1973,1974) Trist (1974).
As will be clear in the series of empirical case studies (Chapters 4 to 7), the broadcasting
industry witnessed substantial organizational change over a protracted period from the
late 1970s. The move from rigid, specialized bureaucratic job descriptions within the
field of creative and technical work, to occupations based (loosely) upon ‘post-specialist’
job descriptions required that multi-skilling be adopted – that employees be able to
master several tasks (Howard, 1995:35). The impact of technological change within the
broadcasting industry (and in ITV, in particular) removed the absolute requirement for
the established competency of a generation of employees – a competency developed in
part through complex demands of broadcasting technology in the period up until the mid
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1980s. Thus, as one on the four themes of LPT, (to parallel the empirical work in
Chapters 4 – 7) the de-skilling/ up-skilling effects of the introduction of new broadcasting
and recording technology within ITV, must be traced in order to provide a full account of
organizational change within the sector and the broader broadcasting economy. ITV, as
will be established, had been the exemplar of skill change because of both its size and its
historically poor industrial relations in the area of technology introduction. Chapter 5
details the long dominance of the complex and unreliable technologies in the period up
until the early to mid 1980s and which made the acceptance of a highly regulated labour
process the only choice for ITV management. It further details the emergence of
management control over the labour process and skill during the 1990s – as an
increasingly important weapon in improving profitability. Control over technology
operation (or rather the notion of control over skill) was a critical factor, both in
managements’ ability to properly manage the workplace and in the traditional notion of
an employee’s sense of competence. Thus, professionals within the workplace who
experienced ever increasing technological developments risked having their skills eroded
(Chang Boon Lee, 2002). Conversely, they were provided with the opportunity to
increase their skill base by a management keen to adopt modern broadcast technologies
(Frenkel, 1999:27). Consequently, the maintenance of, and control over skill became a
critical part of contemporary LPT.
In 1.3 here, there are two main parts – the first (1.3.1) explores the Bravermanian impact
on LPT – in particular his emphasis upon de-skilling. It further traces and examines
literature which has emerged after Braverman and which has developed the de-
skilling/re-skilling debate. The second element, (1.3.2) develops the theme of re-skilling
or up-skilling within the UK economy and its suitability for an application to commercial
(ITV) television.
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Section 1.3.1
The De-skilling Thesis.
As Chapter 4 will set out, in the period up until the mid 1980s, the concept and
application of skill had been subjected to comprehensive restructuring in an effort to
challenge the control of production by highly skilled employees within the ITV Network.
In Chapter 5 a review is undertaken of STV managements’ attempts to alter and later to
eradicate what they viewed as the excessive control of production exercised by skilled
employees. According to Braverman (1974:443) the elimination (or at least the reduction
in importance) of craft skills together with the reconstruction of work as a collective or
social process, destroyed the traditional concept of skill. When Labour and Monopoly
Capital (Braverman, 1974) first appeared few would have predicted the breadth and
detail of debate which followed. Braverman subsequently divided scholars of LPT into
two camps – those who, albeit with certain qualifications, accepted his approach, and
others who considered it inadequate to deal with contemporary developments in the
labour process. Critics of Braverman’s thesis have faulted him for failing to address
workers’ subjective experiences and acts of resistance (Knights &Willmott, 1989;
Wardell et al, 1999). However, for every researcher who attempted to follow in the
footsteps of Braverman, another attempted to challenge, if not discredit, his work
(Wardell et al, 1999:1-2).
Despite the plea not to allow Braverman-inspired LPT debate to degenerate into a de-
skilling/re-skilling impasse – the direction of much of the research undertaken in the
period after the publication of his work resulted in just such an outcome (Smith &
Thompson, 1998). Braverman (1974:112) argued that de-skilling was ‘fundamental to all
advanced work design’. In essence, the idea of de-skilling reflected the effects of
technological change where work was newly defined as unchallenging. Re-skilling or up-
skilling is the opposite outcome, where the application of new technology in the
workplace provided enhanced opportunities for employees to use and develop new skills
(Haines, 1999). The 1980s witnessed the emergence of fresh contributions to the labour
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process debate which seemed to mark the end of the up-skilling/re-skilling arguments.
Those debates considered, inter alia, the re-emergence of forms of craft labour, the rise in
the numbers of multi-skilled occupations and the concentration upon professionalization.
The employment of new technologies and the alleged rise in autonomy (which enhanced
skilled workers’ control over labour process) was also the subject of much discourse and
the flexible specialization thesis was especially important (Piore & Sabel, 1984). In one
of the most sophisticated accounts of flexible specialization, it was suggested that the
term was given to efforts to convert traditional integrated structures into more subtle
organizational forms capable of responding quickly to shifting market conditions (Piore,
1986:146). In a previous guise the theory of flexible specialization made a direct link to
questions of de-skilling and labour control while simultaneously moving away from
standardization (Sabel, 1982).
Post Braverman research (Zimbalist, 1979; Kraft; 1979) confirmed the view that de-
skilling would inevitably result from the introduction of new technology. For ITV
management, new organizational strategies based on flexible organizations were deemed
necessary to compete with the emerging, low-cost, independent production sector.
Removal of unnecessary cost structures – of which high-skilled workers and unreliable
technology were deemed core contributing elements – emerged as organizational
priorities. For management, skill became conflated with regulation, while skilled trades-
people acknowledged and accepted that they were television workers but their first
loyalty was to the craft community from which they emerged. In 5.1 the acceptance of
the separation of the aesthetic and the technical spheres of production is detailed – a
situation where it was entirely rational for management to collude with strong trade
unions and skilled employees in the creation of balkanized internal labour markets. For as
Brown (1972:42-61) noted, camera crews within the ITV sector were regulated, not by
ITV management but, rather, by the workgroups from which they originated. It will be
seen that STV managers were dependent on the skills of the various trade groups to avoid
the commercial disaster of a ‘blank screen’.
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While Braverman (1974) argued that the application of scientific management techniques
would inevitably lead to de-skilling and the degradation of labour, his work was the
subject of much criticism because of the perceived inadequate reading of worker
resistance within the workplace (Edwards, 1979). Braverman was also criticised for his
perceived failure to develop or acknowledge the importance of worker consent within the
labour process (Burawoy, 1979). (In 5.1, it will be seen just how important employee
consent was for management within STV). Minor changes to working arrangements
were, indeed, possible but attracted significant payments to employees (Campling,
1992:207-211). The critical element of Braverman’s work remained the analysis of the
long-term consequences of the separation of conception and execution in the labour
process and the inevitable increase in management control. If one understands the de-
skilling thesis as a process which did not apply across all industries or individual firms at
the same rate, then one can conclude that the subtlety of the Braverman argument
remains entirely valid. However, the stalemate which has ensued theoretically over the
last 30 years has not helped those in search of re-examination of the notion of skill, either
in its variants of de-skilling/up-skilling or a combination of the two processes (Frenkel et
al, 1999).
The fundamental difficulty in applying the de-skilling thesis to the broadcasting industry
is that during the 1970s new technologies were absorbed into the existing craft-based
division of labour and were appropriated by the incumbent trade groups. This situation
continued up until the early 1980s when the implementation of revolutionary new
recording and filming techniques resulted in individual workers becoming less challenged
by their positions (Kraut et al, 1989). In addition, as new technology was introduced on
the shop-floor it removed some of the decision making capability of workers and their
autonomy (and skill level) was reduced. Agnew, et al, (1997) noted that technological
change resulted in work becoming increasingly routine, dull and stratified – this contrasts
with the complex knowledge required to operate technology within STV. As 5.1 details,
the ACTT controlled the introduction of new technology. By the mid to late 1980s
technological development and specific technological change on the shop-floor of UK
broadcasting firms had resulted in a significant transformation in skill requirement for
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workers. The ITV sector more generally witnessed the decline of discretion afforded
individual technicians and with a corresponding increase in the way managers sought to
direct how their employees interacted both with external customers and with internally
based producer/directors (Grugulis, et al, 2003; Rainbird & Munro, 2003). The de-
skilling of technical labour was developed in tandem with an increase in the requirement
for ‘soft-skills’ where management sought to manage how employees viewed work.
While the development of such interactive skills had been recognized as existing within
retailing and other service industries, the emergence of substantial competition within the
supply of production resources services resulted in a focus on the aesthetics of the labour
market as a form of up-skilling. Cost based competitive strategies, which emerged during
this period and based upon the supply of relatively standardized services (in conjunction
with Tayloristic forms of work organization which made very limited demands upon the
breadth of workers skills) became the norm (Payne & Keep, 2005:146). In Chapter 5 the
movement is traced from a high-skilled production environment (in which the limitations
of much of the production technology demanded very skilled technicians to produce
programming) to one where technological advancements had provided STV management
with an opportunity to employ very small numbers of skilled technical workers
supplemented by low skilled operatives. In addition to the relegation of STV employees
into the realm of the de-skilled, the implementation of Electronic News Gathering
(‘ENG’) meant that some employees experienced both de-skilling and up-skilling as new
technology was integrated into the franchise.
1.3.2.
The Up-skilling Thesis.
The past twenty-five years have seen the rapid development of information technologies
together with very substantial improvements in recording, sound and production
technologies within the broadcasting industry. As a consequence the issue of skill, and its
potential for up-skilling, assumed a new dimension. The literature shows that workers
within other industries – who survived the original implementation of new production
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technologies – experienced a further significant degree of up-skilling as they were trained
in new technologies (Hirschorn & Gilmore, 1992). Adler (2005) in a contribution to LPT,
(relating to questions of skill) argued that the theory had failed to take account of two
critical trends in work and skill adoption. He argued that labour process theorists failed to
track trends in task/occupation based skill requirements. The notion of up-skilling is not
simply about competence in relation to the newest technologies. Payne (1999:42) argued
that all workers were now skilled – regardless of the type or quality of the job undertaken
and the level of personal control, autonomy or power enjoyed. This is the fundamental
difference in how skill is officially conceptualized today compared with the past when to
be skilled implied some level of real market power and personal discretion over one’s
work. Dench et al (1999:xv) also proposed that the importance of skill (in terms of
information technology) can be over played – arguing that most employees do not require
a detailed understanding of how and why technology functions. While many employers
may subscribe to the view that a high or up-skilled economy is a desirable goal – and
engage in training employees in high-skill techniques – there is a legitimate concern
about the cost of such training. The suggestion was made that the demand for universal
up-skilling and low skill provision can have the effect of canceling each other out and
further, that up-skilling may threaten the ability of firms to be competitive (see Brown &
Keep, 1995:98; Keep, 1999).
The issue of skill (and related matters) is fundamental to any comprehensive
understanding of labour process – indeed, the subject may be said to lie at the heart of the
contradictory relationships which undergird capitalist economies (Rubery & Grimshaw,
2002: 107). In an interesting comparison to the work of Braverman, the contention is
made that skill is intricately connected with the idea of working-knowledge, thus being a
necessary prerequisite for successfully undertaking any task regardless of its
classification as skilled or unskilled (Kusterer, 1978:138). No task is ever fully unskilled
because all jobs require the acquisition of a modicum of working knowledge –
comprising ‘knowledge about routine processing procedures’ and ‘knowledge about the
formal organization’ (Kusterer, 1978:136). The de-skilling thesis does not consider the
acquisition of such working knowledge. In a later contribution to the debate on the
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existence of an inherent process of de-skilling, it was argued that skill should be thought
of in terms of three core dimensions (Mainwaring & Wood, 1985:175). These include the
learning of routine tasks, the acquiring of awareness necessary to perform certain tasks,
together with the acquisition of cooperative skills, or softer skills such as empathy with
potential clients (Mainwaring & Wood, 1985: 192; Flecker & Hofbauer, 1998).
Mainwaring & Wood (1985:192) contended that de-skilling should not be seen as a
unidirectional process developing along Bravermanian lines but, rather, as a process
containing two directional tracks. The first of these is specialization, where the range of
skills is narrowed but the status of particular jobs may be increased, while the second
fragmentation is where the level of skill required is reduced.
In his work on the notion of skill saturation, Aneesh made the distinction (going on from
the previous dichotomy between specialization and fragmentation) between saturated and
unsaturated skills (Aneesh, 2001:369-375). Saturated skills are recognized by an express
disavowal of any creative engagement with the task in question while unsaturated skills
allow greater flexibility in the application of skill. To paraphrase Aneesh, such skills have
connections that house ambiguity and equivocation and thus resist complete explication
and codification (Aneesh, 2001:374). Manipulation of skill, either in terms of the move to
de-skilling or up-skilling, became a critical factor in the search for increased
competitiveness within industry outside the UK. Outwith core LPT literature, one can
review a range of sources which proclaim the importance which individual firms attach to
skill development (up-skilling) arguing that it is a precondition for success (Lam, 2005).
Literature dealing with the implementation of technical change upon skill has tended to
offer evidence in favour of the positive correlation between organizational change and
up-skilling (Greenan & Guellec, 1998). In a study on the introduction of information
technology equipment in a sample of US firms it was suggested that up-skilling was
merely one part of a general trend to restructuring work and organization (Bresnahan et
al: 2002; Pival et al: 2005).
Friedson (1990: 433) noted how ‘professionals’ define the work they are engaged in as
intrinsically valuable and beneficial to others – crucially such work does not emphasize
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the importance of costs. What is important is the quality and virtuosity of the work
performed. In attempting to apply the theory of saturated (as opposed to unsaturated)
skills to the ITV sector (and more specifically to the STV franchise), Chapter 5 will detail
the rise in ‘push and press’ technology which provided for ease of task execution and no
longer depended on the development of very intimate technology specific skill levels.
Further, the case study of technical and organizational change within STV provided
examples of both skill saturation and its corollary. ‘Push and press’ technology offered a
predictability of procedure and outcome (and was introduced rapidly after the mid
1980s). Earlier technologies were dependent on the experience of technicians to repair
equipment after constant breakdowns and gave rise to a confusion of ‘working
knowledge’ with ‘skill’.
1.4.
Identity and Work for Creative Workers.
Castells (1996:160) argued that the maintenance of a high level of organizational
commitment by knowledge or skilled workers was essential if an institution was to
prosper. By ‘prosper’, Castells was referring to the need for particular organizations to
ensure that skilled workers did not keep their tacit knowledge to themselves and shared
their learned skills with the organization in which they worked. This outcome could only
be achieved by security of employment because in such circumstances it would become
rational for individuals to transfer their knowledge to the company or organization in
question. A current theme of LPT within the broadcasting sector, and specifically the
British Broadcasting Corporation (‘BBC’), is that of an attack on occupational identity
and, by implication, the security of occupation within the Corporation. This theoretical
contribution to the study of occupational identity within the BBC and the challenges
faced by it, is not predicated on the view that BBC staff were always slavish in their
commitment to the organization itself. For example, Reicher’s (1985:469) model of
organizational commitment does not take the organization to be a monolithic entity,
rather it elicits only a unitary response from individual employees. Skilled employees
have multiple loyalties – including, inter alia, to their occupational identities, to the trade
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union organization and to the institution in which they are located. For management
within the BBC, the central difficulty (set out in Chapter 6) was the possible
incongruence between a strong occupational identity and loyalty to the institution and the
ability of management to direct an employee’s labour process.
A basic criticism of the work of Braverman was the disregard of the ‘organization of
consent’ (Burawoy, 1979). For Burawoy, it was the labour process itself and not the
factors outside the process, which created consent, by constituting workers as individuals
rather than as members of a class (Carchedi, 1991). However, the organization of consent
analysis excluded the real and important role of identity, both as a principle to
collectively defend workers from further intrusion into the labour process and as a tool by
which management sought to motivate employees (Flecker & Hofbauer, 1998). The
increasingly indvidualizing tendencies of the modern workplace, together with the
intrusion by a form of increasing corporate culture upon personal and occupational
identity, contributed to the undermining of an individual’s search for a stable identity
(O’Doherty & Wilmott, 2001). If it was clear that the provision of discretionary effort
was being increasingly downgraded by managers within the BBC in particular, with a
corresponding attack on the notion of collectivity, then the study of identity formation
and resistance and change became a fundamental element of LPT.
Changes in the television industry over the past 25 years – and in particular the public
service broadcasting element of UK broadcasting – have contributed, through direct
legislative intervention and technological advances, to a radical alteration in the working
lives and occupational identities of employees. The labour process of BBC employees
moved from a highly regulated system where occupational identity was firmly fixed in
the minds of both managers and workers, to a situation where a fluid structure in which
occupational identity was treated as an additional and unnecessary cost. Until the early
1980s a relatively fixed articulation of craft identity existed and this suited both parties
(management and skilled employees) since it contributed to a stable working and
production environment. The identity of craft workers had historically been tied up with
the nature of public service and commercial broadcasting and which demanded a high
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level of technical skill. Roles/occupations such as journalists, programme producers,
technical staff and editors were preoccupied with maintaining behaviour which was
deemed professional/expert as opposed to amateur (Burns, 1977; Biddle, 1979). The
consequence of the prioritisation of expertise resulted in programme quality becoming
one of the remaining methods for broadcast employees to exert control over the
production process. In 6.2 the working environment before the introduction of
institutional pressure on occupational identity is outlined. One of the essential issues for
employees within the public sector (which includes UK public service broadcasting
workers) was the struggle for control of the contested terrain of worker autonomy during
the 1980s and beyond. Public sector workers fought against what they saw as
increasingly aggressive management regimes rooted in private sector notions of
efficiency. In noting the emergence of emotional labour and ‘wellness programmes’,
researchers have traced the gradual encroachment of questions of ‘identity moulding’
through differing levels of employee seniority (Thompson & McHugh, 2004:293).
It is quite appropriate to study the impact of organizational restructuring upon individual
occupational identities when attempting a comprehensive study of organizational change.
This is particularly the case in an era where the intrusion of corporate cultures became so
intense within the workplace. The question of whether an individual’s core identity was
ever intrinsically linked to his/her occupational identity is a complicated philosophical
debate. Perhaps, as some Foucault inspired research in this area has concluded,
individuals became embedded within disciplinary mechanisms resulting from the
surfacing of peer pressure (Puligano, 2002:13-14). While there is debate as to the
longevity and depth of occupational identity within the BBC workplace – it is a fact that
BBC employees developed a strong attachment to both their occupational community and
institutional identity. Salaman (1974) noted that membership of an ‘occupational
community’ represented a relationship between an individual’s work and life. An
important element of such an occupational community is ‘self-image’ – the way
individuals see themselves as broadcast workers, labourers, software developers, etc..
Critically, many of the values and points of reference which define the particular
occupational community have their origins in relationships outside the workplace but are
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inextricably linked to the social relationships of work (Baldry et al, 2005:7). For as
Salaman (1974) contended, work is undertaken not just for the monetary reward but also
for the satisfaction derived from its execution. One must be careful, however, if arguing
that labour for BBC directorate employees was not simply an economic exchange –
labour for financial reward. The point here is that BBC employees had a strong
occupational identity which differed from the newer broadcast workers who carried no
industrial relations legacy (Baldry, 2005:2).
Chapter 6 will address attempts by BBC managers to eliminate what they considered to
be an uneconomic or excessive and restrictive attachment to occupational identity,
membership of occupational communities and the provision of unnecessarily complex
and expensive services to clients. BBC managers sought to maintain the quality of output
without the attendant extras which, heretofore, technicians had simply proffered as part of
their basic level of service. BBC employees tendered the view that they did not
differentiate between supplying their services as highly skilled BBC operatives to private
sector independent production companies’ (‘IPCs’) clients and to internal producers and
directors. In fact BBC employees retained a very strong commitment to an ideal of the
Corporation as well as to their own occupational identity – thus the inclusion of the study
of identity within a multidimensional LPT framework is important because a whole new
realm of workplace practices is rendered visible (Fleming, 2001: 191). Issues of
programme quality, for example, became inextricably linked to questions of identity and
the consistent demand for increased quality control and self-regulation encouraged a
break with the traditional service levels offered by broadcasters (Daymon, 1998). In
many cases professional or occupational identity was seen as a hindrance to profit
seeking production practices. As will be demonstrated (Chapter 6) a certain level of
practical ability was demanded of technical workers within the BBC Resources
directorate but anything beyond a basic competence was seen as having a cost
implication for management.
The study of the identity of particular firms or organizations has tended to follow the
same pattern as the study of occupational/individual identity – often positing institutional
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identity as emergent, fluid or fractured (Scott & Lane, 2000). For the BBC, the
restructuring of the Corporation during the 1980s saw it adapting to changes within the
business environment – becoming a flexible, unstable and always provisional institution
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Contemporary debate surrounding the issue of identity may
be understood, in part, from managerial efforts to mobilize employee commitment
through new corporate culture and customer-centered initiatives. Managers were
increasingly turning their attention to efforts to secure and control occupational identities
which they believed threatened the long term stability of firms (Knights and Willmott,
1985; Weigert, 1975). It was a fact that new managerial strategies met employees’
identities and interests on new contested terrain (Newsome & Thompson, 2004:150).
Within the BBC these contested terrains became the two critical directorates of
Production and Resources – the departments within the BBC concerned with the
provision of programming and the supply of technical services to programme makers.
Inside the BBC personal identity had run in tandem for some employees with a form of
occupational/community identity. For other broadcasting employees (particularly those
within the independent production sector, see Chapter 7) the definition of self was as a
technician or skilled operative standing alone – not the passive recipient of an
organizational identity. While the empirical Chapters 4-7 provide evidence of a new
flexible approach to the idea of a career in television – most broadcasting workers in the
period until the 1990s were firmly entrenched in one firm. Thus organizational and
occupational identity went hand-in-hand. This latter form of work or occupational
identity had also been developed by skilled employees so as to differentiate themselves
from other workers. Within the literature on the formation and activities of professions, it
is suggested that they (professions) are different from other skilled or unskilled workers
because of their ability to be partly or wholly self-governing (Ackroyd, 1996). While
greater efforts were put into securing and managing worker identity, the threat that
employees would attempt to develop informal work group cultures in order to retain a
degree of autonomy remained a constant worry for BBC managers. The break up of the
Corporation into a series of directorates was aimed at securing allegiance to particular
directorates. For example, the decision to include all BBC Production directorate
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employees below the rank of assistant producer in the Talent Pool (a collective of
available labour who moved as directed between programmes to provide research and
other services) was a deliberate attempt to attack occupational identity within Production
– see 6.5.
The literature has provided two further alternative approaches to examine the relationship
between work and identity formation (Halford & Leonard, 1999). Firstly, individuals are
determined by work roles – the external imposition of identity. Secondly, identity
formation is the result of the internal imposition of work/occupational identity – workers
pursue a strategy of personal self-interest in order to maximize their economic returns.
The initial approach suggests that individual employees take on certain identities in a
conscious way but, over time, such identities become etched into their persona. An
element of personal choice is relevant to the adoption of an occupation but, after that
point, individuals develop their identity as a result of their structural location. This is a
development of the occupational community theory – but this particular psychological
perspective goes further, contending that employees require the umbrella of the
organization in order to allow a particular identity to take root. An important part of an
individual’s identification is cognitive and depends upon the salience of organizational
membership, but that membership can also be motivated by the desire for self
enhancement (Wiesenfeld et al, 2001: 215). The empirical work detailed in Chapter 6
ultimately leads to a view that organizational identity was dependent upon the location of
the employee within the Corporation. Thus, for Production directorate employees, being
located within the Talent Pool reflected a particularly flexible approach to work. For
those at a sufficiently senior level, the rules of membership of the Talent Pool (see 6.5)
did not exist. Resources, which underwent a comprehensive restructuring process during
the 1990s, aligned this decision with the need to maintain and uphold the tradition of
public service broadcasting (‘PSB’). As will be detailed in 6.3, managerialism – far from
being the enemy of BBC/PSB culture – became critical to its survival.
Third wave LPT attempted to reclaim the role of identity for researchers – from a narrow
reading which established the belief that occupational identity was not a source of
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resistance to the intrusion of management prerogatives. Workers, it was contended,
remained knowledgeable about their craft and retained the ability to resist management
inspired change (McKinlay & Taylor, 1996). The critical element of this argument was
the reassertion of the contested nature of identity formation in the workplace. The
workplace is considered the primary arena where ‘structured antagonism and divergent
interests are reproduced, rather than merely one site in which more general processes of
identity formation are located’ (Newsome & Thompson, 2004:149). Any proper analysis
of identity at work must consider the adoption of occupational identity as a defensive
strategy by employees, while the articulation of a dominant corporate identity may also
be recognized as a source of competitive advantage by management. Identity is certainly
viewed as a socially complex resource and one which can accrue value to management if
it is brought under control (Barney, 1998). However, organizations are willing to make
room for the continued maintenance of occupational identity of workers in exceptional
cases where there is a limited supply of skilled individuals (Thompson, 2002:340).
Identity can be properly explored in a minimum of three ways (Barney, 1998). Firstly, as
a negative resource, a source of competitive disadvantage. Secondly, as a neutral
resource, and, finally, as a source of competitive advantage, allowing firms to offer an
enhanced service within the marketplace. This is of particular importance in the highly
competitive marketplace for technical resources within the broadcasting industry – where
extra services are recognized as a personal relationship which skilled technical staff have
with their customers. Meyer & Allen (1997) in their study of commitment in the
workplace noted that organizational commitment was based on three important elements.
These are affirmative commitment (emotional linkage to the firm), normative
commitment (a sense of obligation to the firm) and continuance commitment (knowledge
of the high cost of ending one’s relationship with the firm). Firms recognize the high
costs for employees, both financially and emotionally, of exiting the firm. Thus, within
the shipbuilding industry of the 1960s, for example, some employers remained supportive
of the craft system of production – in order to maintain discretionary effort and
identification or commitment to the firm – even if it resulted in an altered understanding
of craftsmanship (Roberts, 1993). It was suggested that the meaning of craftsmanship had
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changed from ‘implying a mastery of technical mysteries to being a promise of
competence in a variety of exacting conditions and circumstances’ (Roberts, 1993:2). As
the empirical work in Chapter 6 will show, modern broadcasting technology did not
require a lengthy apprenticeship to attain a competent level of workmanship and craft
controls have been largely eliminated (Stone, 1973:7:6). However, it will be seen that
some levels of craft identification remained despite a countrywide commitment to cost
based competition from the 1980s onwards.
As indicated in 1.3 this new economy centered on relatively standardised services
together with Tayloristic forms of work organization which sought to make increasingly
limited demands upon employees’ skill levels (Payne & Ewart, 2005:146). Employers
moved to isolate conservative or narrow conceptions of occupational identity with the
result that the customer replaced the craft worker as the essential labour process actor
(Harley et al, 2005:10). Accordingly BBC managers sought to imbue their employees
with a loyalty, not just to their profession or occupational identity, but also to the
organization’s long-term strategic goals. For these managers such goals were
concentrated around the issues of more rigorous accounting procedures and continued
reduction in the amount of recorded downtime for staff. It has been argued that these new
work systems inverted the Taylorist labour process based on deskilled work and rigid
hierarchies (MacDuffie, 1995; Pil & MacDuffie, 1996). The difficulty with this thesis is
that broadcasting labour was not based on de-skilling in the period up until the advent of
new production technology. A replacement system would witness work organization
based upon broadly skilled workers empowered through extensive involvement in shop-
floor problem solving. The empirical evidence provides little or no support for this view
on the part of employees within the Production directorate – in effect this was
restructuring of identity by another name. For some workers within the Resources
directorate this autonomy was creating discretionary gaps which required a new software
of control (Townley, 1993). (Software attempts to define employees as empowered
individuals who can devise their own creative and career paths, though by association,
such individuals have the burden of skill development and education placed upon them).
While possessors of a particular form of knowledge or skill can, if they form themselves
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into a group, standardize and control the dissemination of knowledge regarding entry to
their own skill area but this view is only supportable if entry of very highly skilled
employees into the marketplace is traced (MacDonald, 1995).
For the majority of skilled employees within the UK broadcasting industry, retreat into
established core skilled positions was impossible. The concept of the profession in
relation, for example, to health professionals offers only a limited a degree of relevance
for broadcasting employees (Friedson, 1990). Is it possible to argue that in a pre digital
era of regulation, broadcast technicians and producer/directors fitted comfortably into
that definition? A more appropriate conception of the work and employment relations of
the skilled broadcasting professional may be that they are in possession of discretion
rather than pure autonomy (Evetts, 2002:345). Even that very limited involvement in the
decision making process within the TV production environment continues to be
threatened for a great many employees.
The central element of empowerment or positive identity change seems at odds with the
current reality of work within the broadcasting industry. The advent of neo-Taylorism
appears to offer a more convincing appraisal of change on the shop-floor, adopting as it
does the two first principles of the Braverman thesis, namely to gather and systematize
employees’ ‘tacit knowledge’ and specifying each task in detail. The final principle (that
of removing all intellectual tasks from the workplace) is replaced with a desire to enlist
employees in idea generation in order to improve production quality. Workers are
therefore no longer treated as physical labour to be controlled, but as sources of
innovation – typically this brand of neo-Taylorism offers a form of consultative
participation (Vallas & Beck, 1996). The application of organizational change within
BBC Scotland is reflective of Braverman’s first principle and the comprehensive
restructuring of the Corporation in Scotland – with the imposition of the directorate
system – reflected that view.
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1.5.
Networks and Networking within the
Independent Television Production sector.
Networking is a critical part of the labour process of two essential groups of workers
within the contemporary UK broadcasting industry – it is a form of endeavour, which
extends beyond the workplace and is rarely acknowledged by employers and results in no
immediate additional remuneration to the individual. The two groups who undertake this
process in the independent production sector are networks of Producer Owners [owner
managers of some of the independent production companies (IPCs)] and, secondly,
networks of Broadcast Professionals (freelance suppliers of technical and creative
services and sometime employees of the IPCs). The theoretical contributions to
networking and its relationship to current LPT will now be considered in some detail.
The restructuring of the UK broadcasting industry after 1979 saw the movement of many
television employees outside of the traditionally highly regulated framework of television
production (Dex, et al, 2000). This regulated structure had provided an easily understood
and accessible labour market but with the loosening of the formal regulation of the
industry in terms of the numbers of programming providers, networking could be seen as
a form of replacement labour regulation for television workers. Networks may be defined
as either ‘prescribed’ or ‘emergent’. A prescribed network is viewed as a set of formally
specified relationships between superiors and subordinates and who interact to
accomplish a particular task. In contrast, an emergent network displays informal
discretionary patterns of interaction where the content of the social relationship may be
work related, social or both. Emergent networks are not the result of a natural alignment
of factors but, rather, are contrived by individuals to achieve a specific set of responses.
Networks and networking are important factors in the success or otherwise of an
individual’s strategies for advancement within the freelance broadcast labour market.
Social networks are as complex and heterogeneous as the varied daily activities of any
business venture (Johanisson & Paterson, 1984:4).
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The networking literature has been likened to a ‘terminological jungle in which any
newcomer may plant a tree’ (Nohira, 1992:43). Recent calls for research into the areas of
regulatory, legislative and organizational change have included an emphasis upon
interdisciplinary and ‘mixed-method’ research to explore the networks of trust and power
relationships within television (Frith, 2000:49). Nohira & Eccles, (1992) suggested that
the term network had lost its precision through over use and that it was an abstract
concept which referred to a set of relationships and nodes which connect them (Fombrun,
1982:184). Networks may, on the surface, appear to be something that organizations
adopt in the same way they develop corporate identity strategies. However, networks are
more than that, and they are ‘the final arbiter of competitive success’ (Burt, 1992:58).
Networks play a fundamental role in the determination of how information is exchanged
within the media industries and reflect a significant change in the regulative structure of
UK broadcasting. Within the industry such developments are not new – there has been a
history of employees responding to individualized and deregulated employment and this
had traditionally been achieved by resorting to collective organization, specifically a
reliance on membership of trade unions (Seglow, 1978). As 7.3 will explore, the
diminution in the scale and power of trade unions within the broadcasting industry
resulted in employees seeking representation through other means. The difference in
contemporary broadcasting organizations is that while networking outwardly appears to
be an individual, unregulated process, the psychological contract of networks replaced
national collective industry bargaining for groups of Broadcast Professionals.
Psychological contracts for these individuals consist of relationships – through actual
networks of information sharing – between individual broadcast workers. (Marsden,
1999:18). For Producer Owners, such psychological contracts had the effect (as will be
seen in Chapter 7) of providing encouragement to develop networks of a substantial
nature with the broadcasters’ commissioning departments and with trusted groups of
freelance Broadcast Professionals. Further, for Broadcast Professionals psychological
contracts manifested themselves through the desire of freelance workers to produce a
portfolio of high-quality work on a continual basis in order to secure and enhance their
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reputations (Sydow & Staber, 2002). It will be shown in Chapter 7 that economic
restructuring within the UK economy since 1979 provoked a series of substantial changes
in the labour process of broadcasting industry professionals resulting in a fundamental
requirement for broadcasting employees to engage in networking (Baumann, 2002). The
emergence of networking must be understood in two ways, firstly as a method for
managers to explore the boundaries of flexibility within the workplace and secondly, as a
new element of the labour process for employees in order to soften the impact of
organizational restructuring (Amin & Hausner, 1997).
The literature on networks and networking is replete with inventories of specific firm-
related network strategies and influencing tactics (Galskiewicz, 1979:178). Little attempt
has been made to specify the conditions under which certain types of strategies may be
more effective than others and scant consideration has been paid to the identification of
interactions between strategies, context and action. Coordination is achieved not through
contractual means but, rather, by patterns of communication between employees (Sobero
& Schrader, 1998; Doz et al 1989). Networks play a fundamental role in the
determination of how information is exchanged within the media industry. The
information may be simple in nature, for example an invitation to a drinks party for the
launch of a TV programme, or as important as specific information for media workers
about job opportunities (Boorman, 1975; Montgomery, 1991). In a text aimed at those
seeking entry to the competitive US media industries the importance of ‘luck’ in finding
employment was emphasized and the adoption by a ‘mentor’ was also found to be an
important strategy for success in securing paid employment (Tepper, 1999).
Within any contemporary organization many of its assets will be what some have termed
intangible (Marsick &Watkins, 1999; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). These intangibles may
include intellectual, structural and customer capital. For individual Producer Owners and
Broadcast Professionals, networking is a form of intangible labour process which is
extremely difficult to quantify – particularly in terms of its success. Individual employees
of IPCs operate an informal and unstructured form of personal networking in order to
achieve something as close as possible to continuous employment. Employment is often
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on a fixed term contract basis and individuals are therefore responsible for their own
career development and employment. They use personal contacts to develop their
information ‘bank’ in order to protect themselves from prolonged periods of
unemployment. In addition, the successful development of a new entrepreneurial venture
is hugely dependent upon the accurate deployment of network strategy. Networks
function as ‘conduits for information’ while providing access to resources without the
high costs of developing complex internal and external communication strategies
(Larson, 1992). An effective network strategy can make the difference between short-
term failure and success for the nascent IPC and in the elimination of severe bouts of
unemployment for individual Broadcast Professionals (Stier & Greenwood, 1995).
1.5.1
Networking and Producer Owners.
The information benefits – for Producer Owners – of membership of a network is defined
through the awareness of industry specific information about, inter alia, forthcoming
commissions Burt (1992:13). As 7.2 will show, the central aim of engaging in networking
(by Producer Owners) is to gain access to elite or information bearing networks. Oliver &
Ebers (1998:568) concluded that inter-organizational network research is confined to two
issues, namely the ‘social network perspective’ and the ‘governance perspective’. Those
employing the social network perspective utilized the formal apparatus of social network
analysis. The governance perspective comprises all theoretical approaches which are
concerned with the institutional structures and through which inter-organizational
relationships are developed. It differs from the ‘social network approach’ in that it
focuses less on the structural properties of network relationships. The governance
approach concentrates on individual entrepreneurs themselves and the style and depth of
their relationships with each other. The governance approach offers an insight into the
development of relationships between Producer Owners and the commissioning editors of
the broadcasting companies.
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Networking literature considers two possible directions for research – firstly studies
concerned with what are termed ‘clusters of organizations’ and their interaction.
(Saxenian, 1991:339; Gray, 1985) The networking effects of innovation were studied
within six high tech industries and provided evidence that firms using networking
practices were likely to have 20 per cent more product improvements than firms which
did not network (Gemunden et al, 1996). Secondly – a focus on the firm itself as the
centre of analysis is deemed worthy of attention. This technique is simply concerned with
understanding how the firm creates and manages a network and this style of analysis
seeks to track the outcome of such networking. But how are these networks developed
and how successful have creative Producer Owners (cultural entrepreneurs) been in
developing and expanding networks? (These question are considered empirically in
Chapter 7).What are the motivations behind both Producer Owners and Broadcast
Professionals joining or sustaining networks? The literature is not overburdened with
empirical studies of the symbiotic relationship between entrepreneurship and network
strategy (Chu, 1996). In a study of the Hollywood film industry the question was posed
as to how group ties and inter-group affiliations arose (Baker & Faulkner, 1991). Many
forces within creative industries provide a poor basis for integration and a network
organization may not arise spontaneously and may have to be deliberately created by use
of integrating systems. Understandably the idea of entrepreneurs happily sharing
information and strategies is at odds with the individualistic nature of the classic
entrepreneur. However, entrepreneurs draw heavily on personal networks to extend their
operations and, in turn, this helps to resolve operating problems by supplementing the
organization’s internal resources.
For a network to develop the entrepreneur needs to continually create what Granovetter
called ‘weak-ties’, i.e. ties between the individual employee/employers who do not know
each other. Granovetter placed particular emphasis upon weak-ties which act as bridge-
builders between individuals and other networks (Granovetter, 1973:1378). Employment
and other networking information transfer is facilitated by weak-ties in contrast to the,
perhaps, more obvious choice of ‘strong-ties’. He developed the theory of embeddedness
in order to explain how networks influence society and the economy. Networks give
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order to an individual’s dealings within the market place and they can provide an
entrepreneur with cheap and regular access and knowledge of the market. The existence
of long-term relationships between networkers can provide a motive to maintain the bond
because of the degree of emotional and economic investment involved. The empirical
support work offered in Chapter 7, will contend that strong-ties and the development of
trust within the independent television production sector were of particular importance to
career progression within the industry. Within a market situation the notion of trust does
not extend to providing unconditional support to programme providers irrespective of
quality, profitability or competitiveness. Properly managed networks for Producer
Owners and commissioning editors must, and do, allow for the option of exit and there
are no implied assumptions of loyalty beyond that provided by a sense of self-interest.
Strong-ties within the independent production sector are largely between the dependable
IPC’s with long track records and the safety conscious commissioning departments.
1.5.2
Broadcast Professionals and Networking.
Christopherson & Storper (1986:242) noted the increasing importance in developing
active social networks for employees within the United States’ broadcasting and film
industries. Further, the more recent debates about ‘flexible specialization’ and the
network firm have placed renewed emphasis on the centrality of human resources and
skill to the production process (Brusco, 1982; Nohira & Eccles, 1992). Project production
and small IPCs have flourished in media industries because of the unique or ‘one-off’
basis of the creation of programming and which is financially uncertain in terms of
economic return for individual IPC’s and broadcasters. Thus cultural entrepreneurs seek
to lessen risk through the development of trusted teams of Broadcast Professionals who
have developed a good reputation as technical or creative workers. This form of
networking behaviour has been identified as significantly boosting the innovation output
of firms in a range of industries (Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al, 1996). Industry professionals
have tended to accept and even promote the reality of project-networks within the
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industry. Networks it is suggested, are the most effective organizational structure in order
to cope with the increasingly complex and competitive broadcast environment (Miles &
Snow, 1986). Inherent within the maintenance of networks by entrepreneurs is the desire
to continually create weak-ties to prevent the dominance of the industry by a few strong-
ties. Critically, casualized employees are often only able to access weak-ties after an
apprenticeship or a period of time in which they have been accepted informally into a
network of broadcasting/media professionals. Membership of such elite or trusted groups,
as outlined in 7.3, is a lengthy process which is not defined by any set period of time. The
suggestion that membership of networks of weak-ties is something which can only be
achieved after gaining experience within the industry may appear to contradict the
established Granovetter (1973) position. But for Broadcast Professionals, a competent
professional reputation will allow membership of networks based upon weak-ties which
will allow for greater movement of information between Broadcast Professionals.
Baumann (2002) resurrects the notion of reputation as a critical element in the
development of networks within the British and German media production industries.
The aspirational lifestyle element of the broadcasting industry (which many outside the
industry attribute to media work and workers) means there are significant numbers of
individuals therein who have no technical or industry experience and who do not have
access to either strong or weak-ties. Coleman offers a neat contrast to the weak-ties
paradigm by suggesting that the social capital emanating from a closed set of
relationships allowed for norms to emerge that facilitate exchange (Coleman, 1990:320).
He further developed the theory by suggesting that if a closed set of relationships was not
available, then intermediaries could emerge to establish trustworthy ties. In 7.3 outlines
the importance of online networks of Broadcast Professionals in securing work,
developing information banks and in securing a semblance of a return to collectivity
within the industry is emphasized although there is no suggestion that real evidence of
collective bargaining within the freelance market is emerging.
Personal networks which linked firms and individual Broadcast Professionals through
social contacts, were the starting points for social networking and these personal
networks have a particular resonance for both Producer Owners and Broadcast
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Professionals (Grandori & Soda, 1995:199). Such communication amounted to
exploratory networks for the discreet exchange of industry specific information or data
and which may have some, unspecified, future value (Scharder, 1991). This data may be
industry sourced information or it may be vague rumour or conjecture about future
industry changes. In reality, the actual information transfer itself is often unimportant and
the simple agreement by Broadcast Professionals or Producer Owners to meet and
exchange the most basic of information can be the key determinant for the development
of social networks. Such personal networks, or the new information technology networks
in which employees or single entrepreneurs are involved, are critical to the maintenance
of a pool of potential partners which firms may use when searching for some form of
strategic alliance or a ‘more tightly-coupled, action-orientated networks’ (Grandori &
Soda, 1999). Broadcast Professionals or Producer Owners who do not cooperate and who
do not formally/informally exchange knowledge are, in effect, limiting their knowledge
base. Networks are not only critical for accessing knowledge to create in-house
innovations but are equally important for firms to learn about innovative work practices
(Erickson & Jacoby, 2003).
Networking can significantly boost innovation, competitiveness and the marketability of
Producer Owners and Broadcast Professionals – those who choose not to network run the
risk of loosing access to industry knowledge over the medium term. The literature
suggests that as a firm’s output becomes increasingly similar to its competitors, so firms
recognize the need to collaborate with other firms (Powell et al, 1996). Indeed, the
crucial point of innovation is no longer the individual IPC itself but, rather, the network
in which the IPC is embedded. What is clear is that there are substantial differences
between the networking needs of those who identify themselves as either Producer
Owners or Broadcast Professionals. For the entrepreneur, the process of networking may
increase the level of success for entrepreneurial activities (Baum et al, 2000). Network
relations provide emotional support for those involved in risk-taking entrepreneurial
activities and enhance the level of persistence to remain in a highly competitive work
environment (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Critically, it is not simply the activity of
building a network which is important as it is perfectly possible to spend a lot of time
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talking to other people and never learning anything of importance (Il &Mann, 1977:28).
Indeed, information must be filtered and evaluated if individuals are not to be
overburdened with irrelevant data. It is evident from 7.3 that the successful Broadcast
Professionals were those who managed to network as part of elite groups of workers who
were in constant demand by Producer Owners. They had successfully passed on a degree
of risk to Producer Owners who had to work hard to maintain the services of elite
Broadcast Professionals.
While much of the literature on networking is focused principally upon business-to-
business networks, the role of informal/formal networking relationships of Broadcast
Professionals and other third parties is also important. Third parties have an important
role in promoting innovation and helping to share information on a whole range of
employment related issues. They can act as very knowledgeable conduits for the
development of relationships between IPCs and the skilled professionals seeking
employment (Verspagen, 1999; Kaufmann & Todtling, 2001). For Galaskiewicz
(1979:178) there are two types of network strategy – those which entail the formation of
a personal network suited to functioning in a particular kind of environment or system,
and strategies which involve the selective mobilization or adaptation of a personal
network for a particular purpose. The central theme is a commitment to a high degree of
flexibility in terms of the continued development of personal networking strategies.
Friendship is an important source of industry information and is a further important
element in the securing of employment contracts for Broadcast Professionals. In Chapter
7 this elements of networking which can smooth the way for the acceptance of proposals
or ideas in relation to networking strategies is explored (Gray, 1985:931). Most available
research within this area has focussed on existing networks while the problems of
organizing structures for individuals when there are no existing networks has received
much less consideration. Larson (1992) suggested that researchers should concentrate
their efforts on the development and evolution of personal network patterns within new
entrepreneurial firms. For individual media workers it is reputation as competent
professionals which constitutes their passport to continued operation within the industry
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(Tolbert, 1996). Networks are neither uniform in structure nor wholly equal in terms of
access for Broadcast Professionals. There are many types of network in operation –
including an outer network in which individual workers send unsolicited requests for
work, workers who learn of vacancies through mailing lists, etc. and the core of freelance
professionals known to producers and production staff (Antclif et al, 2005:7).
(Reputation is a key entry requirements to this latter group). In the film industry the
macrostructure (the patterns of interactions among industry participants) is characterized
by core and peripheries (Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Kadushin, 1976). Both core and
peripheries are sustained over time where the opportunity to work with high-status
professionals enhances an individual’s standing and the notion of individual capital is
linked to how others recognize and perceive abilities.
An individual has at least three types of capital, namely financial, human and social.
While financial and human capital are owned by the individual, social capital in this
context is the relationship an employee has with other employees, Broadcast
Professionals and Producer Owners (Burt, 1992:11). The structure of the individual’s
network and his/her personal contacts can, if managed correctly, provide a modicum of
competitive advantage. Freeman (1991:503) alluded to the notion of the increasing
importance (both for entrepreneur/employer and for the individual employee) of the
development of informal networks. He suggested that behind most formal networks are a
variety of informal networks, e.g. personal relationships of trust and confidence. Because
of the highly personal nature of some of these informal networks, cultural/social factors
including, language, religion, educational background and shared experiences come to
the fore. Indeed, much of the literature on social capital points to the positive elements
accruing to professionals but one must acknowledge that such networks of workers can
place restrictions on entry for those less favoured (Portes, 1998).
The literature relating to networking is predominantly concerned with, and emerges from,
a distinctly managerialist framework (Kalinkos, 2003). However, within contemporary
organizations the need for individuals to be both creative and adaptive and to engage in
continuous learning is self-evident (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996). The creation and
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nurturing of networks of career contacts – the knowing-whom career competences – are
critical for creative workers (DeFillipi & Arthur, 1994). But are networks for the
Broadcast Professional merely a set of contacts, (one’s ‘black book’) or can networks be
a source of opportunity and renewal for trade unions within the industry? (Antclif et al,
2005:25) These issues will be addressed in Chapter 7 when the networking activities of
two of the distinctive occupational groups within the independent production sector will
be considered.
Conclusion.
This Chapter has explored four essential themes of contemporary LPT so that the case
studies (Chapters 4–7) would have an appropriate set of theoretical underpinnings.
Broadcast Professionals – in their previous mainfestation as established, skilled
employees within the ITV and BBC sectors – controlled the labour process throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s by their dominance of technology. The absolute requirement
for specialized learned knowledge on the part of skilled employees has declined in recent
years and LPT does not merely note these changes but attempts to link workplace
practices to disconnected capitalism, reflecting a trend to challenge institutional and craft
distinctiveness (Thompson, 2003). In 1.1 the contribution of LPT to studies of workplace
change was set out and its relevance to the case study or empirical method explained. In
1.2 the development of the UK broadcasting economy was traced from a position in
which the structures of national collective bargaining dictated how labour was deployed
to one where the de-regulatory impulses of something akin to post-Fordist strategies took
hold. Within the ITV sector it was necessary to explain how top-down regulation had
contributed to a relatively quiet industrial relations environment before the bottom-up re-
regulation of the 1990s and beyond.
In 1.3 the themes of de-skilling and up-skilling within the area of creative labour were
explored. New skills were continually required so that workers could operate ‘flexibly’ in
order to satisfy both the demands of managers and of the technology which, as Chapter 5
will show, allowed for increased usage time as less attention and skill was required for set
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up and maintenance. In a contemporary study of trade union representatives most felt that
the greatest change to their labour process was one of task enlargement through a
combination of multi-tasking and self-regulation (Danford et al, 2002:317). Task
enlargement came in many forms including a move to regulation of emotional labour as a
critical skill and productivity source. De-skilling emerged as a very real issue for
employees and trade unions within the ITV sector but, critically, the research on labour
process generated a rich vein of literature on issues of skill and managerial strategy
(Knights & Willmott, 1990; Wardell et al, 1999).
The effect of the contemporary workplace upon occupational identity was outlined in 1.4.
According to (Broekstra, 1998) within an ideal scenario, employers and employees would
allow occupational identity to develop flexibly in order to respond to an ever-changing
business environment. Further, the literature suggests that organizational identity – which
is both adaptive and flexible – can contribute to the avoidance of organizational
difficulties (Weick & Roberts, 1993). However, identity change can be a painful process
for employees who recognize it as restructuring by another name and managers (e.g.
within BBC Scotland and as detailed in Chapter 6), had to negotiate carefully in order to
maintain a motivated and customer driven workforce. The role and identity of managers
was also consistently placed under pressure by continual worker resistance (Thompson,
2002:350). Changing work culture, which was at the heart of management strategies,
placed shop-floor managers in a buffer zone between senior management and worker
resistance (McHugh, 1997:2).
The labour process of two groups of creative workers who are employed within the
independent television sector was considered in 1.5. Individual television workers
(Broadcast Professionals) and entrepreneurs (Producer Owners) use networks in different
ways but with the same broad objective – to maintain, develop and alter established
patterns of communication so as to facilitate the flow of beneficial information. For the
IPC owners and managers the use of networks or, more accurately, the desire to be part of
a network with access to the commissioning arms of broadcasters, is a very real and
specific requirement. For the main participants in the IPC sector, the opportunity of
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sharing sensitive programming ideas through a network of competitors is limited, but
information regarding competitive threats and general industry information is usually
available. While networks for entrepreneurs are complex, they remain important conduits
for industry-wide developments and as indicators of forthcoming changes in the
programming requirements for broadcasting commissioners.
The critical roles which networks and networking play in alerting Broadcast
Professionals to the opportunities for employment will be addressed empirically in
Chapter 7. As indicated in 1.5, individuals have had to develop ever more complicated
and detailed strategies in order to maintain regular employment in an increasingly
complex and difficult labour market. Networks provide opportunities for a tentative first
step in the renewal of collective resistance to the managerial control over workplace
autonomy. Opportunities which are available to Broadcast Professionals to increase their
bargaining power tend to be centered on elite groups of workers who, understandably,
have little interest in improving the collective pay and conditions of their colleagues (see,
inter alia, Paterson, 2001; Ursell, 2000). However, the literature does not provide a
definitive determination as to whether such elite workers believe that further
opportunities for career advancement will best be made through collective networking
arrangements or whether they are better off to network individually (Antclif et al, 2005:
4).
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Chapter 2.
The Materials
and
Methods of Study.
This study adopted a case study design methodology and data was gathered by
conducting in-depth, loosely structured, thematic interviews with employees, trade
unionists and management staff across a range of UK broadcasting institutions.
Interviews were the basis of the four empirical case studies undertaken. While the
introduction to the thesis, (pages i-vii) sets out the structure of the work it proposed
from a presentational perspective (and so as to not interrupt the natural flow of the
thesis) to provide some detail as to the materials employed and methods used in
garnering the empirical research in this Chapter. The data gathering methods for each
of the four case studies is set out in order of their appearance in the thesis. For
example, the process of interview formation and structuring which contributed to
Chapter 4 is detailed first, followed in succession by Chapters 5 to 7 inclusive.
Two broadly structured research questions, noted below, establish the objectives of
the study as originally planned at the outset of the research project.
2.2
Broad Research Questions of the Study.
1. How was organizational/firm change/restructuring experienced in terms of a
series of industry case studies? Further, how was organizational restructuring
experienced and understood by employees, managers and trade union
representatives interviewed in the course of development of the four different
case studies presented here? How does the experience and pattern of
organizational change differ amongst individual firms within the UK industry?
2. How can the fracturing of LPT be understood and applied in order to provide
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a theoretical underpinning to organizational change within the four case
studies?
Two fundamental matters should be clarified at the outset of this brief description of
the methods employed. Firstly, an explanation of the decision to employ a case study
approach is desirable and, secondly, a clear expression of the issues behind the
decision to choose the four case studies as outlined in Chapters 4-7 inclusive is
desirable. The decision to use Labour Process Theory (‘LPT’) is explained in both the
Introduction and in Chapter 1. In 2.2 the role case study research played in the
analysis of organizational change is addressed together with its relevance to this
thesis. In 2.3 the precise reasons why the particular case studies were chosen. Finally
in 2.4 – the methods employed in gathering data for the cases are explained and an
outline of the thematic interviews which formed the basis of the thesis cases is given
with a simple statement of interviews carried out.
2.3
Rationale for the Multiple Case Study Research Approach.
This work has sought to address the lacuna in the literature with regard to studies of
work-place change within the broadcasting industry in the period after 1979. As Yin
(2003:4) notes, the case study method is the preferred research method when ‘how’
and ‘why’ questions are being asked. The decision concerning the selection of case
studies, (which is explained in 2.3), was made in order to provide a comprehensive
history of organizational restructuring throughout the industry. This ranged across the
BBC and ITV sectors (including a franchise specific ITV case study and a history of
ITV industrial relations) and culminates with the impact of the independent
production sector during the 1990s on the established industry. The ‘how’ questions
relate clearly to the implementation of strategies of organizational change – while the
‘why’ questions necessitated an inquiry into the motivations behind management
decisions to respond to nationally inspired changes in industrial relations and labour
process.
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Arzt (1996) suggested that work processes and histories should be studied from a
qualitative subjective perspective, involving a deep understanding of employee
experiences. The work here was undertaken as a cross-sectional, case study method of
analysis. It is important to explain why the case study method was chosen together
with outlining the rationale for the decision to choose the particular set of case studies.
Eisenhardt (1989:534) described the case study method as ‘a research strategy that
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings’. While there is
a substantial degree of prejudice against this method of empirical inquiry, there is also
much to recommend it as a form of analysis. As Yin (2003:10) noted, the case study
approach has been subjected to a number of criticisms – notably that it is less
desirable than other comparable forms of inquiry because of a concern over a lack of
rigor and a suggestion that the case study investigator may be careless and may not
always follow systematic procedures. It is true that the case study method of inquiry
received less attention from researchers in terms of providing investigators with
specific procedures to follow. However, this does not mean that by choosing the case
study structure for analysis the researcher is forgoing methodological rigour. Rather,
the case study is an ideal methodology when a holistic form of investigation is
required (Feagrin et al, 1991).
Case studies are designed to bring out details from the perspective of participants by
means of the use of multiple sources of data. (Voss et al, 2002) suggested that case
studies contribute to theory-building research as ‘unconstrained by the rigid limits of
questionnaires and models…[and]… can lead to new and creative insights and the
development of new theory’ and further contended that theory-building research
should be conducted with a few focused, in-depth case studies. Selection of cases
must be done so as to maximize what can be learned in the period of time available
for the study.
In this work, four case studies were considered appropriate to provide a significant
and satisfactory appraisal of the degree of organizational change undertaken in the
industry since the late 1970s. An important criticism of single case study work is that
it provides little basis for ‘scientific generalization’ – the researcher cannot generalize
from a single case (Yin, 2003:10-11). Further, the criticism of this particular
methodology in that results obtained may not be widely applicable in real work
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situations, is valid and contributed to the design of the thesis as a collection of
individual cases. As Yin (2003:32-33) explains, a fatal flaw in undertaking case
studies is to conceive of statistical generalization as the method of generalizing results
– simply, the chosen cases are not ‘sampling units’ and should not be chosen for that
reason. It has been established that it is incorrect to view a particular case study in the
same way one might view a single respondent via an interview process. As multiple
cases were chosen here these should, according to Yin (2004:32), be seen as ‘multiple
experiments’. Levy (1988) used the single-case design method in his study for the
University of Arizona – and which may be used to confirm or challenge an
established theory or understanding of a particular situation, industry or firm.
Single-cases are particularly appropriate for revelatory cases, e.g. where a researcher
may have access to a particular phenomenon which had previously been ignored or
inaccessible. Some disciplines (including political science) have developed a set of
methodologies for developing single and multiple case studies. Yin (2003:46) takes
the view no clear distinction should be drawn between single and multiple case study
work, thus the choice is considered one of research design. While the archival
material employed in Chapter 4, for example, has been referred to in only the broadest
terms within other literature in this field, it was felt that the multiple case studies
methodology was particularly suitable to this study. Herriott & Firestone, (1983)
(quoted in Yin, 2003:46) contend that evidence from multiple cases is more
compelling and, consequently, the overall study is more robust than single casework.
While any one of the four case studies detailed in this thesis would provide a basis for
a partial account of organizational change in the UK broadcasting industry, the
imperative of the single case study – that of the rare, critical or compelling example of
organizational change – does not exist. Simply, it would not have been accurate or
sustainable to contend that any one of the four cases was more important than any
another.
The mode of analysis undertaken here replicates what Yin has referred to as ‘analytic
generalization’ where a previously developed set of theories (in this case LPT) are
employed as a structure upon with which to compare the results of case studies. As
outlined in both the introduction and Chapter 1, the structure of this thesis is quite
clear in that regard. As Eisenhardt (1989) noted, theory development takes time and
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can be difficult. It is important to be wary of simply ‘bolting-on’ a theoretical Chapter
at the beginning and then simply ignoring its relevance to the empirical Chapters in
the body of the work – this has been avoided here. The four themes of LPT developed
in Chapter 1 are interwoven within the empirical work. Yin (2003:29) rightly noted
that the case study researcher is not being asked to be ‘a masterful theoretician’, rather
the clear goal is to have a blueprint for one’s work. Quoting Sutton & Staw,
(1995:378) the suggestion is made that research design provides strong guidance in
determining what data to collect and, further, that theory development prior to the
collection of case study data is an essential step in undertaking case studies.
Kraut, et al, (1989) noted that organizational restructuring should be studied in
different settings and work cultures. In choosing to use the case study method similar
processes of organizational restructuring can be studied within various locations or
settings. In applying the method it is possible to explore both the direction and pace of
change within the industry and the individual experience of organizational change.
The crucial reason for selecting the case study method of analysis was the notion that
organizational change progressed at a different pace and in different ways throughout
the four studies chosen. As will be set out, organizational restructuring within at least
one of the case study firms was inspired by industry-based change occurring at
another institution – also the subject of case study.
2.4
Data Selection Methods and Selection of Cases.
This work is a series of case studies preceded by a contextual piece setting out the
political and economic environment in which the industry operated for the duration of
the period examined. The case studies are preceded by two further contributions,
Chapter 1 which sets out the theoretical basis for a detailing of the firm specific
restructuring which occurred in the industry during the period c.1979-2002, and
Chapter 3 which provides the reader with an entry into the political and regulatory
environment which was broadly supportive of industry restructuring.
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In case-study research, data is not sampled statistically but, rather, theoretically
through the selection of interviews relevant to the research questions (Eisenhardt,
1989). The data selection of this study included selecting cases and interviews
determined by two critical criteria. The first criterion was that the empirical research
(through the choice of case study) should consider organizational change within the
UK broadcasting industry in a period of intense flux. The second criterion was that
interviewees be broadly representative of departments/sections or occupational groups
within the particular case so that a minimum of obvious prejudice would be evident in
the transcripts produced from the interviews.
The cases selected, (Chapters 4-7) offer an overview of the UK broadcasting industry,
providing evidence of the very substantial changes to the way the industry was
structured before and after the deregulatory impulses of the 1980s, together with
empirical linkage to the heavily regulated industry. Until the explosion in satellite and
cable broadcasting during the mid 1990s, the BBC, ITV and Channel 4 represented
the preponderance of the UK broadcasting industry and in the subsequent period have
witnessed the greatest reorganization. The cases chosen represent and reflect the
importance of the two public sector broadcasters, (ITV and BBC) within the
development of UK broadcasting. ITV provided two case studies in this thesis
because of the complex history of industrial relations’ policy and change and a desire
to complement the choice of a case study of BBC Scotland with the central Scotland
ITV franchise, STV. The most fundamental single development within the industry –
in the aftermath of the emergence of commercial television in the 1950s – was the
deregulation of the industry and the consequent emergence of independent production
companies (IPCs). The industry development and labour process of the independent
production sector is considered in Chapter 7. It is now proposed to move to outline the
methods employed in gathering the data which formed the basis of the empirical
Chapters.
2.5
Data Gathering Methods and Interviews Undertaken.
Data was gathered at four different ‘sites’, i.e. four different sets of interviews were
undertaken. Interviews took place at a number of different locations and these are
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noted in the statement of interviews which follows. The basic process of interview
remained the same for the four cases and a set of broadly based interview themes
(which was directed at securing agreement about the case concerns of respondents)
formed the basis of the interviews undertaken throughout the research work and is
provided. Through recorded interview, data gathering was conducted by the author.
Written analysis began with the work required to set broad thematic questions and this
was completed by reviewing literature concerning industry change in the UK
broadcasting industry. The work required to transcribe the recorded interviews into
text was undertaken and any repetition of language or inaudible or linguistic
phenomenon – which contained no important information – was not documented. A
total of 46 interviews were transcribed and used in the construction of case material.
A further 6 interviews were recorded and partially transcribed, but these were not
used because of poor sound recording or because the interviewee developed an
anxiety in the course of interview.
Prior to the start of interview, a letter of introduction from the relevant academic
supervisor was presented to the interviewee. In addition, the aims and objectives of
the research and the methods to be employed were outlined. The general themes of the
case were discussed in broad terms, prior to recording. The interviewee was again
asked if he/she had any objections to the interview being recorded. The interviewee
was told that a copy of the transcribed interview could be provided, if requested.
Anonymity was promised for those who did not wish their name or precise technical,
or administrative position to be stated within the body of the work.
It is a fact that most of the interviewees contributing to Chapter 4 (the first of four
cases) were agreeable to their names being attached to the interview when using direct
quotes in individual Chapters. Thus at the foot of the relevant pages (in Chapter 4) the
names and roles/former roles of individuals interviewed are set down. Chapter 4 was
the result of a set of interviews, (detailed here) with former senior representatives of
the employers’ association, the Independent Television Association, (‘ITVA’), current
and former senior trade union representatives, (ACTT & BETA) and former
executives of ITV franchises. The employment of archive material concerning the
development of strategies aimed at restructuring the employment relationship within
the ITV Network is a crucial element of this work and references for all archive
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materials are detailed at the bottom of the page in which the works are cited.
Documents which were retrieved and photocopied from the National Archives in
December 1999 remain on file with the author.
Criteria for the selection of interviewees was based upon the work experience of the
individuals. Interviewees had worked in the ITV sector or had very significant trade
union experience in negotiating with ITV. In addition, current (at the time of
interview) BECTU trade union negotiators were also interviewed. The interviews and
the case studies were carried out consecutively over an eighteen-month period from
December 1999. The main data was collected using ‘thematic interviews’ where the
general themes of the interviews (outlined here) were prepared prior to recording.
However, the unique experiences of individual interviewees directed some of the
subsequent questioning and allowed the interviewees to add material which opened up
new areas of interest. The suggestion that specific questions, and the order of
questions, varied according to the success of the interaction between interviewer and
interviewee is supported in the literature (Yin, 2003:89; Eisenhardt, 1989).Yin
(2003:89) contended that interviews are essential sources of case study information –
and most likely to be guided conversations rather than structured queries. Yin
(2003:89) quoting Rubin & Rubin (1995) proposed that the actual sequence of
questions is likely to be fluid rather than rigid. The benefits of a fluid process of
thematic question setting allowed interviewees to relax in a situation which could be
alien to some.
In Chapter 5 interviews conducted with Scottish Television (‘STV’) employees are
employed. The interviews conducted at the beginning of this work were undertaken
with serving and former employees of the ITV franchise. This process began in the
summer of 1997 with a then self-employed, former STV ‘stage-hand’. Interviews with
serving STV employees were difficult to organize because of a ban on serving
employees speaking about internal corporate affairs in the public arena. All interviews
undertaken for Chapter 5, (again stated in the footnotes) identify the
occupation/former occupation of those interviewed. Those interviewed were happy to
accede to a request to provide some detail of their occupation and the footnotes are
brief and to the point. All those interviewed requested that their names be excluded
but this was easily accommodated by defining the person in terms of their occupation.
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For example, the first interview reference in Chapter 5 is that stated as [Interview
former STV engineer]. If at any time there was more than one reference to a person
undertaking the same task, for example two camera operators, they are referred to in
terms of the Chapter number, in this case 5, and a subsequent number beginning at 1,
e.g. camera operator 5.1.
In addition to the interviews detailed below, the production of a STV children’s show
at a large covered venue in Glasgow, Scotland, was observed in May 2001.
Permission was also forthcoming to attend a set of BECTU/NUJ meetings at STV,
Glasgow, April/May 2000 held in preparation for industrial action undertaken shortly
afterwards and the industrial action which followed was monitored. Further, the
results of an internal Scottish Media Group (‘SMG’) – the parent company of STV –
survey of employees’ attitudes which was provided to the author by an SMG
employee, was utilized. A former STV and ACTT trade union activist provided the
ACTT, Glasgow, archival records of the ‘Way Ahead’ negotiations and which were a
critical part of the work on industrial relations change within STV in the late 1980s.
The interviews for the case study in Chapter 6 were undertaken – unlike the previous
two cases – in an intensive ‘block’ period of interviewing. Access to BBC Scotland
was organized via Professor Alan McKinlay, University of St Andrews, Department
of Management, the author and the head of Human Resources at BBC Scotland.
Interviews commenced in November 1999.The choice of occupations/departments to
interview was driven by the (then) relatively recent introduction of Producer Choice
and the breaking up of the Corporation into three basic directorates. The objective was
to interview people from the three directorates, with particular emphasis upon the
Resources and Production directorates which had undergone the most significant
restructuring and this is reflected in the interviews. Interviews are referenced in the
footnotes but because of a replication of some titles of those interviewed – and due in
part by a demand for anonymity – interviews are described using a simple system of
job description and numbering. For example, the two numbers used, e.g. (6.1) include
the Chapter number (6) and the sequence of interview (in this case 1.).
The final case study (Chapter 7) was the result of a series of nine in-depth interviews
carried out with independent producers, independent production companies (‘IPCs’)
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and freelance employees. The firms, in question, ranged in size from the very small
single-operators, who worked from their own private residence, to a handful of the
largest Scottish IPCs who were significant suppliers of programming product to the
UK market as a whole. The statement of interviews, offered below, lists the
individuals interviewed. As it was the final case to be devised, researched and written,
it benefited from the development of a previous set of questions and themes. Many of
the interviewees from other cases made reference to the sector in their contributions,
however the only empirical contributions employed in Chapter 7 result from the
interviews outlined here later. The footnotes are employed to note the reference
number for interview details of which may be found at the end of the appendix.
The theoretical basis of this case, outlined in Chapter 1,1.5, was developed in a review
of literature regarding change in labour process within the industry. However the
significant response by interviewees in articulating the critical role that networking
played in developing a successful career was important in placing the theme of
networking at the heart of this case. It was felt that it was appropriate to place two
contrasting cases at the beginning and end of the empirical work. The clear contrast
between the highly regulated history of the ITV sector, pre the mid 1980s, may be
contrasted with the ultra-flexible management regulation of the independent sector.
An outline is provided below, of the broad thematic subjects which were covered at
interview for the case studies contained within Chapters 4-7. The interview process
always began with a request for personal information including age, name etc…
Employment Background.
Tell me a little about your background, how did you become in involved in (insert
applicable firm/organization)?
Technical/Job Description.
Describe your work responsibilities.
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Organizational Change.
Tell me about how your personal working environment has changed over the course
of your employment?
What are the main issues of organizational change facing this firm?
Changes in Skill Requirements.
Trace for me the change in skill requirements for employees within [insert firm] over
the course of your employment here?
Skill and Work.
How have changes in technologies employed here affected the idea of skill and
occupational identity?
Networking.
Trace for me your own experiences of networking?
2.6
Statement of Interviews, including Date and Location.
Chapter 4.
J. Calvert, former Director of Industrial Relations, ITVA. 5 December 2001. London.
M. Stevens, former Head of Industrial Relation, Thames TV. 5 December 2001.
London.
R. Lockett, former ACTT official. 8 December 1999. London.
A. Sapper, former General Secretary ACTT. 13 January 2000. London.
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M. Spence, BECTU representative. 9 December 1999. London.
T. Bell, BECTU activist (Thames). 18 November 1999. London.
S. Elliott, BECTU official. 9 December 1999. London.
R. Bolton, Media commentator. 13 January 2000.
D. Elstein, Former ITV employee (Thames). 12 April 2001.
Chapter 5.
Former STV Engineer, 26 July 1998. Glasgow.
Former STV Camera Operator (5.1) 2 July 1998. Glasgow.
Former STV Camera Operator (5.2) 2 July 1998. Glasgow.
Former STV Electrician (5.3) 17 August. Glasgow.
Former STV Stage-hand 4 July 1997. Edinburgh
STV Manager 16 June 1998. Edinburgh.
Former STV Director of Personnel. 7 December 1998. Glasgow.
Former STV Electrician (5.4). 16 August 1998. Glasgow.
Former STV Video-editor 25 August 1997. Glasgow.
Former STV ACTT Shop-Steward. 21 August 1997. Glasgow.
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STV Director of Corporate Affairs. 1 June 1999. Glasgow.
Former STV Producer. 14 June. 1999. Glasgow.
Former STV Manager. 1 June 1999. Glasgow.
Former STV Senior Producer. 27 August. 1997.
STV Producer. 16 August. 1998. Glasgow.
Interviews with BECTU/NUJ representatives. 12 February 1998. McManus, P, April
2000.
Interview with ‘Picket’ at STV industrial dispute Cowcaddens Glasgow April 2000.
Chapter 6.
Senior Resources Manager 6.1. 24 January 2000. Glasgow.
Senior Broadcast Manager 6.2. 17 January 2000. Glasgow.
Senior Resources Manager 6.3. 10 November 1999. Glasgow.
Senior Production Manager 6.4. 10 January 2000. Glasgow.
Resources Manager 6.5. 10 November 1999. Glasgow.
Freelance Manager 6.6. 10 January 2000. Glasgow.
Resources Manager 6.7. 10 November 1999. Glasgow.
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Senior Production Manager 6.8. 3 November 1999.Edinburgh.
Production Manager 6.9. 17 November 10 January 2000. Glasgow.
Broadcast Assistant, 6.10. 17 January 2000. Glasgow.
Human Resources Manager (not quoted) 3 November 1999.
Acting Human Resources Manager (not quoted) 3 November 1999.
Chapter 7.
Independent Producer 7.1. 4 January 2000. Glasgow.
Independent Producer 7.2. 7 January 2000. Glasgow.
Independent Producer 7.3. 21 February 2000. Glasgow.
Independent Producer 7.4. 24 February 2000. Glasgow. (Not quoted).
Independent Producer 7.5 20 March 2000. Glasgow.
Independent Producer 7.6. 21 March 2000. Glasgow.
Independent Producer 7.7 21 March 2000. Glasgow. (Not quoted).
Independent Producer 7.8. (freelance/part-time) 21 March. 2000. Glasgow.
Producer-Director Freelancer. 11 April, 2000. Glasgow.
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Chapter 3.
The Political and Regulatory Context of the
UK Broadcasting Industry
1979-2002.
Introduction.
Four themes of labour process theory were outlined in the previous Chapter and which
contributed to a very comprehensive restructuring in the organization of work and
labour. Parallel to changes in the labour process during this period were a series of
legislative developments and which contributed to a sea-change in the attitude of
governments to broadcasting.
The television industry was significantly transformed in the period under review and,
in particular, the market for skilled labour within the sector changed out of all
recognition (Paterson, 2001:203). Changes in the regulative structure of the UK
broadcasting industry resulted in the increasing fragmentation of employment and the
emergence of a significant freelance labour market (Antcliff, 2005b:1). It is important
to determine why a highly regulated market for labour which included controlled
methods for entry into the broadcasting industry should have fragmented in this way.
The very significant policy inputs by various governments which sought to direct the
future of the industry, together with broader industrial relations legislation, were
critical factors but many other influences were at play. Legislation which was
designed to introduce competition to the industry would simultaneously contribute to
a restructuring of the employment relationship (Antcliff et al, 2005b:5).
While the period of inquiry to this study of change within the UK broadcasting
industry is predominantly between 1979 and 2002 – it is useful to briefly note (as an
aid to understanding how the changes in the regulation of the UK industry evolved)
one of the key conclusions of the recently published Burns Committee Report into the
future of the BBC (DCMS, 2004 & 2005). This can help explain how the radical
thrust of broadcasting policy which unfolded during the 1980s was largely adopted by
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legislators and BBC/ITV management in the interim period. The central conclusion of
the Burns Committee was that the BBC’s governance was seriously flawed and that
its institutional proposals to rectify these deficiencies were inadequate. The creation
of a Public Service Broadcasting Commission (‘PSBC’) was considered appropriate
in order to protect programming of a public service nature – the implication was clear,
the BBC had largely deserted its public service remit in favour of an overt
commercialism. While it would be misleading to reductively argue that the conceptual
framework developed by legislators during the 1980s completely dominated UK
broadcasting policy – the deregulatory impulses of, inter alia, the 1986 Peacock
Committee Report, had moved the issue of how the industry should be regulated to
the forefront of contemporary thinking (Collins, 2005:25). Legislative developments
(it will be shown) were strongly influenced by the work of Peacock
in the period since the 1980s.
3.1.
Context For Industry Change.
Television programming in 1946 was broadcast for approximately 28 hours per week
(Seymour Ure, 1991:186). In contrast, British television viewers in 1999 could choose
from over 40,000 hours of programming in any single week through the medium of
five terrestrial and well in excess of 250 digital satellite stations (European
Audiovisual Observatory, 1999). Since 1979 the television industry had been
subjected to a form of marketization which fragmented the industry (Murdock, 2003).
National policies across the world shifted from tight government control towards the
privatisation and deregulation of the media and telecommunications industries – the
UK was no exception (Goff, 2004:1). There was clearly now a real and tangible
television industry as opposed to what was once conceived of as being a largely
cultural experience and process.
In the post-war period, successive governments enacted legislation to direct expansion
in the provision of broadcasting by regulating both the content and the method of
delivery. This Chapter will outline and evaluate those critical pieces of broadcasting
legislation which helped structure the way in which the industry was regulated and
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shaped from the late 1970s. The year 1979 is symbolic in understanding
organizational and regulatory change within the UK television industry. This year can
be seen as the high water mark for both trade union control over the craft production
process and the enactment of legislation which treated the broadcasting industry as a
special case (i.e. insulated from market led regulation). After 1979, technological
advances would increase the numbers of channels and satellite platforms currently
available to what would have been unimaginable levels as recently as the mid 1980s.
By the mid 1980s profound and lasting changes had been made – not least the
transformation of employment arrangements when many television jobs which had
been permanent, became freelance or contract based (Platman, 2004: 578; Antcliff,
2005a,b.). Attitudes to careers, employment and craft within the broadcasting industry
changed enormously during the 1980s (Murdock, 2003). The notion that there was
something intrinsically unique about work within the industry or, indeed, about the
output of broadcasters, was eroded during this period as broadcasters began to
respond to accusations that the industry was the ‘last bastion of restrictive practices’.1
The two employment Acts which were passed in 1980 and 1982 were not enacted
specifically to regulate the broadcasting industry. Nevertheless they had a significant
impact upon how the industry would come to be structured during the 1980s and
1990s. The thrust of broadcasting policy and legislation had traditionally been
‘illustrative of the evaluative ideas and terms encountered in national culture and
politics’ and broadcasting legislation had largely reflected the cultural policy concerns
of successive governments (Harrison, 2000:45). As far back as 1974 broadcasting had
been categorised as a tradable service and not as a cultural activity in the European
courts and the resulting legal definition of broadcasting (which effected copyright and
employment law) meant that broadcasting was now legally considered as an industry
for the first time (Hood & Peterssen, 1997:61). By the mid 1980s the view that the
performance of broadcasting organizations could be substantially improved if market
forces were allowed to play a prominent role became commonplace (Dyson &
Humphreys, 1988; Pratten, 2001).
1 Mrs Thatcher famously referred to the employment practices of ITV during the early 1980s as being
‘the last bastion of restrictive practices’.
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One of the most significant contributors to change within the comfortable duopoly of
UK broadcasting was the introduction in 1982 of Channel 4 – challenging the
established positions of both the BBC and ITV and operating as a ‘publisher
broadcaster’ (Tulloch, 1990). Channel 4 would soon test the longevity of the
vertically integrated producer broadcaster system (Kustow, 1987). Ushered in under
the directive of the Broadcasting Act, 1980 it was conceived and established so that it
would not simply replicate the existing diet of commercial television. With its
dependence and, indeed, its encouragement of the independent television production
sector, Channel 4 would become one of the cornerstones of change within the UK
broadcasting industry.
The period after 1979 begat a revolution in the organization, production and
distribution of television programming, together with an equally significant change in
both the labour process and technical innovation (Dyson & Humphreys, 1988). The
UK television industry was cited as an exemplar of the transition from a Fordist mass
production system of broadcasting to one concerned with ‘flexible specialization’
(Cunningham & Jacka, 1996:126). This did not happen immediately, but the move
from a highly regulated industry in the period up until the mid to late 1980s, and the
subsequent emergence of a de-regulated production environment, requires a more
detailed explanation. Legislative imperatives included a role for markets within
broadcasting organizations which emerged as a critical organizational principle for
broadcasting with its key policy preoccupations of finance and labour deregulation
(Franklin, 2001:10).
Commercial (ITV) and public service (BBC) television in the UK had been operating
in a highly regulated environment where neither party competed in terms of
programming or work organization (Cave et al, 2004). In the period from the mid
1980s the ITV Network was exposed to severe competition for advertising revenue
from satellite broadcasters. For its part, the BBC was facing ideological threats to the
renewal of the statutory licence fee (Saundry & Nolan, 1998). Further, the
development of a publisher-broadcaster model marked a shift from a vertically to a
horizontally integrated model and helped to develop the independent production
sector. By the mid 1990s the commercial sector moved irrevocably towards a
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concentration of ownership in the hands of a few large ITV companies while the BBC
experienced significant change in its organization – moving to a directorate system
and internal market. After the Broadcasting Act, 1990 independent producers became
a very important source of programming material for both BBC and ITV and
contributed to the break up of the comfortable duopoly (Sparks, 1994). All of these
factors are central to any comprehensive study of organizational and industry change
during this period. (The following Section briefly details the regulation of the industry
before its restructuring during the 1980s).
3.2.
U.K Television Broadcasting 1950-1979.
While this work does not address the contextual history of broadcasting in the period
before the late 1970s – it is interesting to note that the first challenges to what was
viewed as a comfortable monopoly/duopoly emerged, not during the 1980s but,
rather, in the 1950s. In the 1940s and ‘50s television was perceived as an evolution of
the existing radio service and, as a consequence, should be regulated using the
established principles of public service broadcasting (Briggs, 1995). The first
challenge to the BBC’s monopoly came from a London School of Economics
academic (Coase) in his work on British broadcasting and monopoly. He challenged
the two arguments underpinning support for the BBC monopoly, namely, technical
considerations (spectrum scarcity) and programming quality (Coase, 1950). The
Beveridge Committee, while not explicitly acknowledging Coase’s arguments,
proceeded to critique the idea of monopoly broadcasting with a broad acceptance of
the merits of the Coase position (Beveridge, 1951: para 185).
The passing of legislation establishing commercial broadcasting in Britain in 1954 can
be seen now as a watershed in terms of a new and broadly commercial attitude to
broadcasting. While the commercial network mirrored public service lines, the UK
was one of the first countries in Europe to abandon the State monopoly in
broadcasting (Van den Bulck & Van Pecke, 1996). The new ITV Network was to
carry local news in an attempt to separate it from its competitor while, at the same
time, complementing the public service ethos of the BBC. In reality, market forces
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would later squeeze the Network into the hands of just a few large ITV franchise
companies, thus negating the importance of the smaller regional voices (Seymour-
Ure, 1991). The consolidation of the Network was of concern to the IBA well before
the rush to concentration of ownership in the late 1990s. However for a brief period,
real and sustained competition and choice seemed available to viewers and the BBC’s
monopoly was to be superseded by the arrival of 14 privately owned ITV companies.
This latest addition to the UK broadcasting arena quickly developed a unique style
and the formality of traditional BBC broadcasting was replaced by a new commitment
to informality and the direction of programming moved towards a traditionally
ignored segment of the marketplace, namely popular culture.
The Pilkington Report.
The history of the regulation of the broadcasting industry can be understood, in part,
through the development of debates over issues of quality, populism, accountability
and ownership. The conclusions of a succession of reports and inquiries into the
industry inched towards an ever more critical analysis of established views of the
available TV service. By the early 1960s the Pilkington Committee made a number of
far reaching recommendations, with responsibility for the expansion of broadcasting
being given to the BBC. The most important elements of the proposed expansion
included a second BBC channel and a network of local radio stations. In addition, it
was suggested that the regulatory body, the Independent Television Association
(‘ITA’), should begin to schedule programming for the ITV Network. The Report also
proposed that the ITA should assume sole responsibility for dealing with advertisers
so that such commercial transactions would not compromise the programme makers.
With regard to what was seen as excessive (monopoly) profits, the Committee
proposed the introduction of a levy (in addition to standard corporation tax) and it was
suggested that this levy should apply to all advertising revenue in excess of GBP 1.5
million. The Report is now, however, best remembered for two conclusions – that
television audiences were vulnerable and required protection from broadcasters and,
further, that programming produced by ITV was of poor aesthetic quality (Collins,
2005:10).
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The Annan Report.
By the time the Annan Report emerged in 1977, the difficulties surrounding the
frequent changes in government during the early to mid 1970s had taken their toll.
The Committee was formed during a period of intense criticism of the existing
duopoly – critics were unhappy with an unaccountable BBC although it was still
accepted that the Corporation remained the most important cultural organization in the
nation (Annan, 1977: para 8.1). Annan was also careful to express the consideration
that the BBC should remain as the national instrument of broadcasting in the country
(Annan, 1977: 476). He did, however, deviate from the Pilkington position by
recognising that spectrum scarcity led to a problem of broadcasting regulation.
Broadcasting regulation in the UK had traditionally resolved the spectrum problem
by providing a centralized service with a particularly heavy top-down regulatory
approach. Annan provided evidence of a new system of thinking within broadcasting
with the radical proposal that television audiences were sufficiently competent to
make sophisticated decisions about their own viewing preferences.
Annan believed that only government regulation could remedy the inherent failures of
the market. No real privatisation of the BBC could have been countenanced and the
Report was largely satisfied with the use of resources by the Corporation. In addition,
the Annan Committee was concerned that the establishment of a fourth channel
should not replicate the existing broadcast offerings and their Report reflected a
growing disenchantment with the regulatory arrangements for broadcasting. The
Committee considered recommending breaking up the BBC but, ultimately,
acknowledged that the breadth of its existing resources allowed the Corporation to
produce programming of a particularly high quality. The critical difference between
the Pilkington and Annan conclusions was the latter’s concern, expressed in
regulatory form for the first time, that viewers and listeners should be placed (at least)
on a par with the interests of management and regulatory bodies. However, the
extremely influential Peacock Report of 1986 would place these seemingly significant
changes in an appropriate context.
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3.3.
Pre-Peacock De-regulatory Manoeuvrings.
The first step taken by the incoming Conservative administration in 1979 to open the
telecommunications and broadcasting industries to market forces emerged in the early
1980s. The Hunt Committee Report into the feasibility of securing benefits from
emerging cable technology concluded (in its first Report) that high capacity cable
systems could provide wide and expansive services – including television and
business services (Home Office, 1983). Indeed, what was happening in the field of
telecommunications in the early 1980s may now be seen as a forerunner in the
evolution of methods directed at regulating the UK broadcasting industry. During
their evidence to the Hunt Committee, both the Independent Broadcasting Authority
(‘IBA’) [the ITV regulatory authority] and the BBC expressed serious reservations
about an uneven playing field. In the first instance, the IBA was concerned that
unregulated cable stations would have an advantage in the search for audiences over
the heavily regulated ITV sector. Cable television policy was described in the 1983
White Paper as ‘the cross roads at which broadcasting and telecommunications issues
meet’ (Home Office, 1983:5).
The first Broadcasting Act (1980) to be passed under the new administration included
elements which attempted to ensure that the new channel would be different. Firstly,
the IBA was duty bound to ensure that programmes contained a suitable proportion of
programming designed to appeal to tastes not generally catered for by ITV. Secondly,
the IBA had to ensure that a suitable proportion of the programmes were of an
educational nature and, critically, that the encouragement of innovation and
experiment in the form and content of programming was pre-eminent.
3.4.
The Move to Marketization: The Peacock Report.
For the Conservative administrations of the early 1980s the BBC, in particular, was
seen as a prime example of inefficiency, excessive bureaucracy and waste in the
public sector (Foster, 1992:46). The years after the introduction of colour television in
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the early 1970s had seen substantial increases in revenue for the BBC because of the
growth in the number of colour TV licenses. However, by the mid 1980s revenues
were falling in real terms. The BBC’s request for a substantial increase in the licence
fee in December 1984 led to the establishment of the Peacock Committee and the
recommendations which emerged from its deliberations on the case for renewal of the
BBC’s statutory licence fee were considered ground breaking (Elstein, 1999).
Peacock was the first parliamentary committee which was not required to have regard
to the public service element of broadcasting as its primary consideration. The
Committee (set up in 1985) to examine the financing of the BBC concluded that the
franchise holders within the commercial ITV Network had demonstrated an
impressive ability to structure their various businesses so as to minimize their liability
to both tax and levy (Collins et al, 1988:125). The terms of reference included an
obligation to assess the effects of the proposal to introduce advertising to the BBC as
either an alternative or supplement to its income stream. Peacock immediately
recognized that it would not be possible to fully adhere to the terms of reference laid
out by the Home Secretary (i.e. the financing of the BBC) without considering the
entire regulatory infrastructure of the UK broadcasting industry. The apparent
goodwill felt by Peacock towards the organizational structures of the ITV Network
was evident early on in meetings of the Committee. One Committee member (a
former Controller of BBC Scotland) told the trade paper Broadcast that Professor
Peacock remarked at an early meeting;
We are all agreed, aren’t we, that we are going to have advertising on the BBC?
(Broadcast, 1986:25).
While Peacock’s conclusions were quite complex, the central proposals therein were
relatively clear and precise. It was considered that monopoly profits were being
shared between the franchise holders and the trade unions, with the taxpayer being
poorly remunerated for the provision of licenses to broadcast (Saundry, 2001). From
the outset it was obvious that the Committee were quite expansionist in their terms of
reference. Peacock indicated that;
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Before we can devise guidelines for the financing of broadcasting, we have to specify
its purposes (Peacock, 1986, Cmnd 9824).
There was concern in some quarters in the period up to the formation of the
Committee that the government would simply pack it with members sympathetic to
free market economics (O’Malley, 1994:94). The Home Secretary announcing the
formation of the Peacock Committee provided the group with a broad canvas upon
which to deliberate. Peacock implicitly acknowledged that any alteration of the
established regulated television market would require a fundamental change in the
way in which both governments and broadcasters conceived of the organization of
cultural production and distribution (Ryan, 1991). The reputation the BBC had
developed was based on its ability to attract ‘extraordinary personalities and
exceptional talent’ (Barnett & Curry, 1994:46). The Corporation was a tightly
regulated institution and had perfected a style and format for broadcasting and
production which was seen as the industry standard. The fundamental challenge to the
BBC from Peacock was the direct implication that changes would have to be made to
the very core of the organization – i.e. how the BBC produced programming and
financed itself. Peacock recommended a series of alterations to the licence-fee
arrangements and proposed that it should be linked to the RPI (retail price index).
This would, obviously, result in the Corporation achieving a level of independence
from government while simultaneously providing an incentive to control costs.
Three areas were to be addressed in the Report, – firstly, an assessment of the effects
of the introduction of advertising or sponsorship on the BBC’s Home Services (either
as a supplement or an alternative to the income received from the licence fee). In
addition the Committee included a broad point of reference for consideration –
namely, the effect that advertising would have on the financial structure of the
Corporation, ITV, cable providers, the press and the advertising industry. It also
considered the impact that advertising would have on the quality and breadth of
programming and put forward proposals for securing income from the consumer other
than directly through the licence fee.
The Peacock Report (published in July 1986) can most usefully be analysed under
four headings (Goodwin, 1998:234). Firstly, its general attitude to broadcasting,
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secondly, its consideration of the central question of the continued financing of the
BBC, its more general approach to the longer term existence of the Corporation and,
finally, its recommendations with regard to the entire UK broadcasting system. The
Report was a complex mix of adherence to the ideals and realities of public service
broadcasting with a commitment to an overhaul of the funding arrangement and
organizational structure of the industry. Peacock devoted much space to the issues of
cost reduction and the efficiency of resource allocation and highlighted the
complexity of quality and cost of public service broadcasting (Peacock, 1986: para
598).
The Report concluded that in conditions of spectrum scarcity, public service
broadcasting had provided viewers with a range of cost effective and high quality
programming. This was achieved – Peacock contended – by a system of licence fee
provision for broadcasting with the implication being that the quality of programming
was superior to that which could have been provided by an advertising financed
system. This was the central core of the Report – whereas, in contrast, consideration
of the efficient use of resources had not been a significant element of either the
Pilkington or Annan Reports. Peacock concluded that greater financial pressure on the
BBC and the ITV Networks was the driving force necessary to deliver improved
efficiency. Large-scale free market reforms for the Corporation were not favoured –
Peacock argued in favour of a sophisticated market system with no direct introduction
of advertising on the BBC (Peacock, 1986:para, 421/ 592).
The Report broadly accepted the argument that in a market where the number of
television channels was severely limited (by spectrum scarcity) an unregulated
advertising financed broadcasting system would not deliver an adequate response to
the needs of a broad viewing public. Peacock took the view that both the BBC and
ITV Networks had been more successful in providing a genuine consumer market
than any truly laissez-faire system. In terms of the cost of programming, Peacock
went further and suggested that broadcasting authorities had not only mimicked the
market but had provided packages of programmes to audiences at remarkably low
costs (Peacock, 1986, para 582).
77
Peacock did proceed to question the cost structure of UK television. The Report
concluded that public service institutions suffered from an endemic weakness in their
approach to cost control and efficiencies. It also suggested that no amount of
prompting by accountants or consultants could replace the discipline of a fully
competitive market for television programming. Peacock’s objectives were seen by
many as a combination of the political/ideological together with an effort to improve
broadcasting competitiveness (Collins, 2005:13). The Report also noted that the
significant increases in the cost of programming in the mid 1980s were due to
industrial relations difficulties difficulties in the ITV sector – and not because of
programme cost inflation in the BBC (Campling, 1997). The Report was insistent that
there should be an early introduction of the available and significant new technologies
in order to reduce the cost of programming (Murdock, 2000).
The reality of the broadcasting environment upon which Peacock reported was one
where the cost of labour was the single greatest element. Traditionally the BBC had
considered labour costs to be fixed and these were treated in the same way as, for
example, a studio and rarely ever individualized. A set number of technicians would
work on a particular type of programme, or on a particular day of the week (Jacobs,
1983:132). Peacock believed that technological change would make it possible for
consumers to identify their programming preferences through price in a pay-per-view
process and this would have the benefit of eliminating the need to employ wasteful
levels of resources (Collins, 2005:14).
The BBC reacted quickly to the change in policy which ensued from the Peacock
Committee findings. By1986 the Corporation had begun to develop new managerial
strategies to deal with the potential reduction in revenues, and including the proposal
that all peripheral services (including cleaning) should be contracted out. By 1987 the
BBC had implemented a new system for staff paid on a weekly basis and this reduced
the original thirty pay bands to five while also removing some demarcation
boundaries (Goodwin, 1997). The following year saw a further hollowing out of
traditional BBC terms of employment and working conditions, and in 1988 an
agreement with technicians working in News removed the crew minima (minimum
crewing levels) which had, traditionally, greatly concerned management (McKinlay &
Quinn, 1999). The removal of minimum crewing levels saved GBP 8 million pounds
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annually according to newspaper reports of the time (Financial Times, 24/9/87) In the
same year the then Director General (Michael Checkland) decreed that all restrictive
practices should end before 1989.
Peacock recommended an indexation of the licence fee but with no advertising for the
foreseeable future. Further, the Report suggested that the BBC should ultimately
move to a system funded by subscription and supplemented by grants (Peacock, 1986:
para 673). The finding that the BBC should consider the concept of subscription
would later prove unworkable both for financial and ideological reasons. Research
undertaken at the time suggested that the difficulties in terms of subscription were not
technical but, rather, that the concept of subscribing or paying directly for television
services would not be popular with audiences (Booz Allen, 1987). It will be seen that
almost by accident, the most significant effect of Peacock upon the UK broadcasting
industry would be felt within the ITV Network (Crissel, 2002:234). The 1990s would
alter the reality of the UK broadcasting industry from what had been recognized as a
comfortable duopoly – replaced by a ‘triadic oligopoly’ (Collins, 2005:16).
Peacock made a series of recommendations for commercial television – a critical
proposal being that franchises for ITV contracts should be issued after a period of
competitive tendering (Goodwin, 1997:109-122) It was argued that competition for
tenders would have the merit of raising revenue for the ‘consolidated fund for
broadcasting’ (Barnett & Curry, 1994). He further proposed that the IBA should
establish what were termed minimum performance standards for ITV contractors and
that all franchises should remain under the regulation of the IBA. The franchises were
to be awarded on a rolling review basis so as to reward franchise holders who had
fulfilled all promised contractual and programming details. On the other hand, it
would also have the effect of penalising unsatisfactory performers. The commercial
television industry’s franchise competition in 1991 broadly maintained the ITV
Network with its characteristic split between three major and ten/twelve
smaller/regional operators. The major changes in management objectives and
processes were a sharpened cost awareness together with the introduction of
procedural mechanisms in the specifics of the production process. The
recommendations of the Peacock Report would act as one of the central motivating
factors for the reform of industrial relations within the ITV Network (Ursell, 1998). It
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can truly be said that Peacock signalled the beginning of the end to the old system of
British broadcasting (Barnett & Curry, 1994).
3.5.
Broadcasting in the 1990s and Beyond.
The 1988 White Paper, Broadcasting in the ‘90s took its ideological inspiration from
the conclusions of the Peacock Report (Home Office, 1988 Cm 517). The
deregulatory nature of Peacock attempted to place the viewer at the centre of all future
regulatory or policy making and sought to create, for the first time, an open and
competitive market for the broadcast product (Peacock, 1986:592: 547). The White
Paper proposed that the BBC should remain as the cornerstone of British broadcasting
while noting that the government looked forward to the eventual replacement of the
licence fee. It also included a reference to the important role that independent
producers would play in the new and less regulated broadcasting environment of
the1990s (Home Office, 1988: 41).
The critical proposal in the White Paper was that there should be greater separation
between the various functions which made up the broadcasting process. This was
suggested in order to counter what the authors saw as the excessive vertical
integration inherent within the UK television industry (Deakin & Pratten, 2000).
Further, all television services (including the BBC) would be given freedom to raise
additional finance through what it termed subscription and/or sponsorship. There was
an almost immediate organizational response by BBC management to the White Paper
(Born, 2004:50). Back in November 1988, senior BBC management had issued a
warning that all ‘Spanish or restrictive practices’ must be eradicated by the end of that
month as they were concerned that the inquiry by the Monopolies and Merger
Commission (‘MMC’) would target such practices. Significantly in its report
published in late 1988 the MMC admitted that it had been largely unsuccessful in its
attempts to identify any blatant examples of restrictive practices currently in operation
within the BBC (Franklin, 2001:60).
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3.6.
The Broadcasting Act, 1990.
The best illustration of the influence of free market ideas on television policy was not
what was included in the 1990 Act but, rather, what was omitted – cable and satellite
technology were to be left to the market place (Smith, 1999:4). The legislation which
emerged in 1990, while not endorsing all of the recommendations of the Peacock
Report of 1986 (and the White Paper’s proposals), provided for 25 per cent of
programme production to be contracted out to the independent production sector. This
was the single most important element of the Broadcasting Act, 1990 and it would
have a radical impact on the entire structure of broadcasters – from the commissioning
process through to the organization of production resources. This radical approach
had its origins in the Peacock Report which considered that the vertically integrated
structure of British broadcasting was a historical precedent which contributed to
industrial relations problems. Reduced in-house production as a result of the
introduction of independent quotas were to result in large-scale redundancies in the
BBC and ITV (Antcliff et al, 2005b:5).
The 1990 legislation sought to develop the notion of competition within programme
production while severing the essential link between programme production and
broadcasting. In short, broadcasters could produce programming for other
organizations and for the first time the trademark Granada and Thames Television
logos were to be seen at the end of programming broadcast on the BBC. In addition,
government supported the radical proposal that ITV franchise renewal should be
subjected to a bidding system which, although subject to strict criteria on issues such
as programme quality, centered upon the franchisee’s ability to fund the cost of the
franchise. The issue of cost control became the critical subject for management within
existing and new franchise holders. In addition, ITV’s regional monopoly over
advertising revenue was to be removed thus allowing Channel 4 to sell its own
advertising. Both the BBC and the ITV Networks had already begun the process of
cost reduction and general restructuring before the Broadcasting Act, 1990 directed
the government towards;
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A blitzkrieg on UK broadcasting institutions, values, practices and employment
which greatly accelerated and shaped the process of change (Ursell, 2000:152).
The hugely important changes in the organization of production, the concentration on
cost reduction and the restructuring of industrial relations were not short-term
measures. They were, in fact, a reflection of deep-seated change within the industry.
The term ‘efficiency’ was translated, clearly, as cuts (in budgets) (Born, 2004:58). In
the decade 1986-1997 the various ITV companies shed 44 per cent of their staff
(Ursell, 1997). Between 1990 and 1995 total employment within the ITV companies
which had retained their contracts to broadcast during the franchise auctions, fell by
more than 28 per cent. These figures conceal an even more substantial fall in
permanent employment and a significant rise in the number of short-term and
freelance contracts (Saundry, 2001). The previous guarantees of employment in the
BBC or the various ITV companies were replaced in the 1990s by increasing
casualization of employment (estimated by 1996 to be about 60 % of the workforce).
(Paterson, 1998)
By the mid 1990s the UKs broadcasting production workforce could count a total of
some 50 per cent of its members as freelance (Woolf & Holly, 1994). Job insecurity
had become a way of life for a whole new generation of production workers, and
which was in stark contrast to the very formalized and rigid employment structures of
their predecessors. The establishment (through the Broadcasting Act, 1990) of the
Independent Television Network Centre (‘ITNC’) had the effect of consolidating the
decision making process in relation to commissioning arrangements. ITV companies
were forced, through the emergence of the ITNC, to cut costs in order to remain
competitive in the search for additional commissions (Berkeley, 2003). The ACTT
and The Broadcasting and Entertainment Trades Alliance, (‘BETA’) trade unions
subsequently argued that the Broadcasting Act, 1990 was one of the factors
contributing to the erosion of the highly regulated broadcasting environment which
existed in the UK up until the 1980s (Campling, 1997). The provision of an
independent scheduler was to be at the heart of the new-look ITV and this change
would allow the emergent independent producers to compete with the ITV franchises.
The independent sector had slowly emerged in the 1980s as a result of a small but
significant loosening of the grip on production by ITV and BBC.
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The period after the Broadcasting Act 1990, proved a difficult one for the successful
ITV franchise holders. Advertising revenue was hit almost immediately by the cable
and satellite competitors and by the change in the advertising status of Channel 4. In
1993 the franchise holders took 78 per cent of all TV advertising but within twelve
months the ITV sector had lost 3 per cent of the market. Unsurprisingly consolidation
followed quickly and Yorkshire and Tyne Tees were the first franchises to merge. In
1993 LWT purchased 14 per cent of Yorkshire Tyne Tees and in the same year
Granada paid GBP 68 million for a 15 per cent stake holding in LWT. By the end of
the decade a large proportion of ITV had been carved up by the three big franchise
holders, Carlton, Granada and United News and Media. The government had made it
clear that any future increases or, indeed, the continued existence of the licence fee
depended upon the BBC delivering cost reductions and value for taxpayers equity.
Within the ITV Network franchise renewal was largely predicated upon individual
franchise holders reducing the cost base of programming. With the new independent
production industry now flourishing, ITV and BBC managers (and even legislators)
could begin to examine the cost base for production across three different types of
broadcasters.
While the Broadcasting Act, 1990 was largely directed at improving efficiencies
within the commercial television sector, the BBC had not escaped an examination by
the then new Conservative administration. The Green Paper (published in 1992), The
Future of the BBC had one clear imperative - what it termed ‘value for money’ (DNH,
1992: Cm 2098). The concept of Producer Choice was not new and had first appeared
in 1990 when both the trade unions and producers were informed that in order to
make cost savings of almost 5 per cent (in the financial year beginning April 1991)
producers would be allowed to purchase essential services from external providers. Its
introduction had begun to change the culture of production within the Corporation.
While, traditionally, the programme makers were at the top of the organizational
pyramid within the BBC, the introduction of managerial strategies altered the
relationships between programme makers and managers and, in the process, created
new relationships (Harrison, 2000:64). A culture of entrepreneurialism entered the
Corporation for the first time signalling that the BBC was beginning to identify a role
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for itself in terms of the broader television marketplace (unpublished BBC document,
quoted in, Born, 2004:60);
The government has urged the BBC to improve its efficiency. The decision to hold
licence fee increases below the levels of inflation, as measured by the Retail Price
Index has encouraged the BBC to look for ways of reducing its costs (DNH,
1992:CM 2098).
The Corporation’s own statement of intent outlined a new strategy driven by the need
for labour and resource flexibility. The BBC committed itself to a radical change in its
organizational structure and this would quickly result in an increase in the number of
freelance and contract staff employed. Perhaps the most radical shift in strategic
thinking was the decision to break the Corporation up into directorates or
departments, and which were designed to function independently from one another.
As will be detailed in Chapter 6 the three central directorates were, Production,
(which dealt with programme making), Broadcast, (which was the commissioning
arm of the Corporation), and Resources, (which was concerned with supplying
essential production technology and skilled technicians on contract terms). Resources
could tender both for internal production work or for external contracts from
independent production companies.
The BBC moved to a position very quickly from 1993 onwards where all internal
transactions were conducted on the basis of a costing system and by means of formal
contracts. This was considered to be a valuable and cost saving initiative but the
process started from the belief that ‘there is no such thing as costless bargaining’
(Williamson, 1975). Each individual transaction between one department and another,
for example, involved a new expenditure of time and energy by either the individuals
or departments involved. These were not cost free manoeuvres and necessitated
substantial cost additions to an initiative which was designed to reduce cost (Ursell,
2000). However the principle behind such organizational change was clear and
mangers wanted to employ the language and logic of the marketplace within the BBC,
even if it didn’t always make commercial sense to do so. Breaking the culture of high
cost programming was to be of critical importance to BBC managers. The
implementation of regulatory changes which occurred within the broadcasting
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industry ultimately reflected the significant organizational change which was being
undertaken in other publicly funded institutions. Some noted the similarities between
what was termed the introduction of a ‘quasi-market’ system within the BBC and
those already in existence elsewhere in the public sector, most notably in the National
Health Service and local government (Deakin & Pratten, 2000:322).
The Broadcasting Act, 1996.
Almost a decade on from the Peacock Report a White Paper on Media Ownership and
Broadcasting was published in 1995, and in May 1995 the Department of National
Heritage published a Green Paper (DNH, 1995). The proposals therein offered a two
stage process for the proposed liberalization of media ownership in a way which
sustained media diversity but allowed British companies to flourish in a period of
rapid economic and political change. The Broadcasting Act, 1996 was the last major
piece of broadcasting legislation passed by the successive Conservative
administrations of the 1980s and 1990s.The aim of the legislation was to assist in the
emergence of British commercial broadcasters so that they might compete
successfully with international media organizations and, further, that the
organizational restructuring undertaken and supported by government could continue.
The Act emerged as a result of extensive consultation following the publication of the
Media Ownership Green Paper. The primary concern of the 1996 legislation was
digital terrestrial broadcasting and the questions of its ownership and control. The Act
incorporated almost all of the government’s proposals outlined in Media Ownership
and Broadcasting. These included the decision to allow newspaper groups with less
than 20 per cent of national newspaper circulation to apply to control television
broadcasters constituting up to 15 per cent of the total television market (Doyle,
2002:2). In addition the Act gave the regulator power to disallow such control where
it was deemed not to be in the public interest. To prevent the development of local
media monopolies the legislation forbade control by any newspaper group of a
regional ITV licence where that group had more than 30 per cent of regional or local
newspaper circulation.
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As noted, the main focus of the 1996 Act was to facilitate the introduction of the
world’s first digital terrestrial television service, (‘DTT’). However the UK
government’s inability to control market entry across the digital television industry
meant that the regulation and licensing of DTT was overshadowed by the launch of
the British Sky Broadcasting (‘BSB’) platform in 1996 (Smith, 1999:17). The 1996
legislation placed responsibility for issuing satellite licences with the Independent
Television Commission (‘ITC’). Government policy as outlined in the Broadcasting
Act, 1996 was concerned with ensuring that a number of distribution technologies and
platforms would be available. Despite the reservations of BSB, in particular, all of the
UK terrestrial broadcasters had indicated a willingness by 1997 to avail of the
Multiplex licences.2 The Broadcasting Act, 1996 had further given the power of
deciding between rival bids for the remaining Multiplex licences to the ITC and
criteria used to decide the fate of the licences included the following:
1. The extent of broadcast coverage.
2. The speed of rollout of the various services.
3. The ability to establish and maintain the proposed services.
4. The promotion of take up of digital decoders (Smith, 1999:21).
Two years later a Green Paper, Regulating Communications; Approaching
Convergence in the Digital Age was concerned to examine the implications for the
regulatory policy in place at the time, of expanding digital delivery technology (DTI
and DCMS, 1998:Cm4022). There was a concern with the complex and sometimes
overlapping system of broadcast regulation and where, traditionally, a number of
bodies were conferred with a responsibility for content while others dealt with issues
of competition. In essence the government believed that the expansion of digital
services would stretch the ability of various regulatory bodies to adequately respond
and meet their increasing obligations.
The government believed that in terms of the economic regulation of broadcasting
further legislative steps should be taken relating to the issue of competition. The
argument was made that there should be a withdrawal from excessive regulation and
2 Multiplex, was the title given to the ‘bundle’ of band-with available to potential digital broadcasters.
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any additional controls should only be concerned with ‘universal access’ and
‘bottleneck control’.3 The Green Paper had no definite proposals with regard to
regulatory change or for a slimmed down regulatory structure. However it did suggest
a number of preferred models for the future structure and these included, inter alia,
separate regulators for both infrastructure and for the content-providing industry.
Although the general thrust of the Green Paper was towards a ‘lighter touch
regulation’, signalling a move towards a single regulator covering media and
telecoms, the regulatory environment had become increasingly crowded in the period
since 1990 (Teather, 2000:10). The proliferation of regulatory bodies during the 1990s
(resulting from the Broadcasting Acts of 1990/1996) had prompted ‘contradictory
judgements of the same issue among regulators’ and had resulted in calls from both
broadcasters and politicians for a less complex system of regulation (Franklin,
2001:173). In a reference to the rapidly changing broadcasting industry it was noted
that;
[Since] 1996, media markets have changed to a significant degree and the time is now
right to review the Broadcasting Acts regime (DTI & DCMS, 2000: Cm 5010).
The White Paper, A New Future For Communications, provided for very significant
changes to the arrangements for the provision of licenses, and for ITV in particular. It
lifted the restriction prohibiting ownership of licenses which, when combined, would
deliver 15 per cent or more of a total audience share. The White Paper also removed
the restriction on a single company owning the two ITV London franchises. Finally,
in an important development, the White Paper invited comments on possible changes
to rules regarding cross-media ownership (DTI & DCMS, 2000:4.6.1)
The Communications Act, 2003.
As recently as 2003 further legislation continued to relax the controls on media
ownership within the UK. The rules, originally signalled in the 1990 legislation,
were altered to allow non-EU corporations and individuals to own UK
3 ‘Bottle neck control’ meaning the use of regulatory powers to remove obstruction to a well
performing broadcasting industry.
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broadcasting firms. The 15 per cent or one firm regulation was dropped together
with the prohibition on joint ownership of the London ITV franchises, joint
ownership of a national ITV franchise and Channel 5 (Goff, 2004:9). Cross media
restrictions were reduced – however rules restricting any newspaper owner with
20 per cent of the national newspaper market to no more that 20 per cent of an
ITV franchise did remain (Higham, 2003:35). The deregulatory essence of the Act
was intended to promote competition and investment, while maintaining plurality
and diversity (including a plurality test for proposed mergers, inter alia, the
proposed purchase by a firm of an ITV franchise) (Allen & Overy, 2003). In
preparation for the forthcoming switch from analogue to digital services, The
Office of Communications (‘OFCOM’) was established by legislation passed in
2002 and among its areas of concern is the role of ensuring that the proliferation
of TV services which have emerged over the last decade are of sufficiently high
standard.
Conclusion.
The regulatory environment within which the UK broadcasting industry operates has
been significantly transformed since the beginning of the 1980s. The following case
study Chapters will address specific firm based approaches to organizational change
within the industry. While there are subtle and significant differences in the methods
employed by the various parties in engaging with the paradigm of organizational
restructuring – some critical similarities can be identified. Legislation aimed at
restructuring the organizational basis of the industry (and which gave ITV companies,
the BBC and the independent production sector encouragement to re-regulate their
respective workplaces) provided a basis for radical change in the organizational
structure and labour process of contemporary television production.
The stable competitive environment and the tightly regulated labour market within the
ITV sector in the period up until the mid 1980s may be contrasted with the situation
pertaining in the late 1980s and 1990s. In the latter period, management successfully
challenged the National Agreements, encouraged annualised hours schemes and
demanded multi-skilling and multi-tasking (Ursell, 2000). For the ITV sector,
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legislative freedoms provided in the period after 1990, gave additional encouragement
to reclaim control over the labour process in the fight to remain profitable and redress
the balance of power on the shop floor. In this period of legislative upheaval the BBC
underwent a process of disaggregating its production, commissioning and technical
resources and while ITV was busily ‘re-aggregating’ (Born, 2004:132). Quite simply,
by the middle of the 1990s the ITV companies were engaging in mergers or
developing their production capacity in order to compete with the emerging and
increasingly aggressive independent sector.
Within the BBC, the decision to formally separate the Corporation into directorates
and, in particular, the separation of the BBC’s internal production arm from the
commissioning and resources directorates (in response to the implementation of
Producer Choice), was the most significant reaction to the imperatives of Peacock and
the Broadcasting Act, 1990. The traditional BBC organizational structure (with
control over entry to both employment and programming supply) had been replaced
by the legislatively driven move to a pluralized broadcasting environment (Collins,
2004). Broadcasting legislation in the period since 1990 – in particular through the
introduction of the 25 per cent quota for independent production within the BBC –
had resulted in a very serious erosion of ‘in-house programme making’ (Saundry,
1998:153). Deregulatory legislative changes were beginning to combine lower
production costs (and the introduction of high quality and relatively cheap sound and
recording equipment) with aggressive management techniques in order to force
through a far-reaching restructuring of the industry. The effects were a variation on
the virtuous circle for ITV/BBC/independent production company managers and
entrepreneurs who left the established industry to form their own independent
production companies. The legislation in place continued the emphasis for an opening
up of broadcasting markets – putting further pressure on the production cost base.
Management opportunities to demand flexibility of employees and trade unions
increased and offered the possibilities of enhanced profit levels and a rejection of
tightly regulated organizational structures (Barnatt & Starkey, 1994).
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Having considered the critical role of legislative change in contributing to industry
restructuring it is appropriate and informative to now move to consider the initial case
study.
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Chapter 4.
Management, Work and Industrial Relations:
British Commercial Television,
1979-2000.
Introduction.
When you are an electrician with a Gucci jumper and a pair of slip-on shoes and you
are running around putting in a light bulb for GBP 30,000 per year and having trips
abroad ‘first class’ you are not going to give that up. In 1989 we told the union what
the pay settlement was, imagine that, only 5% this year but we also had to deal with
the nonsense of demarcation and gross over- manning.4
As indicated previously the UK commercial television sector (ITV) has been much
vaunted as an exemplar of the transition from a Fordist mass production system to one
which took its inspiration from the ‘flexible specialisation’ thesis. Changes in the
sector reflect movement from slothful, hierarchical bureaucracies to loose, dynamic
networks of small production companies and from inflexible, electrical-mechanical
technologies to the new possibilities of relatively inexpensive technologies. The
metamorphosis from a Fordist political economy of broadcasting to one which adopts
the flexible specialization model was triggered by external shocks to the broadcasting
system (Blair & Rainnie, 1998). For the ITV sector during the 1980s and 1990s,
examples of shock included the formation of new employer strategies in order to
reign-in what were viewed as the excessive applications of trade union power and the
emergence of new, lighter and cheaper broadcast technologies (Campling, 1992). The
implementation of legislation pertaining to industrial relations and trade unions
enacted between 1980 and 1992, allied to the remaking of industrial relations in the
period after the end of national bargaining, had a profound impact. From the mid
1980s the ITV Network was exposed to increasingly significant competitive threats –
most notably from the emergent satellite and cable industries which began to compete
4 Interview with John Calvert, former Director of Industrial Relations, Independent Television
Association (ITVA).
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for advertising revenues. This competitive shock triggered an assault by ITV
employers upon the fundamental tenet of regulation, i.e. national collective
bargaining.
The temptation to attribute the restructuring of collective bargaining and, by default,
the remaking of the ITV Network solely to the political imperatives of neo-liberalism
should be resisted. While the legislation which changed the industrial relations terrain
was important, it was a fact that major shifts in ITV employers’ strategy were already
emerging in parallel with neo-liberalism. This case study explores the major
differences in employer strategy at firm level together with a strengthening in the ITV
employers’ capacity for collective action through their association, ITVA. The
development of the ITVAs strategy alongside a shift in theoretical readings of the
move to a de-regulated economy is considered in Chapter 1 (1.2.). Industrial relations
within the ITV Network were characterized by high levels of union involvement in
formal collective bargaining frameworks. The ITV sector had typically exhibited all
the usual characteristics of public sector national bargaining – i.e. recognition of trade
unions together with the promotion of collective bargaining, a high proportion of trade
union membership, comprehensive National Agreements and an implicit commitment
to being a good employer. The formality of the industrial relations system was
augmented by a highly developed system of union organization and job control at
shop floor level (Danford, 2005:16). Broadcasting licenses were granted on the basis
not just of programming plans but regard was also had of available capital equipment
and labour. State regulation was paralleled by national collective bargaining. For the
employers, any radical reshaping of the labour process and employment contracts
necessarily involved breaking with national collective bargaining.
This case study begins with an outline of the commercial ITV sector in its heavily
regulated state. Regulation of work within the commercial television industry was
controlled in two ways. Top down regulation was the direct result of the
implementation of the National Agreements negotiated between trade unions and ITV
management and, secondly, bottom up regulation was based upon the vital craft skills
of workers. Development and maintenance of craft skills was central to trade unions
in gaining control over production and broadcast but the emerging production
technologies during the late 1970s and 1980s were adopted, in part, by management to
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counter union control. Technological advancement was identified by management as
an important vehicle whereby capital could be used to help wrest control over the
labour process from organized labour (Braverman, 1974). The newspaper industry
provided a parallel and an exemplar (for the ITVA) where the aggressive introduction
of new print technology was coupled with an adversarial approach to collective
bargaining. Investment in specific shop-floor technologies was particularly attractive
to management within the UK newspaper industry in the late 1980s because of the
extent of union control over employment and production within the workplace.
During the 1980s the change to photocomposition effectively rendered obsolete many
of the craft skills of the compositor (Gennard & Dunn, 1983). Traditional
relationships which existed between management and craft unions prior to the mid-
1980s were based on the need to maintain production at all times and to devolve shop
floor management to skilled employees. The critical importance of craft to the output
of product within both the newspaper and broadcasting industries meant that
management viewed the indulgence of union demands as a price worth paying in
order to maintain a peaceful industrial relations’ environment. It has been previously
noted that while major shifts in employer strategy were emerging in parallel with
industrial relations’ strategies of the Thatcher administration from 1979-1983, major
shifts were emerging at individual ITV firm level. 4.1 and 4.2 will outline the role of
both the employers’ associations and National Agreements in achieving a relatively
quiet industrial relations environment.
4.1
‘Tales of Corruption’.5
Nothing would please me more than to be able to turn the clock back some 25 years
and start again.6
The role of employers’ organizations was fundamental to the British system of
industrial relations – over a protracted period – in traditional industries of the
Victorian era and in a later time (and in a very different industry) when they would
5 Interview with David Elstein, former Thames Television, Director.
6 Towers, HTV to TSW, 9 November, 1983 (ITVA B53/Box 24).
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contribute to the regulation of the ITV sector. The 1960s onwards witnessed
employers designing bargaining procedures which had the effect of drawing conflict
away from the workplace and into regional and national forums. The objective of such
centripetal processes was to make the union official (and not the shop-steward) the
focal point of collective bargaining. This inherently unstable arrangement opened a
gap between formal, rule-driven bargaining procedures and informal workplace
bargaining – usually regulated by custom and practice (Danford, 2005:169). In
commercial television informal bargaining simply supplemented and improved upon
national settlements. In the period before 1979, collective bargaining was highly
adversarial but the two competing ideologues – the employers’ association and the
main trade union – effectively marginalized each other’s effectiveness.
Employers’ associations played a critical role in shaping the development of British
industrial relations. The internal politics of these bodies mirrored those of trade unions
and the master plans of employers’ associations were inevitably compromised by
regional, sectoral and firm-specific strategies (see, inter alia, Zeitlin, 1991; McIvor,
1996; Adams, 1997, 506-30). This tension between solidarity and schism was no less
true of commercial television. The ITVA had two main functions – primarily as a
clearing-house for commercial discussions about Network programming, and for
financial transfers between member companies. The other prime function of the ITVA
was as the commercial companies’ negotiating body with the trade unions at national
level. The ITVAs negotiating strategy was formulated by a committee composed of
one representative each from the smaller ITV franchise holders. Organizationally the
Association was relatively weak as it had a limited secretariat, no powerful central
officers and did not attempt to develop a central strategy. Its core policy was diluted
to the status of providing helpful guidelines for individual member companies and it
simply provided the administrative mechanisms of formal collective bargaining. As
shall be shown, the employers’ strategy in the period up until the mid 1980s was one
of containment and bargaining over the national wage rates and crewing arrangements
which set the industry’s minimum standards. The Association’s limited strategic
ambitions were critical to maintaining employer allegiance (Seglow, 1978:252). For
the ITVA’s lead negotiator, the ITV companies ‘were separate PLCs, they were in
competition with one another although they were in the Association. I was lobbied
like hell. For example, I would be told by one company that it wanted a very low
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settlement this year because things are not so good and then you would get Richard
Dunn or Brian Cowgill (Thames) saying for Christ’s sake don’t rock the boat’.7
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s television workers held on to the core belief of
the importance of their craft. Management remained dependent upon the goodwill and
cooperation of craft grades in order to introduce new technology on any significant
scale. The difficulty inherent in operating much of the traditional technology required
to produce programming during the period up until the mid 1980s meant that both
trade union and worker control of the labour process was virtually total. The
complexity of much of the machinery involved in maintaining normal programming
schedules contributed to the achievement of demands from the unions for substantial
increases in earnings in return for the (low) level flexibility that the industry (even in
the late 1970s) was seeking. Since the advent of UK commercial television, ACTT
members had regularly taken responsibility for a number of important production
decisions. Indeed, ACTT leadership encouraged what some viewed as a policy of
encroachment into the management arena. This largely guildist approach was
wholeheartedly embraced by ACTT membership on the shop floor while management
quietly acquiesced so that something resembling a normal working environment could
be maintained. The collapse of the guild strategy occurred during the mid/late 1980s
as the ITV unions failed to grapple successfully with an ITV management buoyed up
by technical change, together with a changed political environment and most
importantly of all, the dismantling of the National Agreements which had regulated
the industry.
As early as 1983 management were beginning to articulate – through ITVA
correspondence – their dissatisfaction with the way skilled technicians held the reins
of power within the ITV franchises. In an internally generated document circulated to
the board of directors of Thames Television, managers referred to the historical
context of the monopoly 1970s and anticipated the competitive environment of the
coming decade. Likening the shop floor technicians to whom they had to concede
authority in order to maintain a quiet industrial relations environment, as ‘shop floor
Dick Turpins’, ITV managers were in no doubt they were employing technicians on
7 Interview with John Calvert.
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terms which were extremely favourable for the workers concerned. 4.2 (following)
will outline the way in which the commercial television sector was regulated in the
period when the National Agreements between employers and trade unions dominated
the industry. The moves by ITV employers to radically restructure the employment
relationship, hesitant at first but later determined and ruthless, will subsequently be
considered.
4.2
National Agreements and Regulation;
A Relatively Quiet Industrial Relations Environment.
We are selling the labour of our members for the highest and best price, using any
and every related reason to get it. That is what a trade union leader does. He is not a
philosopher or a Socialist writer. I am a trade union negotiator and I am selling a
product.8
Up until the late 1980s questions relating to industrial relations within commercial
broadcasting were dealt with through national collective bargaining involving seven
trade unions.9 The process of negotiation was organized through the Labour Relations
Committee of the ITVA. The committee consisted of a single representative from the
five largest and most powerful ITV companies, together with two alternating
individuals representing the smaller ITV franchises. National Agreements, brokered
between trade union representatives and ITV managers for most of the 1970s and
early 1980s, had (as noted) provided for a relatively quiet industrial relations
environment. These National Agreements were comprehensive and included agreed
positions on diverse issues including minimum rates of pay for full-time workers and
the conditions of employment for contract employees.
8 Obituary of Alan Sapper, ACTT, Daily Telegraph 15 May, 2006.
9 Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied Trades (‘ACTT’), Broadcasting and
Entertainment Trades Alliance, (‘BETA’), National Union of Journalists (‘NUJ’), Electrical,
Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union, (‘EETPU’), The Writers Guild, Equity,
Musicians Union (‘MU’).
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The labour process within the ITV sector and the broadcasting industry as a whole
was highly regulated. Television production was, as previously indicated, a craft
industry where a number of different trades operated independently of one another.
Similarly, individuals and groups of workers within the commercial television
industry believed that their particular artistic and technical skills afforded them an
elite position within the industry (Campling, 1992:234). The ACTT was the guild
which ensured these workers sustained a critical role within the programme
production. BETA, contained many members who had developed trades, essential to
production e.g. carpentry or stage design, but which in the hierarchical structures of
the commercial broadcasting industry were considered to be significantly less
important than the various technically demanding production tasks. The difference in
emphasis in the way the two unions were treated by management gives an insight into
the ACTTs power base before the mid1980s. The contrast between individuals who
were employed in creative or highly technical roles, and workers who were seen as
merely ‘broadcasting labourers’, mirrored in many respects the treatment received by
the members of the printing union, National Society of Operative Printers, Graphical
and Media Personnel (‘NATSOPA’).
Regulation (for management) centred upon a set of comprehensive working rules
which specified quite inflexible conditions for individual tasks and for patterns of
production crewing. However, workers and unions were not unhappy to maintain
meticulous regulation of work within the industry. For most core workers, the strict
arrangements for labour produced substantial benefits and the structure and career
path was coherent and relatively transparent. Although the commercial broadcasting
environment offered no guarantees in terms of individual career advancement,
workers recognized that the structure guaranteed significant training and skill
development. The multiplicity of grades, which so infuriated management in later
years, offered workers the opportunity to gradually increase their skill base and salary
levels through length-of-service agreements. In practice, seniority often only meant
that a skilled worker had reached a particular age and thus qualified for advancement
to another grade – frequently without any regard to the qualities of younger
candidates.
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The National Agreements in operation until the mid 1980s were a given for
management and unions. Local conflict and negotiation could improve terms and
conditions for labour, but the Agreements themselves were not subject to negotiation.
Industrial conflicts, when they arose, were about the boundaries and content of
National Agreements. From the unions’ perspective these National Agreements had
the effect of ensuring that no ITV company, being a signatory to the Agreement,
could introduce or impose conditions and rates of pay which were lower than those
agreed across the Network. Unions pressed hard at local level to improve and enhance
the broad National Agreements, e.g. with special local overtime payments which kept
average wage levels high, and management was often happy to acquiesce in order to
maintain a stable industrial relations environment. ITV companies relied upon
advertising revenue as a major source of finance and any ‘blackouts’ (resulting from
even minor industrial unrest) caused immediate, substantial and often irretrievable
loss. Throughout the 1970s small-scale conflicts between unions and managers placed
the balance of power in the workplace firmly in favour of the unions’ established
positions.
Union bargaining power was strengthened by the fact that individual technicians or
other production workers – from camera and sound operatives to post production
employees – could disrupt programming. Unions could use the threat of blackout to
resolve disputes in other related parts of the television labour process. The late 1970s
and early 1980s saw an increase in the number of hours of television broadcast daily
by ITV from approximately 11 hours to 12, 13 or 14 hours per day. Collective
agreements which had been introduced to deal with a very regulated and relatively
short broadcast day proved quite unsuitable for the new environment. Broadcasting
developed into the late night and early morning and was coupled with an increased
desire by producers to engage in location shooting. Management also began to require
a greater flexibility in working hours and work practices. The strength of the unions’
negotiating position still allowed them to extract a significant increase in pay, for
often minimal additional flexibility. Technicians were in a very powerful position
because ITV franchise revenue was dependent upon uninterrupted programme
transmission. In order to maintain the status quo management simply went along with
unrealistic, and often ludicrous, demands for special payments. So called ‘golden
hours’ payments were introduced in 1972 to compensate for the anti-social hours
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consequent on the new and extended broadcasting schedule. Before the ‘golden hours’
agreement, staff working after midnight were paid at three times the hourly rate. After
1972, a payments schedule was agreed which could result in employees being paid up
to five or six times their basic hourly rate – a level which would, inevitably, become
untenable for employers.
The existence of output restriction, demarcation lines, strict manning levels, the
artificial creation of overtime and the employment of unproductive labour all resulted
from informal local bargaining, rather than from an explicit exercise of power by the
unions. That is not to suggest that unions had only a limited or insignificant role in
regulating the shop floor, or, indeed, that management sought to marginalize unions in
favour of dealing directly with workers. Broadcasting employees were insulated
against any real form of market discipline. If a technical or creative issue emerged and
required an agreement between unions and management, then the union officials and
shop stewards employed well-rehearsed techniques in order to achieve the desired
outcome.
For management, programming constituted the deployment of nationally negotiated
crews rather than the movement of individuals to fulfil specific requirements. Station
managers had no method of explaining the cost of individual programmes and
accounting procedures systematically masked the substantial under-utilisation of
production resources. Over-manning was frequently physically concealed by
managers who sometimes employed unproductive technicians in discreet
housekeeping functions so as to keep them hidden from senior management. The
period up until the mid 1980s was characterized by collective National Agreements
which formalized shop floor industrial relations. Indeed, the view that these
Agreements may have been a potent mechanism for pursuing a form of order on the
shop floor during a period of robust union power is a recurring theme in the industrial
relations literature (Dunn & Wright, 1994).
National Agreements were important because you had very different companies -very
large, very rich companies and small and medium companies…so it was important
that you used the big companies to pull up the smaller ones since the larger
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companies had a lot more resources. Shop stewards could go and erect a kind of
superstructure on top in terms of local agreements.10
National Agreements were the original source of union bargaining power and the
employers’ reliance upon a national settlement of work organization reflected the
centrality of skilled labour to television production. The technicians’ most potent
weapon was to work strictly to formal agreements while rejecting short-term lucrative
inducements to alter agreed patterns of crewing or other work matters. National
Agreements were supplemented at local level by intensive bargaining conducted by
highly motivated local union representatives and the ACTT was particularly adept in
this regard. ACTT negotiations with management offered;
A fairly unlimited opportunity to ask for money via claims for improved job grading
or allowances of all kinds. To employees in a creative industry this offers a
marvellous opportunity for thinking up imaginative and costly claims together with
continual potential for disruption.11
Throughout the ITV Network, ACTT shop stewards consciously used pattern
bargaining in order to diffuse gains made in the largest and most profitable
companies.12 At station and industry level the established employer strategy was to
‘buy peace’. One regional company’s programme controller who had assumed
responsibility for industrial relations believed that ‘you dealt with any problem by
opening the drinks cabinet. It was a big boy’s game’. The ACTT clearly felt it had the
upper hand in discussions with employers whose apparent ‘informality’ had reached
new heights by the early 1980s. The strategy of ‘buying peace’ was occasionally
aided by the unusual practice of managers consuming large quantities of alcohol prior
to negotiations. It was alleged that the practice was widespread – although this was
never corroborated by any other interviewees.
10 Interview with Roy Lockett, BECTU.
11 Ramsey, ITVA to Fox, MD, Yorkshire TV, 18 December 1983 (ITVA: IR/B27/295)
12 Interview with Roy Lockett.
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We dealt with drunk employers. In negotiations we would walk out with the crown
jewels. I can deal with drunk managers any time. But that was the sort of real
incompetence which was common …as late as the early 1980s. Unthinkable now.13
Operational flexibility was possible but always at a price. Managerial discretion to
change and amend production schedules was constrained by tight union rules
regulating working time. Minor delays would incur massive premium payments for an
entire crew. A two-minute over-run would automatically trigger payment for two
hours’ overtime and crews might not necessarily even accept this payment. If the
following day was a rest day then the crew could reject two hours’ overtime in favour
of working their day off at double time and, in addition, accrue a day’s leave. The
camera crew maintained a strict hierarchy and electricians gained enormous
bargaining power because of complex, fragile and unreliable technologies. Camera
cables were coupled by thirty-six fine pins and to damage only one pin risked an
expensive halt to production, and essential components such as high voltage bulbs
required frequent replacement. There were, in short, compelling production
imperatives to maintain full crews of skilled and experienced technicians.
From the later 1970s protracted and piecemeal technical change, together with
unreliable mechanical and unproven digital technologies, made for a difficult
industrial relations’ environment. Mechanical skills remained critical in broadcasting
and new technologies were absorbed into craft job territories until the mid 1980s.
Workgroups were always vigilant against any perceived incursions into established
job controls. Electricians successfully defended their right to control every aspect of
studio lighting – even where rigs could be operated from a mixing desk.14
Management’s grudging collusion with a bewildering collection of job controls was
an entirely rational response to skilled workgroups’ bargaining power given the
practical limitations of available mechanical technologies (Brown, 1972:42-61).
Commercial television management was as much about maintaining stable (if
fractious) industrial relations as it was about making programmes (Annan,
1977:27:19). At this time precisely the same strategic constraints limited
13 Interview with Roy Lockett.
14 Central Conference Proceedings, Thames and EEPTU, 9 June 1980 (ITVA: IR/A37/010A).
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management’s ability to either introduce new technologies or restructure the labour
process so as to decisively shift the balance of power as was achieved in the
newspaper industry (see, inter alia, Martin, 1983; Cook, 1996).
Major capital costs were fixed by the industry regulator who specified the precise mix
of recording and transmission equipment necessary to obtain a regional licence. The
complex system of transfer pricing across the Network, and cross-subsidisation of
projects inside individual companies, focussed management on the total cost of output
rather than the cost of any particular programme or manager (Lury, 1993:142-143).
The ITV companies’ lack of awareness and poor control of efficiencies and costs was
an acute variant of British big business and limited ‘Americanization’ of their
corporate structures and processes (McKinlay, 1999). Lockett said of the relationship
between management and unions within ITV in the period up until the mid 1980s;
They were making so much money that nobody wanted to rock the boat. There was a
very strong union at the bottom and powerful directors at the top doing deals…with
middle management effectively stripped of any power. This was an incredibly
powerful monopoly and everybody wanted his or her cut. ITV was a very badly
managed system: on the ground it wasn’t managed, the (union) shops ran it. The
unions boxed management in and gave them nowhere to go.15
4.3
The Formation of Employers' Strategy
Parallel with the emergence of a new political environment after 1979, key figures
inside the ITVA began to question employer compliance with a work organization in
thrall to collective bargaining – rather than by managerial prerogative. Just as line
managers had become indifferent to labour inefficiency, so also had employers (as a
body) failed to use collective bargaining to reshape work organization. At station
level, companies had begun to introduce business priorities into the line management
role but only in the most tentative manner. A former ITV industrial relations director
15 Interview with Roy Lockett.
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spoke of the beginnings of a process which would eventually lead to a very significant
organizational and labour process change within ITV and the television industry as a
whole;
I was faced with an industry which, disagreeable though they found it, was beginning
[to ] cotton on to the fact that change was in the air. New technology was there, a
camera with a light on it…so you didn’t need sixteen people to go to Downing Street
to interview the Prime Minister.16
Front line management had actively sustained custom and practice in order to
maintain production. Managerial authority on the studio floor was a blend of
acknowledged professional competence and adherence to the norms of craft
administration. The employers had to begin to think strategically about industrial
relations and, in particular, identifying the thresholds at which the Network would
accept conflict as a legitimate cost, 'an investment in a better IR future, just as we
invest in new technology'.17 There was also a significant deepening of the employers'
development of collective bargaining strategies to be pursued both nationally and
locally. The Network's main coordinating industrial relations committee, for instance,
began to meet quarterly rather than only on the eve of the annual wage round.
One of the things discussed in the ITV Association was how they were going to take
on the trade unions, tearing up the National Agreement, etc.. There was a clear
strategy in the late 1980s and after that there was a sense that we should derecognise
across the board and deal with things individually.18
The companies now appointed senior personnel directors to this committee as they
searched for a more cohesive approach at station level. Management within the
various ITV companies increased their own particular brand of collectivism – to one
based on the need to share information relating to the limits of union tolerance to
organizational change. From being merely a clearing-house of industry opinion the
ITVA became an important conduit for managers to share knowledge about the
16 Interview with John Calvert.
17 'Looking Ahead ', talk given at Yorkshire TV, 20 December 1984 (ITVA: IR/B27/296).
18 Interview with Roy Lockett.
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potential of new technology and current industrial relations’ strategies. From being
solely a passive secretariat, the ITVA now recruited senior officials from
manufacturing companies (including Ford and Pilkingtons) with extensive experience
of adversarial industrial relations’ change and modern management strategies. One of
the issues which the ITV companies’ were most anxious to address was the ongoing
debate over the introduction of ‘Network substitution’.
In fact Network substitution had been a preoccupation of commercial television
employers since the 1979 national dispute. Historically, when an originating ITV
company had been unable to transmit a programme to the Network – due, perhaps, to
a local industrial dispute in that company – it had proved very difficult for an
alternative programme from another ITV company to be transmitted to the Network in
its place. Little progress had been made on this matter by 1980 because of the cross-
cutting commercial priorities of all the ITV companies but, also, because of the
formidable power of unions to block transmission.19 In such circumstances it had been
union policy for some time to insist that a local programme should be transmitted
within each region.
To reiterate a point I have made many times, the Network itself must protect itself
better in the future than it has done in the past from the possibility of the nominated
contractor being involved in a local dispute. If ‘Network substitution’ is such a red
rag to the union bull, then ITV management must collectively demonstrate its wit,
willingness and ability to side-step the issue, while continuing to maintain the
collective responsibility of public service aspects of the Network as a whole.20
The report of the sub-committee on Network substitution concluded that it was
intolerable that the ACTT should be seen to dictate programming policy. It was
determined that a coordinated industry approach should be formulated so as to cover a
situation where an originating company was unable to transmit a programme to the
Network because of an industrial dispute.
19 See ITCA Labour Relations Committee, 'Report of Sub-Committee on Network Substitution', 11
January 1980 (IR/A42/006)
20 HTV to Calvert, ITCA, 1 November 1984 (ITVA: IR/B27/306).
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The sub-committee’s report set out three positions for companies to adopt when
dealing with expected union resistance to the substitution strategy. Fundamentally, it
sought to achieve an arrangement/ understanding that when one ITV company was
unable to transmit programmes to the Network (due to industrial action) then the other
franchise holders would be free to provide their viewers with a normal service. The
companies were prepared to go as far as to agree with the union that the programme
substituted to the Network would not originate from the company which was in
dispute with the union. The sub-committee concluded that should this prove
unacceptable to the union then a fall back position for the companies should include
an agreement that no programmes produced by an individual company in dispute
would be shown by any ITV franchise throughout the Network for the duration of the
dispute. In addition, it considered the situation where guidelines with the union were
agreed, and where the local branch of the union in a franchise not involved in the
dispute refused to take a programme substituted to the Network. The consensus was
that in order to ensure the effectiveness of the general policy, local substitution should
not take place and screens should remain blank and disciplinary action should then be
initiated against the individual workers involved. Even during the 1980 dispute
(which removed the ITN news from the Network) the companies’ were unable to
muster an effective response because of internal divisions and fears that substitution
would escalate the dispute.21 Plans to build a reserve stock of major programmes and
alternative movies for broadcast were constantly bedevilled by divergent commercial
priorities.
The internal politics of the ITVA, together with its historically limited organizational
authority, made it an awkward vehicle for orchestrating a national campaign to redraw
the landscape of collective bargaining. The ITVA sought to redress this strategic
weakness by using the Employment Act, 1980 which made unions liable for any costs
incurred by companies impacted by consequent secondary industrial action. The
repeal of union immunities in this legislation exposed their funds to employer claims
for compensation for losses incurred as a result of secondary industrial action and
there were no upper limits for fines or sequestration orders. The Act was designed not
just as a remedy but, also, as a deterrent. This represented both a significant mitigation
21 Minutes of Network IR Committee, 27 May 1980 (B53/B0075).
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in legal obstacles to using the law as part of a bargaining arsenal and was an assault
on the unions’ capacity for effective mobilisation (Benedictus, 1985; Brown &
Wadham, 1990; Fulcher, 1991:238). By staggering injunctions against any union
involved with a member company, ITVA exposed the television trade unions to
repeated court actions and massively increased their (trade unions’) financial
exposure.
The hesitant moves by ITV employers to develop a more cohesive national bargaining
strategy and the first moves to examine production costs at station level were
paralleled by (and greatly contrast with) radical technological change at this time.
Electronic News Gathering (‘ENG’) became the fundamental new technology issue
for both management and unions throughout the late 1970s and 1980s.The
introduction of light, portable video cameras for news gathering held the promise that
the flexibility and immediacy of radio would be transferred to television reporting
(Bliss, 1991:232). The beginning of a technological evolution in the UK television
industry was evident in 1973 when Southern Television installed two ‘Apmplex’ video
machines and which were acquired for a twelve-week trial period. For six of those
weeks, the technology was utilized under the working practices proposed by
management, and for a further six weeks the new technology operated under union
best practice. These were largely amicable local trials, but on a national level the
ACTT blocked all video work and which prohibited similar trials in other Network
companies. Later the ACTT gave permission for Southern to again proceed with ENG
trials but using only union guidelines. In March 1976 the ITV companies met with the
ACTT to agree guidelines for the introduction of new technology, and draft proposals
were considered at a joint meeting in March 1977. These meetings were not originally
geared towards a discussion of ENG, but following consultations with the ACTT,
management at ITV succeeded in ensuring that the introduction of ENG would be
included within the discussions.
The issue of pay was central to any union agreement on the introduction of new
technology. At a meeting on 15th February 1978 the union stated that the use of
automated and new equipment, including ENG, would be considered in return for
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additional pay and the re-grading of the employees concerned.22By January 1980 a
draft agreement between the ACTT and Independent Television News had been
prepared. However the optimism of senior ITV management that ENG could be
introduced on a national basis and with little resistance was quite unfounded.
In a letter to the then committee secretary of the Independent Television Commission
(‘ITC’), a senior Independent Television News (‘ITN’) executive explained the
essential difficulties the ACTT had with the draft agreement for the operation of
ENG. 23 The union was disturbed with what it considered to be an excessive number
of overseas freelance workers. It was also concerned at the provision of an ENG
camera to a particular northern ITN freelance reporter – an individual to whom the
‘shop’ had developed a personal dislike. In addition the ACTT sought substantial
payments to the technicians directly involved and an across-the-board pay increase of
approximately six per cent for all employees. The ITV management were concerned
with every increasing costs associated with programme making and were determined
to reduce the core costs of production. The attractions of new technologies were based
on evidence derived from the effectiveness of the American experiences of new
camera and newsgathering technologies. ENG was first used in the US in the mid
1970s and arose from the development of small and relatively light cameras. The de-
skilling benefits of ENG and other technologies were quite obvious to managers, and
union negotiators were shocked by the speed and the extent to which management
sought change. Sapper noted the ACTT position at the time in relation to the
introduction of new technology;
When we had these meetings [regarding new technology] with the management at
Thames, I was amazed. They were stupid, they just didn’t realise that you can’t bring
somebody in off the street and after two weeks training put them in front of the
camera. With new technology they thought you don’t need skilled people…madness
just madness.24
22 Code of Practice on the Introduction of Automated and new Equipment. IR/A37/010B.
23 IR/A42/006.
24 Interview with Alan Sapper, ACTT.
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Both Southern Television and Channel Television were at the forefront of the
introduction of new technology. By 1980 under the general managership of Harry
Urquhart, Southern Television agreed in principle to move towards the gradual
introduction of ENG. The cost of this move was reported in January 1980 to be GBP
98,000 (for equipment purchase only) and Southern outlined the perceived benefits
which the introduction of ENG would bring to the company in terms of operational
advantages. One of the (admittedly minor) advantages of employing ENG was that the
heavy trucks required by the film crews (for even the smallest of news or feature
shoots) could be replaced with a medium sized estate car. The Southern document
suggested that the introduction of ENG would not eliminate the need for film craft
skills within the local news bulletin programme and other local feature style
programming. 25 Southern management were particularly impressed by the potential
savings which could be obtained through the employment of new flexible
newsgathering techniques. ENG operated at lower light levels than traditional film
and did not require processing time. Tapes lasted twenty minutes (compared with five
minutes for film) while the storage of material was much easier and cheaper than the
traditional method. By May 1980, there was clear agreement amongst almost all the
ITV franchise holders that the implementation of ENG was much preferable (the
exception was Border Television) to the continued domination of film recording. The
prevailing ACTT view of the introduction of labour saving technologies was summed
up in the union-rallying cry of ‘no exploitation without compensation’.
Grampian Television represented one end of the spectrum in terms of franchise
success in the implementation of ENG. By May 1980 agreement had been reached
with all unions representing Grampian staff for the introduction of ENG under what
was known as the ‘Self Financing Productivity Agreement’ (which gave a rate of
increase in remuneration of in excess of 15 per cent)26. That increased payment
allowed the company to schedule ACTT staff on ENG tasks in line with actual
company requirements. The records show that no additional payments other than
those agreed were made. In addition the agreement stipulated that no electrician
would be attached to an ENG activity unless the company decided that a particular
25 Interview with Alan Sapper.
26 Introduction to ENG 1979-1981 IR/A42/006
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programme merited one. Yorkshire Television documentation suggested that
agreement had been reached with the ‘film shop’ and that management were close to
agreement with the ‘live shop’. The same internal documentation included a strong
caveat that ‘across the board’ payments had yet to be raised by unions. 27 In May 1980
Yorkshire was reported as having an agreement with both film and live shops,
although an internal 1982 company document would appear to contradict this. These
were tentative arrangements which masked ongoing difficulties for Yorkshire
Television in reaching a final agreement on ENG – the relevant industrial relations
document shows conclusively that no agreement had been reached;
After a prolonged period of negotiation it became clear that no operational
agreement could be reached which would be acceptable to both shops (although the
company had reached a draft operational agreement with the live shop).28
In May 1982 Yorkshire entered into a trial period with the ‘live’ shop operating from
Sheffield. By 1983 the company was strongly urging union representatives to
conclude an ENG working agreement because funds had been allocated for the second
phase of ENG and which was planned to replace the existing film news crews. The
trial periods continued until 1984 when the ACTT stewards gave notice of
termination, and in reality, the cost savings involved through the application of ENG
remained elusive. Between 1980-1984 local bargaining either limited the introduction
of ENG, or all but eliminated the cost savings that management knew were possible
(Clarke, 1984; McLoughlin & Clark, 1988).29The documentation which accompanied
the initial attempt to introduce ENG into Thames Television (and which included
significant references to other ITV companies) can be contrasted with the Thames
specific nature of some of the later records.30 In the covering letter sent to Thames in
1981 accompanying the new franchise agreement the Chairman of the IBA wrote;
27 IR/A42/006
28 ENG: Yorkshire Television IR/1327/263.
29 For ENG negotiations, 1974-84, see ITVA, IR/A42/006 and IR/137/010.
30 ACTT/ Thames Television Ltd. Introduction of ENG Tribunal IR/A37/010.
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We touched at interview on the question of the level of costs generally in ITV at the
moment and on the inescapable fact that Thames practices affect the whole system
(Bonner, 1998).
By 1983 Thames was attempting to find methods of improving the cost effectiveness
of its core business. Internal memoranda suggested that management were torn
between two divergent positions, namely simply contracting or downsizing the
organization in order to only fulfil their commitments to ITV alone, or increasing
programming output without increasing plant and staff. Contraction was not an
attractive option and in 1983 it was argued that because of the relatively uncommon
incidence of spare capacity, large-scale staff redundancies would entail greater
amounts of overtime for the remaining staff. This would, in addition, lead to an
increase in freelance workers in order to deal with production peaks. Thames
suggested that such casualization would be ‘an enormously emotive issue’ and that
any financial projections would have to take into account, not only the costs of
redundancy, but also the likely complete loss of advertising revenue for a substantial
period.
By 1984 the National Agreement was no longer accepted as a given where the
employers could only pursue damage limitation – it was now regarded as terrain upon
which the politics of production could be fought and changed. That is not to say that
there was unanimity regarding objectives or the methods to achieve such objectives.
Thames Television was a crucial voice in the employers' internal debates where it
stressed the need to eliminate the ACTTs claim to exclusive access to its membership
and where all but the most anodyne direct communication between company and
workforce was prohibited. Increased flexibility over time and task was no less
important to Thames. Domestically, Thames pursued 'a strategy of stealth and
realistic bargaining rather than to promote a major confrontation'.31 This strategy
aimed to improve production efficiency by pushing existing agreements to the limit
and challenging custom and practice. Throughout 1983-4, Thames experienced a
series of local disputes as management confronted contractual 'rackets' and moved to
31 Dunn to Thames Board, February 1983.
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introduce new technologies based on operational requirements rather than precedent.32
For Thames management this was a managerialist project with a clear moral
dimension. It was a struggle between management ‘missionaries’ with a desire to re-
regulate employment relationships and union ‘mercenaries’ wedded to what were
considered to be amoral bargaining and work practices.
This [idea] of missionaries and mercenaries…the mercenaries were those union
representatives who saw television as an oil well, but it would be quite wrong to
distinguish between the managers who were missionaries and the unions who were
mercenaries. Large numbers of people who lived solely for their work were happy
because the unions were so successful negotiating on their behalf.33
By reshaping work organization and confronting restrictive practices these
management missionaries also confronted a mercenary workforce that was seen to
have corrupted both themselves and the very essence of television production.
In mid-1984 Thames unilaterally issued new rostering schedules and which triggered
a major strike. For the Thames board the dispute was a huge but necessary cost if the
company was to expand its production operation profitably.34 By 1985, local
confrontations were becoming more numerous and more intense and a national
dispute was all but inevitable. The Thames dispute had an enormous and far reaching
impact on the Network's preparations for a major strike. The ability of Thames to
sustain a management operated service through a three-week dispute was a defining
moment in pushing the commercial companies toward a more aggressive bargaining
strategy (Bonner, 1998:159-64).
Prompted by the ITVA, the Network companies held a series of meetings with their
middle managers to discuss the future shape of work organization. However, the
reports from those exercises made for gloomy reading. With the exception of Thames
there was no real push to restructure the labour process at company level. The ITVA
concluded that most local disputes were triggered by managerial opportunism rather
than by a clear strategy designed to erode or challenge union job controls.
32 Dunn to Thames Board, July 1983.
33 Interview with M. Stevens, Thames Director, December 2001.
34 Dunn to Thames Board, July 1984.
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Paradoxically, the initiative for reshaping work organization was thrown back to the
ITVA and national bargaining. The ITVAs member companies remained sceptical as
to whether they could muster the necessary unity to pursue an aggressive bargaining
strategy.
Having ‘been here before’ I am determined not to be too depressed about the
conflicting views being expressed around on this subject. It would be nice, however, if
some colleagues would look beyond their noses and realise we have to devise a
sensible approach for the rest of the decade, rather than worrying so much whether it
costs us x% or y% this year. It seems as if we are back to our eternal response to the
unions: ‘If you expect us to pay you that, what are you prepared to give us back in
return?’: to which the answer is a lemon!35
In private correspondence between the ITVA and Thames, the company confirmed
that confrontation had come only after a series of forays across the ‘frontier of
control’ over the previous three years. Thames Director of Television argued that the
moment had arrived for the Association to coordinate a national challenge to the
unions;
I do believe very strongly that we must disabuse the unions and their members (by
strategic planning and tactical manoeuvres) of the notion that the industry's style of
confrontational bargaining runs all in one direction. We face these perpetual pay
demands mainly because there are worries ‘on the other side’ about reciprocal
demands from the companies…. It is time to change attitudes, and the force for
change must be management orientated.36
The ITVAs 'Thames post-mortem' detailed the specific tactics to be employed in any
subsequent dispute and also marked the emergence of a much harder line to be taken
in future. New labour laws exposed the ACTT to punitive damages if a strike was
called without a ballot. Even if only a single station was directly affected by industrial
action called without ‘due process’, then all stations had a claim against the ACTT
35 Lowes, Director of Operations, HTV to Robinson, Director of Industrial Relations, TVS, 5 April
(ITVA B53/Box24).
36 Valentine, Thames to Calvert, ITVA, 10 April 1985 (ITVA: IR/A37/013c).
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because of Network arrangements for programme sharing. The ITVA proposed that
each station seek injunctions individually, staggering the legal process. This strategy
would both increase the total damages and stretch the union's legal resources further.37
The agreement for an aggressive use of injunctions was to seek to stiffen the resolve
of the companies. ‘My wish is to put some fire in some bellies', commented the
Association's industrial relations’ adviser.38 Internally the Network companies were
conscious of, and accepted that their individual short-term commercial interests would
have to be temporarily suspended.
Network substitution which allowed programming to continue despite the loss of even
a major station was prioritised – the mechanics, and not the principles, were now
under discussion. Irrespective of the certainty of concerted union opposition, the
Network was now primed to adopt a more aggressive policy through national
bargaining.39 This was a key strategic move by the employers and which undercut the
unions’ most potent bargaining weapon. The nature and, indeed, the continued
existence of national bargaining was under serious consideration for the first time.
The debate with the unions was to take place on ground chosen by the unions, with
the companies cast as defenders of the status quo.40 The Network industrial relations
secretariat (now led by a former Pilkingtons HR Director) was actively shaping the
internal debate and drawing on the experience of change strategies in manufacturing,
notably that of the Ford Motor Company. The central issue for Network strategists
was how to use national negotiations (where fundamental change was highly unlikely
to be achieved) in order to broker necessary work reorganisation at company level.
During 1986-88 all the commercial companies attempted to use local bargaining to
remodel work organisation. This development was only partly triggered by State
broadcasting policy. More importantly, the unravelling of national bargaining had
gained an unstoppable momentum. In the event, the ultimate termination of national
37 A. Leighton Davis, Solicitor to J. Calvert, Head of Labour Relations, ITCA, 31 May 1985 (ITVA:
IR/B27/306).
38 T. Valentine, ITCA IR Adviser, to K. Chadwick, KLC Advisory Services, 2 August 1985 (ITVA:
IR/B27/306).
39 ITCA, 'Contingency Planning', 15 January 1985 (ITVA: IR/B27/306).
40 'Woodstock - Strategy Conference for ITC Negotiators', 13 March 1987 (IR/B27/295).
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bargaining was an extremely untidy process and the unilateral withdrawal of Tyne
Tees from all National Agreements had a most significant impact. In a document
circulated to all staff and executive directors, Tyne Tees indicated that the company
had to make significant alterations to its annual budget and advised that annual
savings of over GBP 3 million were required. It was suggested that savings of that
order could only be made through a radical approach to matters such as flexibility,
natural wastage and working practices.41 The formal withdrawal of Tyne Tees
Television from the national ITV agreement was advised in a letter to the four unions
concerned, ACTT, BETA, The Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and
Plumbers Union, (‘EETPU’) and The National Union of Journalists (‘NUJ’).42 Tyne
Tees argued that the National Agreements dated back to a time when the operational
environment was considerably more transparent. The company did note, however, that
until it had an opportunity to examine the details of the Agreement (which they felt
were irrelevant) it would continue to be honoured. The decision not to participate in
the National Agreement was deemed insensitive by the ITVA and John Calvert, the
Director of Industrial Relations argued in a letter to the Chief Executive of Anglia
Television that the decision was potentially damaging to the credibility and public
standing of other ITV companies.43 Crucially Calvert believed he could turn the Tyne
Tees decision to the advantage of the remaining ITV companies.
Within Tyne Tees the National Agreement was now confined to matters of procedure,
rather than to specifying substantive issues relating to terms of employment. The end
of the National Agreement was a watershed in the remaking of the television labour
process and by the close of 1989 working practices in commercial television had been
transformed. All fourteen members of the ITV Association announced extensive
moves towards flexibility and multi-skilling and which ignored restrictive practices.
Tyne Tees reported that for a decade demarcation lines had been 'consistently eroded',
a process significantly accelerated in 1988-89 and 'there are now no restraints other
than those imposed by lack of knowledge or skill'.44 The Monopolies and Mergers
Commission reported that the national picture was broadly similar. Restrictive
41 IR/A37/028.
42 IR/A37028.
43 IR/A37/028 Tyne Tees correspondence.
44 ITVA, 'Labour Practices in TV and Film Making', 15 December 1989 (B53/Box 62).
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practices had been eliminated, ‘or…could be realistically expected to disappear as a
result of current or extended negotiations, or management decisions’ (MMC,
1989:41). This was the epitaph which marked the end of a system of industrial
relations based on management acquiescence and the beginning of a negotiated
regulation of the labour process – a form of negotiation that all but negated
management prerogative on the studio floor. For the first time, managerial prerogative
was decisive in shaping work organization and the employment relationship in
commercial television.
The Network's preparations for the 1989 national negotiations were both cursory and
self-congratulatory. National Agreements were on their way to becoming something
of an historical curiosity, rather like ‘In Place of Strife’(or clothing coupons), as
companies introduced their own agreements to suit their own particular requirements.
The union campaign to build a model local agreement at Television South (TVS)
which could be rolled out throughout the Network had been rebuffed. Industrial
relations which had been once the companies’ Achilles heel, had now become one of
its strengths – however, there was a note of caution. Breaking the straitjacket of
restrictive agreements at both local and national level was the first step in the process
of reshaping the face of employee relations within the companies. The breakthrough
of the late 1980s had been achieved against the backdrop of crisis and political threat,
a cathartic moment which had triggered major shifts in television employers’ attitudes
to collective bargaining and the nature of work. The uncertainty which television
companies now confronted was whether their managers could achieve the transition
from organisers of a successful war of position to the much more subtle demands of a
war of manoeuvre on the studio floor. ‘Do we have managers who are capable of
switching from orderlies of retreat, to Attilla the Hun, to team leaders?’45
45 ITVA, IR Committee, Minutes, 9 May, 1989 (B53/B0075).
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4.4
The collapse of the guild strategy.
‘We were a solace, a reminder that things weren’t always so bad.46
By 1986 the ACTT was compelled to consider its internal organisation and the
examination undertaken was considered to be symptomatic of the political and
personal divisions within that union's leadership. Organisational issues reviewed
included the union's highly centralised decision-making processes – a hangover from
the era of an all-encompassing National Agreement – and the lack of engagement with
the rapidly shifting sands of local negotiations. For the ACTT General Secretary
(Alan Sapper) the 'Race Report' (prepared by London Labour politician Reg Race)
was an attempted 'coup' rather than a dispassionate dissection of the union's
organisation.
The Race Report recognized that the ACTTs remaining strength was its effectiveness
in negotiating wages and conditions – its weak point was identified as the ineffective
handling of new technology agreements. The insistence of the union in maintaining
existing crewing regimes simply increased the potential benefits of new technology
for aggressive managements. The ACTT had even failed to maintain a national census
of new technology agreements and their impact on work organisation. What
bargaining competence it had retained was, largely, because the television industry
had been sheltered from the restructuring experienced by manufacturing and the
public sector. Centralisation limited the union's ability to respond effectively to an
increasingly diverse range of management initiatives across the ITV Network and
intensified the perceived gap between the membership and wholly metropolitan based
national officials. Strong workplace branches were also isolated and increasingly
alienated from the union's internal democratic processes. The strength of the union’s
workplace organization was more apparent than real: few stewards’ committees were
operational, leaving the lay organisation with little strategic capability and vulnerable
46 Interview with Sharon Elliott, BECTU.
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to employer attack. In short, union organization at station level was fatally
compromised and would survive only until management realized this vulnerability.
If the 1984 Thames conflict was critical in reshaping the employers’ strategy then the
1987 TV-am dispute was a certain watershed for the ACTT. From the outset the
dispute was seen as a stalking horse used by the Network companies to terminate the
National Agreement.47 The TV-am dispute quickly escalated from a minor skirmish
over rosters and overtime payments to a full-scale confrontation where there were
dissenting voices on the ACTT national executive who believed that this was a battle
which the union simply could not win. It was also a watershed in terms of forcing the
ACTT to rethink its established bargaining strategy, namely, ‘a strategy of attrition’.48
It was not just that a broadcaster could continue to operate during an industrial dispute
but, rather, that TV-am had rejected outright the established employer bargaining
strategy of buying-off the ACTT. During a plea to the ACTT executive to continue its
financial support for the strike, a bemused TV-am activist conceded that the union had
irrevocably lost its most potent bargaining weapon when, despite its profitability, the
company refused to sue for peace.49
With the benefit of almost sixteen years to ponder the defeat inflicted upon the trade
union movement by the management at TV-am, former ACTT officials agreed with
the assessment (provided, in part, by the ACTT minutes of the Thames dispute) that
the union was badly prepared for such a critical engagement. The raft of recent
legislative changes had transformed the industrial relations landscape and altered the
content and scope of employment relationships including the role and importance of
unions themselves;
My feeling now is that there was an extraordinary complacency on the part of the
union. They really thought that the world wasn’t really changing…TV-am came as a
real blow to them…they had gone too far…we played into his hand…we did exactly
47 ACTT, Executive Committee, Minutes, 25 February 1987.
48 ACTT, Executive Committee, Minutes, 16 March 1988.
49 ACTT, Executive Committee, Minutes, 6 July 1988.
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what he [Bruce Gyngell] wanted. The law was changing all the time…secondary
action had been very important to us.50
The TV-am management opened up the prospect of the ACTT being marginalized or
derecognised throughout the ITV Network. After three months there were dissenting
voices on the ACTT national executive and who acknowledged this was a futile
dispute – ‘this was unlike other ITV disputes in previous years, the union could not
successfully conclude this dispute through industrial methods’.51 For the former
ACTT General Secretary (Sapper) the erosion of the substance of the industry's
National Agreement from 1986 had not eliminated substantive national bargaining –
‘some of the agreement was hollowed out but we still had power on the shop floor’.52
Sapper argued that from 1986 onwards the National Agreements were being ‘chipped
away’, but hadn’t completely disappeared and the union was thus engaged in what
was termed an orderly form of retreat. In truth, the National Agreement had been
thoroughly eviscerated and the only national condition which remained uniform
across all commercial companies was that specifying the normal working week. Local
bargaining procedures had been transformed into, at best, forms of consultation with
union representatives. The union leadership was struggling to maintain even a
semblance of an orderly retreat. Without the National Agreement as a vehicle for a
centralized bargaining strategy the ACTT leadership was increasingly marginal to the
bargaining process. The only advice the union could offer its embattled grassroots
activists was to pursue a ‘strategy of damage limitation’.53
The ACTT leadership rejected any fundamental reappraisal or modification of its
traditional strategy. The leadership was prepared to lose up to two-thirds of its
members in order to maintain the integrity of its restricted membership. Sapper, in
particular, was ready to ‘retreat to the core of the union’ in film and film development
laboratories even if this meant the wholesale loss of the union's television
membership. In commercial television, however, Sapper’s retrenchment strategy fast
lost any credibility and the ACTT membership and lay infrastructure collapsed into
50 Interview with, Martin Spence, BECTU.
51 ACTT, Executive Committee, 17 February 1988.
52 Interview with Alan Sapper.
53 ACTT, Executive Council, Minutes, 19 July 1989.
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disarray in a matter of weeks. In Scottish Television, ACTT membership plummeted
by almost 50 per cent within two months. All the union’s branch officers resigned and
Sapper was booed by a mass meeting convened to bolster local organization.54 Faced
with incessant criticism and collapsing membership Sapper resigned and his
resignation symbolised the end of the ACTTs bargaining strategy of ‘a war position’.
To counter growing financial weakness the ACTT merged with the BBC house union
BETA to form BECTU (see, Blyton & Turnbull, 1994).
We were unable to find a foothold as we slid down the mountain and we grabbed on
to BETA on the way down. 55
Throughout the 1990s BECTU proved unable to rebuild its bargaining strength in
commercial television but it has managed to maintain a presence in all stations. To
this day, BECTUs core of activists remain dominated by former ACTT stewards but
these are overwhelmingly middle-aged, male technicians and not representative of the
union's current and more diverse membership.
4.5
Industrial Relations in the 1990s.
The end of the closed shop (and attendant comprehensive task specifications of the
White Book National Agreement in 1989) decimated BECTUs defences on the
ground. For four years, the union’s leadership attempted to stem the tide of lost
members, to stabilise the union’s finances and to maintain some semblance of shop
steward organization in the commercial sector. Only two regional commercial
companies took issue with union membership by stopping the check-off system which
deducted union dues from salaries. Given the severity and novelty of the challenges to
BECTU, the union concentrated on rebuilding its heartland and did not attempt to
unionise in the independent sector.
54 Broadcast, 19 August 1988; ACTT Executive Council, Minutes, 30 October 1988.
55 Interview with Martin Spence.
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In retrospect the termination of the closed shop within the broadcasting industry was,
perhaps, a virtue in that it ended the degeneracy of the union and forced national
officials to reach out to a membership which had been taken for granted since the
advent of television itself. The bizarre separation between elite trade union officials
and ordinary employees had been largely eliminated. The strategy employed by
BECTU was inspired, not by an overnight conversion to the process of democracy
within the union movement but, rather, by the need to retain membership levels.
There was now a real sense in which even the remaining pockets of lay union
organization did not betoken any real bargaining strength. A BECTU official noted;
Where there were good relations we managed to salvage a little more from the
wreckage, but it was about holding on to agreements, holding on to the relationship.56
Even where the substance of agreements was ignored the simple maintenance of the
structures and personal relationships of collective bargaining was regarded as
something of an achievement. For BECTU, maintaining procedural agreements was;
A holding operation - trying to stop members, organization, conditions, just seeping
away.57
Across the ITV Network, BECTU shop stewards retained only the most basic of
facilities agreements. While most companies continued to pay shop stewards for lost
time while on union duties this was, simply, a pragmatic recognition by management
of the futility of quick responses to local disputes, rather than any commitment to
collective bargaining. Shop steward facilities did not extend to the provision of time
off for more extensive recruitment or representation activities. This, in turn, hampered
union communication between national headquarters and the grassroots. Survival for
BECTU was an achievement in itself. After 1989 basic organizational survival
superseded representation and substantive bargaining as the union’s strategic
imperative. In the mid 1980s the ACTT and BETA had almost the same number of
employees – just in excess of 30,000 each. By 1993 the membership of the new union
56 Interview with Martin Spence.
57 Interview with Sharon Elliot.
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BECTU was only 27,000. A BECTU official contrasted the result of restructuring
within the sector on the ACTT with the impact of the defeat of the miners’ strike upon
the NUM;
I don't think we were ever wiped off the face of the earth in the same way that the
miners were. We did keep a basic infrastructure in every company which retained a
franchise.58
However, there was a real sense in which even the remaining pockets of lay
organization did not represent any real bargaining strength. For BECTU, maintaining
procedural agreements ‘was a holding operation; trying to stop members,
organization, conditions, just sweeping away’.59 The ITV franchise competition in
1991 broadly maintained the ITV Network – resulting in a split between three major
and ten to twelve smaller regional operators. The basic change in management
objectives and processes was a sharpened cost awareness with the introduction of
procedural mechanisms which reached into the details of the production process
(Daymon, 1998). From 1989 onwards the insecurity of employment for technicians
massively increased as companies shifted their labour strategy towards a core-
periphery model (Dex et al, 2000). In 1991 Central Television, for example,
introduced a new employment contract based on ‘zero-crewing’ for each project and
budgets were now devolved to projects rather than functional departments. In turn, the
transparency of this short-run contracting model placed enormous fiscal pressure on
project management to reduce staffing to the absolute minimum. The contracting
model transformed functional departments into cost centres with limited scope to
improve their bargaining position by internal trading. In the regulated environment of
commercial television before the mid 1980s, production costs were almost an
irrelevance in a highly profitable industry. Management control systems were now
radically extended in parallel with the dissolution of nationally regulated labour
contracts and the labour process became critical to profitability. Individual employees
were costed against specific projects and their downtime monitored, measured and
58 Interview with Martin Spence.
59 Interview with Sharon Elliott.
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compared. The television studio was no longer a workplace regulated by collective
bargaining but was now governed by the market.
The first move to rebuild lay organisation as a bargaining force was in 1997. BECTU
systematically compared contracts across the Network in order to identify minimum
terms and conditions as a base line for local negotiators. For the first time BECTU
convened an informal national meeting of Network activists 'to compare notes, to start
to regroup’.60 It was clear that the high-water mark of union influence and control had
long ago been reached and that, in future, trade union demands and their role in the
workplace would be limited – nevertheless union negotiators and shop stewards did
not capitulate. BECTUs Charter campaign fought for clear and 'irreducible minimum'
working conditions – 'to be honest', commented one regional company's Director of
Television;
I think that this is a good sign. The unions …are moving away from cash to terms and
conditions. In the past they were always chasing the dollar and maximising payments
until we had a reputation of excessive crews, overtime rates, etc.. I am quite
encouraged by this sort of approach.61
Conclusion.
In the course of the period since 1979 the landscape of commercial television was
profoundly transformed. Before then commercial television was a benign, highly
regulated environment where firms reaped rich profits and trade unionists bid up the
price of labour without much difficulty or hindrance. After 1979, employers gradually
shifted their labour and technology strategies away from a grudging acceptance of the
limits placed upon their discretion by collective bargaining. Initially employers made
cautious moves to reshape work organization and to introduce new technologies.
However by the mid 1980s, commercial television employers had launched a full-
scale assault on the industry’s formal and informal structures of collective bargaining.
Controlling the labour process moved from being a secondary concern for commercial
60 Interview with Sharon Elliott.
61 Grampian to ITVA, 30 August 1991 (B53/Box 66/303).
122
television stations to being the essential element of the industry’s labour process.
Unreliable and awkward electro-mechanical equipment was displaced – initially by
individual digital tools and, subsequently, by integrated systems which linked
production through to editing. Technological change both increased the potential
benefits of reshaping the labour process and reduced the employers’ reliance upon
skilled, experienced technical labour. This was the second phase of the employers’
onslaught – both the nature of work and the internal labour markets were radically
reconstituted without recourse to collective bargaining. Crucially, these shifts in
management strategy and practices were underway before the Thatcher deregulation
of the industry consequent of the 1989 Monopolies and Merger Commission Report
on trade union restrictive practices. The Thatcher reforms did not initiate the
management assault on the broadcast trade unions but, rather, accelerated processes
already in progress within the commercial television companies.
This Chapter has traced the transition of the ITV sector from a highly regulated
environment where collective bargaining and National Agreements were the dominant
sources of regulation and organization of labour. In contrast, by the late 1980s the
ITV companies could be said to significantly reflect the emerging deregulatory
organizational structures of the independent television sector. The following Chapter
will address the specific firm based experience of ITV restructuring in one particular
franchise. For while STV was not in the first wave of organizational restructuring
during the early 1980s it would emerge later as one of the most important exemplars
of de-skilling, reshaping of labour process and re-regulation of workplace
relationships.
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Chapter 5.
Management – Technology and Industrial Relations Change:
Re-Regulating the Employment Relationship.
A Case Study of Scottish Television PLC. 1979-2001.
Introduction.
When I came into television it was demarcation between jobs. As a stagehand you
would not dare look at a hammer or a paintbrush – it was the painters or the joiners
for that, and electricians for that. Demarcation was very strong as everyone had their
job whereas in the theatre everyone pulled together and got it done.62
The intrusions of the Thatcher and Major governments into broadcasting during the
1980s and 1990s encouraged a new rhetoric of consumer sovereignty. Their
legislative interventions were made in the belief that both the public interest and
quality in broadcasting were better served by commercial competition than through
public service regulation (Harrison, 2000:49-50). While such policy objectives
provided an important backdrop to the wider changes in the broadcasting economy in
the period since 1979, they did not initiate such change.
Throughout the UK broadcasting industry, organizational change was reflected in a
number of ways. Within the BBC the acceptance of marketization was manifested by
breaking up the Corporation into a series of nominally independent directorates
together with the adoption of the restructuring project Producer Choice. This had a
substantial impact upon the occupational identity of BBC craft workers (Wegg-
Prosser, 1998). Within the independent production sector (arguably the main
beneficiary of a relaxation in the regulatory guidelines, and which had up until the
early 1980s ensured the continuation of a duopoly within UK broadcasting)
deregulation gave a small number of entrepreneurial producers the flexibility to
emerge from the vertically integrated television industry (Willis & Dex, 2003:23).
62 Interview former STV engineer.
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The ITV sector, in particular, underwent a comprehensive restructuring process which
became the template for industry change in the period from the mid 1980s onwards.
During the period of organizational upheaval within the ITV sector in the 1980s and
1990s (see Chapter 3) a contextual framework emerged from which it is possible to
explore the archive jungle relating to profound industrial relations change. (Indeed,
the breadth and detail of change within the sphere of commercial broadcasting would
benefit from a specific ITV firm based approach.) It is proposed to undertake a
detailed analysis of Scottish Television PLC (STV) – a specific station based
approach to understanding the very significant changes undertaken since the 1990s.
Changes on the ground in the UK television industry over the past 25 years came
about largely through a combination of legislative and technological applications
which led to a radical reordering of the working lives of those employed within the
industry (Paterson, 2001:212). Until quite recently, comparatively little had been
written about the nature of work and employment in broadcasting (McRobbie, 1996).
The emerging literature on management and labour has focused largely on the
disintegration of internal labour markets and the rapid casualization of employment
which has dominated the industry in the last decade (Dex et al, 2003).
The objective here is to explore the relationship between corporate strategy, the
reshaping of labour processes (so as to incorporate the introduction of new
technology), and the consequent issue of the re-regulation of workplace relationships
within STV. By the mid 1990s, this regional ITV franchise had successfully
transformed itself from a minor regional broadcaster into an aggressively acquisitive
media conglomerate but which, subsequently, withdrew to its core business service
after a series of disappointing acquisitions and diversifications. However its efforts
from the mid 1980s onwards to restructure television production and broadcasting had
not been straightforward. STV was engaged from the late 1970s onwards in
complicated and long drawn out negotiations concerning, inter alia, the integration of
new technology and the management of incremental labour process change on the
shop floor. Drawing on interviews with STV production staff and managers (detailed
in Chapter 2) and with the assistance of internal documents and ITVA archive papers,
it is possible to trace the development of corporate strategy and work organisation as
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STV shifted from being a cultural bureaucracy to something akin to the flexible firm
(see Mangum & Mangum, 1986).
Critics of the radical changes achieved in the structure and management of the UK
television industry point to the pervasive casualization of employment in the sector
(Saundry, 1998). On the other hand, advocates depict an industry which is both
flexible and specialised and populated by freewheeling and imaginative cultural
entrepreneurs linking a vibrant archipelago of production and ancillary services to the
broadcasters (Starkey & Barnatt, 1997). Both analyses are simplistic and fatally
flawed and represent a myopic nostalgia for a lost ‘golden age’ of broadcasting free
from commercial considerations or, indeed, from effective management. The
alterations to employment patterns which gathered pace from the mid-1980s onwards
were prefigured by the development of more rigorous programme budget controls and
local skirmishes over new technology together with the consequence from the
emerging independent television production sector. The rapid growth in production
companies and facilities houses providing programming and specialist services did
not, however, signify the emergence of a form of flexible specialisation (Piore, 1986).
The broadcasting companies commissioning role was not synonymous with that of a
brokerage agency and only a very limited number of production companies were
vehicles for ‘talent’ or had a sufficiently large production base to give them
substantial bargaining power. Neither can the micro-level categories of the ‘flexible
firm’ be conflated with the meso-level terms of ‘flexible specialisation’ without a
collapse of analytical rigour (Robins & Cornford, 1992). Indeed, the experience of
broadcasting casts further doubt on the rigour of flexible specialisation as an
analytical category. For the new entrepreneurial class of independent producers
relations of power continued to be skewed in favour of the broadcasters’
commissioning departments.
It is useful to begin by outlining the principal features of work organisation and
collective bargaining in the period before the mid 1980s. The long dominance of
complex and unreliable electrical mechanical technologies, and the slow introduction
of digital alternatives made acceptance of a highly regulated labour process the only
choice for television management. Satellite and cable technologies – and,
increasingly, competitive franchise auctions – exposed the commercial Network (after
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the introduction of the Broadcasting Act, 1990) to severe competition for the first time
(Franklin, 2001). The following Section traces the collapse of national collective
bargaining and the beginnings of a management assault on the regulated labour
process. These dual forces were to release the potential of digital technologies and
deliver significant efficiency gains so as to redraw the balance of power in the
workplace. Management control of the labour process became an increasingly
important competitive weapon. For STV it was considered that extending control over
the labour process was both essential to profitability and to the legitimation of a new
managerial regime which developed from the mid-1980s.
5.1
Management and Labour in a Regulated Environment.
A stable competitive environment, together with incremental changes in production
technology, meshed with a highly regulated form of labour process through to the
mid-1980s (Crissell, 2002). Regulation centred on a comprehensive set of work rules
which specified rigid conditions for individual tasks and patterns of production
crewing. National work rules were inescapable for franchise holders and, while local
negotiations and disputes could improve terms and conditions for labour at specific
stations, industrial conflicts were about the boundaries and content of national
contracts and not about their existence.
Labour contracts took production efficiency out of the competitive equation for
station managements and work organisation was not a prime factor in competitiveness
or profitability. Management acceptance – however rhetorically grudging – of a
national settlement on work organisation also reflected their reliance on highly skilled
labour. Just as cameras 'had to be heated up', a veteran of the first decade of
commercial television recalled, the camera operator also 'had to heat up, to get his eye
in’.
Each camera had three or four tubes depending on the standard you were working to.
To register the images you had magnetic yokes and you had to be able to shift the
image that was being scanned up, down and sideways to alter the intensity of it, to
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adjust the scanning beam, the focus, the intensity, the current within the read of beam.
You had so many controls and perhaps fifty parameters to control to get pictures. It
was a bit of a black art. Some people were better than others at lining (shots) up, and
certain individuals had reputations as being very good at getting pictures out of
cameras - there was an element of artistry involved.63
Camera rosters were predicated on the assumption that minor technical failures would
inevitably disrupt production. ‘If you wanted to change tapes, it was ‘go and have a
cup of tea while the assistant changes the tape’. Sound engineering, similarly,
involved running adjustments to recording equipment with every change of tape
spool. Downtime averaged one-third of production time and the complexity of
individual tasks was overlaid by a need for collective improvisation based on shared
experience. Camera crews were ordered in a strict hierarchy, primarily based on
seniority, and regulated exclusively by the workgroup (Brown, 1972: 42-61).
The main difference [between the studio twenty years ago compared with the recent
past] is quality and reliability – the equipment now is better, sound quality is better,
everything is better – but also if you were doing a six hour day in the studio then built
into that schedule would be time for doing breakdowns.64
The individual dexterity and group coordination required in the operation of a
pedestal camera was considerable. Although power-operated cranes were introduced
from the early 1960s, fine movements required the senior camera operator to remain
in focus while aligning shots through three dimensions, all while seated on a moving
‘dolly’. The senior operator gestured to the two assistants with a series of rapid, subtle
finger signals guiding the ‘planing-handle’. One camera operator recalled that during
such delicate operations the workgroup relied on an ‘almost telepathic’ understanding
of the image sought by the senior operator;
The old dollies were heavy, bulky – awkward to move. But you had to glide them
across the floor to avoid the slightest bump. All the time you were adjusting the dolly
63 Interview former STV camera operator 5.1.
64 Interview STV producer.
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you had to just know what shot the cameraman wanted then and what he wanted
next.65
Production staff continued to define themselves in terms of their trade rather than as
broadcasters or employees of a specific company. Occupational identity remained
defined by generic competences, tools, and reference to a wider craft community
which stretched beyond the studio floor;
I was an electrician who happened to be working for a telly company. Even after
twenty-five years with STV I still thought that I could have gone back to (electrical)
contracting.66
The management attitude to programme production both accepted and confirmed the
separation of the aesthetic and technical spheres of production. The camera operators’
contribution to production was not aesthetic but, rather, a more restricted technical
conformity. In common with other broadcasting technicians, the camera operators’
primary identity was that of a member of a wider craft community. ‘Of course we
wanted the show to go well, but we had nothing to do with deciding what the shots
were. The only time we volunteered a suggestion was if a shot was impractical’67. The
labour process was articulated around a sequence of tasks conducted by distinct craft
groups augmented by a series of ancillary occupations such as stagehands and
dressers.
Only carpenters could wield saws and hammers, only painters could paint sets.
Stagehands were restricted to fetching and carrying: as a stagehand you would not
dare look at a hammer or paint brush.68
Equally, no tradesman would consider shifting a prop or delivering materials or spare
parts. In many cases there was a technical basis to restrictive job allocations not
65 Interview former STV camera operator 5.1.
66 Interview former STV electrician 5.3.
67 Interview former STV camera operator. 5.2.
68Interview former STV stage-hand.
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derived solely from union job controls. An electrician would not touch a sound cable,
a sound guy would not touch an electrician’s cable or a camera cable, a cameraman
would not touch a sound cable or an electrician’s cable.
It got to the ridiculous stage. There is the story of a chap who bumped into a lamp
stand and the lamp was falling over so he grabbed it before it fell and put it back up.
That caused major problems with the electricians - not because he bumped into it, but
because he grabbed it and put it back up.69
Within this setting it was entirely rational for management to collude with the unions
in the construction and maintenance of balkanised internal labour markets and to cede
significant control over the labour process to skilled labour (Brown, 1972: 55-57).
‘You always bought your way out of any problem – the bucks were there – it was a
corrupt form of profit-sharing’, recalled a former STV Director. In a time-sensitive
setting, any small group could halt production instantly. The same individual recalled
that ‘every weekend the outside broadcast was in jeopardy because the riggers might
be a problem, or the electricians, or whatever. The possibility of industrial relations
problems was accepted as a fact of life’. Through the 1970s small-scale conflicts
confirmed the balance of power in the workplace firmly in the unions’ favour.
Management made a Faustian pact with the unions - we wouldn’t push too hard. If
we were threatened with blank screens we had no choice and we had to back down. It
was all a big boys’ game. We all knew what was going on - they had us over a barrel.
Problems only arose by accident.70
The management view was that programming was the deployment of nationally
negotiated crews rather than the movement of individuals according to production
priorities. Controlling labour costs was not vital either to the station’s profitability or
to the appraisal of management performance. Over-crewing was inherent in the
regulated environment ‘but at that time management liked that because they didn’t
69 Interview former STV stage-hand.
70 Interview STV manager.
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have to think about anything – the management building blocks were really big. It was
a case of programme, crew, money, that’s fine, that’s that sorted out, dead easy’.71
Shop stewards inside STV (particularly electricians who had moved into broadcasting
largely from shipbuilding or civil engineering) developed extensive job controls as
their main bargaining weapon and this was broadly acceptable to management while
the company was in profit. STV had evolved through a number of phases since its
inception in 1957. A confidential report published in 1980 (after a visit to the
company by the ITVA) found that the first ten years of the franchise existence were
marked by high profits.72 By the early 1970s the company was suffering annual
losses, and by 1975 a new board of directors had been appointed.73 By the time of the
publication of the ITVA report management at STV (and other franchise holders) had
begun to radically rethink the way National Agreements were applied on a local basis.
The ITVA report on STV identified a need to restructure local deals so that that they
would no longer be linked directly to a need to maintain transmission. Crucially, the
ITVA report noted that while individual franchise holders did not share information
with one another about industrial relations concerns, the trade unions (and the ACTT
in particular) had developed very sophisticated networks for the sharing of
information.74 It was regularly noted by ex-STV interviewees that the company had a
history of poor industrial relations. A former STV electrician said of the franchise;
STV had always had bad management - always. Bad managers can be good for the
workers if they [workers] are organised. Any time we had to wait (for materials or
other trade groups) we claimed an allowance - the worse the manager, the better the
allowances. Plus, we got the chance to work overtime. That’s what we tried to do: to
build up the agreements so that the worker would not be punished for bad
management.75
71 Interview STV manager.
72 IR/045/015
73 IR/045/015
74 IR/045/015
75 Interview former STV electrician 5.4.
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Throughout the late 1970s the growing divergence in the scale of operations of the
Network companies began to shift management attention to the local level. Although
the industry's National Agreements remained paramount they were increasingly
augmented by locally negotiated appendices and such micro-agreements merely
improved on the content of the National Agreements. The ACTT was at the apex of
its powers within the ITV Network and vigorously policed its pre-entry closed shop.
According to a former head of industrial relations at the ITVA, the period up until the
early 1980s may be characterized as one of ‘waste and poisonous industrial relations’.
Before the mid-1980s technical change in broadcasting had been dominated by a
series of incremental innovations in specific technologies. Even as late as the early
1980s film had remained the dominant form of recording notwithstanding technical
limitations and the difficulties surrounding employment of recording craft skills
within the ITV. The piecemeal process of technical change required a marriage of
temperamental mechanical technologies with unreliable and unproven digital
technologies. The result of this complex and protracted transition (from mechanical to
digital process technologies) was twofold. Firstly, mechanical skills remained of
prime importance in broadcasting and, secondly, new technologies were absorbed into
the existing craft-based division of labour and appropriated by established trade
groups. The ACTT controlled the introduction of new technologies through its highly
developed and rehearsed negotiating strategies. One former ACTT negotiator (turned
commercial television executive) said of his colleagues during the period up until the
mid 1980s;
I remember when I sat on the ACTT national negotiating committee in the 1970s and
what was most evident was the poor quality of the ITV national negotiators. They
were middle-level labour relations executives who engaged in local deal making and
their ability to manage national negotiating was zero and it was quite educational.76
There was, however, some flexibility on the highly regulated commercial television
studio floor but any managerial discretion to reorder production schedules ‘came with
a price tag attached’. Minor changes to working time arrangements were possible but
76 Interview with David Elstein.
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attracted significant premium payments (see Campling, 1992: 207-211). Production
imperatives for the various technical groups came second to the maintenance of the
integrity of collective agreements and custom and practice. Network managers were
compelled to accept their relative powerlessness to circumvent custom and practice
locally or to confront the industry’s National Agreement. Inside STV, producers did
not attempt to take issue with custom and practice.
They were making so much money, it [ACTT] was a very strong union at the bottom
and powerful directors at the top doing deals…with middle management effectively
stripped of power, this was an incredibly profitable monopoly and everybody wanted
their cut, it seems that ITV was a very badly managed system.77
Work groups were treated as fixed costs for the station as a whole rather than
attributed to specific programmes in any meaningful way. The National Agreements –
because of their comprehensiveness in relation to issues such as manning and rates of
pay – contrived to keep industrial relations issues to the margins in the context of
issues which exercised station managers.
Up to the mid-eighties it was a combination of making programmes and making
money. Towards the end of the eighties it was driven solely by the bottom-line:
making programmes was a necessary evil – a cost, no more than that.78
Front line management actively sustained custom and practice in order to maintain
production and their limited discretion in work organisation issues. Managerial
authority on the studio floor was, in practice, a blend of acknowledged professional
competence and adherence to the norms of craft administration.
77 Interview with Roy Lockett, BECTU.
78 Interview former STV director of personnel.
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5.2
The New Broadcasting Economy?
The move from a Regulated to a Flexible Workplace.
As is clear from interviews recounted and from the theory presented in Chapter 1
(1.3), the essential objective of the practice of industrial relations in the ITV Network
(within STV) was ‘to buy peace’. Of the regional television companies, STV was
disadvantaged in terms of advertising revenues and, consequently, was forced to offer
lower rates and heavy discounts for test products (Clarke & Bradford, 1991:24). This
in turn placed real pressures on the balance between STVs cost and revenue
structures. The company was placed very much as a follower (as opposed to a leader)
in the process of restructuring relationships between the ITVA/ITV and the ACTT
and, in particular, in the employment of new broadcasting technology. However
internal ITVA documents provide evidence that as far back as 1977 STV (in the
person of Industrial Relations Manager, Colin Waters) was actively involved in
negotiations with shop stewards about these issues.79 There is documentary evidence
that from as early as December 1977, STV was ready to begin negotiations about self-
financing productivity agreements. However the process was painstakingly slow (as
the minutes of meetings reveal) over the grading of VTR editors under the umbrella of
traditional ACTT guidelines.80 In August 1977 the ACTT had successfully blocked
the hiring of editing equipment for an O.B (outside broadcast) from the Edinburgh
festival.81 From this point (in the late 1970s) it seems difficult to believe that, within a
decade, such inflexibility would be rendered redundant by a revolution in the way
individual franchise holders conducted negotiations with their employees. A former
STV industrial relations manager spoke of the trivial nature of some industrial
relations disputes;
Often crews if going abroad would refuse to go until they got what they wanted, you
would find a reason for agreeing to their demands. I remember at Granada talking
with a manager about an old dispute which was based upon the fact that the mustard
79 IR/468/002.
80 IR/468/002
81 IR/468/002
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pots had been changed in the canteen and the union rep had threatened to take them
off-air because of the quality of the mustard. This guy subsequently became the
manager.82
A defining feature of industrial relations within the ITV sector as a whole during the
1980s was the managerial drive to loosen, if not eliminate, job controls embodied in
formal contracts and in custom and practice (Daniel, 1987:166). In fact the drive to
reshape the labour process in manufacturing was paralleled in broadcasting. From the
early 1980s, commercial television companies began to pursue a range of strategies to
break down national collective bargaining and dislodge the national crew minima
which restricted the wholesale introduction of new production technologies (Ursell,
1998:136). The industry’s early experiences of video cameras for ENG were marked
by extensive local negotiations and which limited the impact of new technology on
working practices and earnings (Clarke et al, 1984). By the end of the decade,
however, national bargaining had collapsed under pressure of company level
bargaining (FTT 7 BETA News, Oct 1991). New technology was important – not just
because of its own deskilling and de-manning potential – but also because it
compelled management to review the technical necessity for conventional large
crews. Network managers identified large crews as a consequence of union bargaining
strength rather than technical necessity (Sparks, 1989:26). Even before concerted
attacks on crew levels in the late 1980s, STV managers had made some limited efforts
at removing the fixed crew regulation;
I think there were always attempts to press the limits and you would see whether you
could get away with a lower crew. But the ability to compromise was pretty narrow.
STV were very late in coming to ENG so you could argue that STV were slow and not
inclined to take many risks. You could almost put a date on when technology allowed
managers to keep programmes on air. The unions realised that unless they sat down
and negotiated they were going to lose. 83
82 Interview former STV director of personnel.
83 Interview former STV director of personnel.
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The key to unlocking the potential of new technology was in challenging the sector’s
historic settlement with the technicians’ trade unions. While a number of television
companies (such as Tyne Tees and LWT) chose confrontation, STVs strategy was to
dismantle, through negotiation, the agreements regulating working practices and
working time. The company’s choice of conventional bargaining channels was in
keeping with the strategies of the majority of independent broadcasting companies
and, indeed, of British management more generally (Daniel, 1987:177). The backdrop
to the formal negotiation process was a difficult and protracted war of manoeuvres on
the studio floor. Increasingly, management attempted to renegotiate local agreements
and alter the terms of custom and practice – ‘we were testing the limits all the time’.84
As noted earlier, STVs use of external contractors was regulated by an agreement
which restricted their choice to other Network companies. ITVA internal documents
from 1981 reveal that in negotiations between STV and National Association of
Theatrical Television and Kine Employees (‘NATKE’), ‘riggers’85 claims for
additional payments for handling portable cameras (as opposed to what was termed
‘conventional’ equipment) had resulted in the offer of a lump sum payment of GBP
600 in addition to a 10 per cent pay rise.86 The riggers demanded more money and the
parties failed to come to an agreement.87
All rented equipment had to be operated by contractors supervised by an equal
number of STV technicians and there was no economic incentive to outsource any
aspect of production. This agreement was moderated so that STV staff worked the
rented equipment under the guidance of contractors, but ACTT blocked any move
toward hiring equipment without restriction. The technicians’ most potent weapon
was to work strictly to agreements, eschewing even the most lucrative exception and
which was a tactic management regarded as ‘worse than a strike’.
‘The two minute rule’ was a pertinent example of such a strategy and any short local
feature on the local news bulletin could be shot by a small crew. However if the item
went over two minutes in duration then the company had to pay for a full crew and a
84 Interview former STV director of personnel.
85 A term given to workers responsible for setting up camera and other heavy, awkward technologies.
86 ITVA IR/A37/002A.
87 ITVA IR/A37002A.
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steward would then use a stopwatch to time features.88 Further, if an actor had to re-
shoot a scene for a drama production then technicians would not ask for an hour’s
overtime but would insist on coming in the next day which was a rest day;
So it was eight hours of double-bubble!.89
Such low cost and low risk industrial action proved highly effective in defending the
boundaries of local agreements and custom and practice. STVs Watters wrote to the
Industrial Relations Secretariat of the ITCA in March 1981 and warned of the
consequences of a continued capitulation (through local deals in particular) to what
were perceived to be the excessive demands of skilled craft workers;90
This industry has suffered too much in the past from doing local deals which could
affect the whole industry, for example, ENG, productivity deals, etc., etc.. I do
honestly believe we have got to take a long hard look at ourselves if this type of
arrogant attitude is going to prevail.91
In September 1986, STV – through the forum of its regular meeting with ACTT
representatives in Glasgow – summarized the company’s position in relation to the
direction in which they wanted to proceed.92 Management were demanding, inter alia,
that crews should operate as required to meet production needs and there should be no
minimum crewing levels. In addition, the continued use of freelance personnel had to
be agreed and a revision of the ENG agreement also be undertaken to give maximum
flexibility to News and Current Affairs.93 At a further ACTT branch meeting, Watters
indicated the company’s intention to deploy staff in a way which would allow the
company to meet its objectives.94 STV managers stated that they had identified bad
practices and were determined to ‘overcome them’.95 The company now expected
88 Interview former STV producer.
89 Interview former STV senior producer.
90 ITVA/A37/002A
91 ITVA/A37002A.
92 ACTT branch meeting 11, September 1986 Glasgow.
93 ACTT branch meeting 19 September 1986 Glasgow.
94 ACTT branch meeting 16 September 1986 Glasgow.
95 ACTT branch meeting 16 September 1986 Glasgow.
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studio hands to track camera cables where appropriate and to incorporate automatic
line up facilities on cameras into programme production whenever possible.
STVs ‘Way Ahead’ negotiations began in 1986 by seeking greater flexibility and
efficiency and with labour deployment stemming from operational requirements
rather than National Agreements. Its objectives were not defined by front-line
managers and producers and, indeed, National Agreements prohibited STV executives
from discussing their bargaining agenda with section managers.96 From the outset the
ACTT shop stewards’ strategy was geared toward damage limitation. One lay union
negotiator accepted that changes in working practices were ‘absolutely inevitable’ and
the objective was not resistance but ‘to try to get it through with the least possible
mayhem’.97 STV managers insisted that reduced existing crewing levels would be
exceptional and would be negotiated with shop stewards. However, the ACTT
stewards were highly sceptical that the principle of mutuality in work organisation
would survive a war of attrition between producers and shop-stewards. The latter
recognised that they could not realistically defend the ‘minimum’ crew agreement
and, instead, sought to install mutuality and contingency rules to govern adjustments
to crewing. For STV management to accept the principle that changes in crewing
levels should be decided through negotiation on the studio floor would be to jettison
restrictive agreements only to become entangled in a cumbersome governance process
where they could be ‘ambushed on a daily basis’. STV, as noted earlier, refused to
accept any restriction on management decision-making according to operational
needs.
By 1987 internal STV documents showed attempts to reassure members of the ACTT
over the application of ‘certain procedures’ (namely, disciplinary procedures) within
the company.98 Through 1987, STV continued to maximise management’s room for
manoeuvre in work reorganisation and carefully avoided specifying tasks, trades, or
time budgets for specific operations. In time the ACTT stewards had no bargaining
position left to defend. The only sop which STV management offered was that
96 See ‘Way Ahead’ document 11 September 1987.
97 Interview, former ACTT Shop Steward.
98 Internal STV Memo from J. Hall to D. McKenzie (ACTT Glasgow) and J. Sheach (ACTT
Edinburgh) 15 April 1987.
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implementation of new working practices would be monitored by a joint working
party, albeit one which had no power to negotiate, rescind, or even endorse specific
changes.99 Whatever the original intention, by mid-1987 STVs management were
simply maintaining the façade of meaningful collective bargaining – while they
waited to see just how far the balance of power was shifting to their advantage. In the
minutes of a meeting between the ACTT and STV management in November 1987,
the ACTT expressed its unhappiness with the use of (independent) facilities houses
‘as necessary’ and reminded the company that it would wish to be consulted before
specialist facilities were introduced.100 In addition the union had noted the company’s
increased interest in the employment of independent productions as part of the weekly
broadcast schedule.
‘The Way Ahead’ proposal document, (version two), published in December 1987, set
out the challenges (as management saw them) facing, not just STV, but the
commercial broadcasting environment as a whole.101 Inside the commercial television
Network the major stations were increasingly endeavouring to terminate the National
Agreement. It is essential to note the development of a more aggressive policy
towards employment and organizational matters by franchise holders such as STV
(and others) in the context of changes to the National Agreement. The STV document
encouraged flexibility and cost effectiveness while emphasizing the parallel increases
in investment which the ending of out-dated working practices would bring. As BBC
Scotland would later turn to a form of internal market for both technical labour and
production resources, so STV articulated its desire to change its labour process by the
employment of, what was termed, the Production Concept.102 The similarities between
the adoption of the Talent Pool at BBC Scotland and The Production Concept at STV
are quite revealing. The central purpose of the STV document was to make the best
use of all available staff skills so as to meet programme and transmission
requirements. In addition, the scheduling of staff was to be flexible so as to react to
changing programming needs while having regard to the loyalty of a core permanent
staff and who were the franchisee’s primary concern.
99 See ‘Way Ahead’ document, 9 October 1987, p1.
100 STV PLC – ACTT ‘The Way Ahead’ 13 November 1987, p2.
101STV PLC –ACTT, ‘The Way Ahead’ 8 December 1987 p1.
102 STV PLC – ACTT, ‘The Way Ahead’ 8 December 1987 p2.
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The spirit of this provision is to ensure that there are no hard and fast rules on the
movement of people, and not that people should be allocated unreasonably.103
Major shifts in the landscape of collective bargaining were paralleled by changes in
the strategy and structure of STV and where control over the labour process was the
company’s core short-term objective. 'Tight management of labour costs', Gus
McDonald, STVs Managing Director, concluded, remained;
The highest priority as the commissioning of programmes is increasingly decided by
the ITV Network Centre on the basis of price.104
Reshaping the employment relationship and work organisation was crucial both to
ensuring the company’s independence in the short-term, and to the medium-term goal
of emerging as a regional media conglomerate (embracing both print and broadcasting
while constructing joint ventures with satellite broadcasters). The ITV Network was
being remade as a deregulated and overtly commercial enterprise – in part by an
increase in the hours broadcast. The proposals put forward by the Joint
Management/ACTT Working Party in February 1988, noted that further flexibility
was required if the company was to resource all its requirements with the minimum
number of employees. There was an acceptance that further recruitment to the general
area of engineering would be required – promotion through the grades would be
available but strict processes of appraisal would be introduced and progression would
be at the sole discretion of the company.
By February 1988 agreement had been reached between the ACTT and STV
management that crewing would be operated ‘as required’ and not as previously
structured by ‘some artificial ruling’.105 In the minutes of the Joint Working Party of
April 1988 three areas of concern which would come to dominate union/ management
thinking during the 1990s were evident.106 These included the employment of
103 STV PLC, Annual Report,1993, p3.
104 STV PLC, Annual Report,1993, p3
105 Memo, Re Night Working –Presentation Controllers, 10 February 1988.
106 Joint Working Party, 27 April 1988.
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“capital equipment, ‘stringers’107 and the use of independent contractors”. There was
real concern within the ACTT that the re-employment of former employees as
independent producers within the company might cause difficulties. Interestingly, the
notes of that meeting made reference to the uncertainty which was beginning to
pervade the industry (staffing was a critical area of concern for union negotiators).
ACTT representatives were anxious to avoid further recruitment to the company
believing that a reorganization of current employees, together with the use of contract
staff, would suffice. STV managers acknowledged that, while not having any formal
policy in place, its position was that there should be ‘non-replacement of staff in
virtually all cases’.108 The ‘Way Ahead’ negotiations ceased abruptly in Spring 1988,
as management concluded that collective bargaining was no longer effective – either
in delivering radical change quickly or legitimising the demolition of the company's
internal labour market structures. Within STV, the fundamental move from a heavily
regulated ITV franchise with intense negotiation required for even the smallest shop-
floor change was characterized by a current senior STV manager as being the ‘pre
Gus McDonald era and the post Gus McDonald era’;109
He (McDonald) was here at a time when changes were taking place in Network
television companies, [they] were taking stock of their cost bases which had been
built up over many years – there were fifteen stable companies making TV
programmes – those companies had established staff…earning wages negotiated
around a table in London by unions reps.
By the late 1980s craft skills were unnecessary for the successful operation and
maintenance of comparatively light and mobile ‘chimp cameras’. These produced
high quality images by simple ‘point and press’ operation and opened up new
possibilities for an aggressive management driven by the bottom-line (Gandy, 1991:1-
2).
107 ‘Stringers’, a term given to occasional or freelance labour.
108 Joint Working Party, 16 June 1988.
109 Interview former STV manager.
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That’s fine, we could get any old monkey to do this, we could bring ten granders in
straight from school, as long as they know what button to push …we’ll be all right.110
There was now little need for the highly refined conceptual and manual skills of the
camera operator and digitalisation had, over time, substantially expanded the range of
aesthetic tasks performed by camera operators.
Where you're trying to cover a multi-camera match the on-screen producer will ask
for lots of graphics to be on-screen, video-tape run-ins, etc., so camera operators
become more like system engineers than camera line-up people as they were. So the
job has changed - they no longer concentrate on a narrow range of technology.111
The implementation of video technology, and the subsequent marginalization of film,
shifted the focus of programme making from labour-intensive, highly choreographed
and expensive production to post-production mixing rooms staffed by a producer and
two or three assistants (Varlaam, 1990:44). From the late1970s manual editing based
on a lengthy process of cutting and splicing film was gradually displaced by the
immediacy of videocassettes and, from the late 1980s, by digital tape. The producer of
a syndicated children’s show explained that ‘the editing is the cheapest part of the
process’;
If you are in a studio and are using seven cameras, a crane, four mini cameras, a
couple of underwater cameras then the studio crew was probably in excess of forty
people, plus the studio itself, and all the power and so on.112
Even poor camerawork could be disguised during the editing process and
conventional images refashioned: ‘any dodgy object – no problem, we can paint it
out’.113 Digitalisation permitted non-linear video editing, and the integration of a
number of previously discrete skills and functions, e.g. editor, graphic designer and
sound mixer. Successive innovations in materials now complemented the radical
110 Interview former STV video-editor.
111 Interview former STV video-editor.
112 Interview STV producer.
113 Interview former STV senior producer.
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improvements in production technology. Digital tape was capable of achieving high-
grade filmic quality at a fraction of the cost of conventional film stock and, most
importantly, the expanded capabilities of digital editing significantly altered the
division of labour on the studio floor. A STV producer spoke at length about how the
creative aspect of production had moved from the ‘shoot’ to the post-production suite;
The basic process is the same but you are shifting the emphasis into post-production.
You shoot things differently because the editing is available to you and it’s faster and
cheaper and everything is budget led. Post-production equipment is so much more
advanced. In the early days it was cut and mix and that was about it, but now you can
do so many other things, electronically alter things frame by frame. 114
It is here where new technology had the greatest impact on the nature of the
production process. Electrical-mechanical film crews had followed pre-ordained
patterns while lighter and more robust digital cameras allowed much greater
flexibility for operators and wider choices for post-production image mixing.
Rehearsals with mechanical cameras had allowed operators to make their instructions
more specific. Digital camera crews, on the other hand, used rehearsals, not to restrict
their freedom of movement, but to become immediately engaged in the aesthetic
production process. Less obvious changes to ancillary systems on the studio floor also
had a significant cumulative effect on crewing and the labour process. For instance,
major improvements in the reliability and performance of radio microphones since the
mid-1980s eliminated the ‘boom’ sound-technician completely from some
programmes and permitted the director to pin the microphone to interviewees.
By the late 1980s, against a background of successive franchise bids, individual
station managements had turned decisively towards the labour process as an emerging
competitive weapon. In essence, stations converged on a single model of organisation
with a core of experienced staff drawing on freelance production labour. This new
production regime is conventionally contrasted with the regulated past – with
flexibility and casual employment having replaced rigidity and joint regulation. While
this somewhat stark contrast is quite legitimate it does, in many respects, neglect two
114 Interview STV producer.
143
crucial elements. The transition from a creative bureaucracy to casualised production
was a lengthy process which followed a quite contradictory trajectory in different
television companies. In STV, management ruthlessly dismantled the old order only
after it became clear that they were slipping behind other Network companies in terms
of restructuring the labour process. Equally, STVs use of conventional collective
bargaining – both to reinforce managerial prerogative and to legitimise new work
regimes – was inadequate. The transition also involved the introduction of new
managerial techniques in order to monitor the production process and the construction
of something akin to the process of Producer Choice (and which had been introduced
in the BBC as a new ideology to legitimise the destruction of the established internal
labour market). In short, managers sought to take on the established craft identities of
commercial broadcasting employees and to restructure the highly regulated supply of
skilled trades (see Berkeley, 2003).
As noted earlier, the labour component of programme budgets was formerly derived
from national crewing standards and wage rates. From the mid-1980s rudimentary
rate-cards were developed to reflect the total costs of programmes rather than only the
variable costs. By the early 1990s STV had finalised a total costing regime ‘where we
measure everything in minute detail’.115 The ‘technical controller’ of STV said during
interview, ‘budget drives everything, the budget defines what programme
management is all about’. By designating discreet functions and programmes as cost
centres the broadcasting companies (such as STV) transformed the social
relationships of production from collegiality and collective bargaining to quasi-market
transactions.
Producers were now under pressure – not just to remain within budgets – but to
actively pursue ways of reducing production costs. Redundancies were aggressively
pushed through by producers and who were redefined, in the process, as being
unambiguously part of management. Employees were ‘tapped on the shoulder’ and
shown their ‘own personalised packages’. Managers were like time-share salesmen.
‘You’ve got to buy it now, because that’s the price today and only today’.116
115 Interview former STV director of personnel.
116 Interview former STV engineer.
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Management control systems were radically extended in parallel with the attempt in
the late 1980s to negotiate new working practices. In particular, Producer Choice
allowed each employee’s productive time to be charged to specific programmes and
their downtime to be closely monitored and compared. Combined with Producer
Choice, downtime measurement was a powerful ideological method of individualising
the selection of individuals for redundancy.
‘When it came to whose shoulder to tap on, the managers were looking at the
individual downtime print-outs’.117 Ideologically, allocation to programmes and
downtime were measures of producers’ ratings of individual crew-members.
Measurement of productive and unproductive time also contained an important
ideological dimension and became a form of peer assessment and meritocracy. Before
the restructuring of the employment relationship in the second half of the 1980s, skill
appraisal had been an issue solely for the craft or workgroup. STVs attempt to impose
a process not dissimilar to that of Producer Choice effectively appropriated this
principle for managerial purposes. Redundancy was defined as an individual rather
than a collective issue – to be mediated by seniority rules or collective bargaining.
This, in turn, raised profound questions about the value of trade union membership,
particularly given the redundancy of ACTTs executive-led bargaining strategy and the
local unpopularity of merger with the non-skilled workers’ union. On the studio floor,
the union’s enormous structural weakness was compounded by the resonance of
management’s ideological onslaught on established demarcation lines among
production grades. The idea of a basic crew structure was replaced with that of
individual rostering, and labour deployment was decided by operational needs rather
than derived from national collective agreements. One indicator of the range and
extent of these changes was that STV increased its proportion of freelance and
contract staff from almost 13 per cent to in excess of 45 per cent between 1989 and
1994 (Saundry & Nolan, 1998:9).
The clear fact and consequence of large-scale casualization in British broadcasting is
inescapable. But this sectoral judgement tells us little about the impact of employment
insecurity and of the new managerial practices in specific firms. Inside STV,
117 Interview former STV sound engineer.
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temporary staff were termed ‘ten-granders’ (their salary) or as ‘nineteen-monthers’,
(the normal tenure with the company). The casualization of broadcasting employment
placed programme producers as key figures in remaking work organisation, and as
brokers straddling the boundary between internal and external labour markets. The
producer now played an ambiguous role as both manager and creator, and was no
longer bound by reciprocal ties of collegiality embedded in a common internal labour
market. STV producers developed several new coping mechanisms intended to offset
the conflict between tight budgetary control and effective production, and constructed
what might be termed a black market on which they traded production services to
lessen the effect of financial controls on production.
Producers were not impotent in the firm’s internal markets, and resource management
embraced the maximum utilisation of capital assets and established staff. The time
accounting regimes initially installed to select candidates for redundancy became a
powerful management tool to increase studio, equipment, and labour utilisation.
Aided by production contracts with SKY Television, levels of labour utilisation had
been raised to 85 per cent. The contrast between STV producers and those of the BBC
(after the introduction of Producer Choice) is most revealing. STV producers were
acutely aware that paid hours of their production staff had to be recovered. While the
Production Directorate of BBC Scotland was prepared to consider the employment of
non-BBC staff during independent productions, STV managers (during interview)
made it quite clear that only in-house staff were to be employed and it would require
quite exceptional production circumstances for external technical freelance staff to be
engaged. The intensive negotiations which characterized the ‘Way Ahead’ noted a
direct commitment by management that core staff would be its primary responsibility
and that ‘stringers’ or freelance staff would be employed only where specific needs
arise.118 A current STV production manager spoke of the importance of adhering to
budgets for all those within the production and administrative areas of STV;
You have the programme makers looking after the cash costs and the budgets but you
have the person that’s in charge (Ferdi Coia) looking after his cost base which is the
salaries, the management of those salaries, anything which was related to hardware
118 See STV PLC – ACTT ‘Way Ahead’ 8 December 1987.
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Ferdi would be responsible for. My measurement is an amalgam of all their costs to
recover my costs – we have set our budget on a seventy or eighty per cent utilization
of my people so we watch our utilization… we don’t employ people outside our core
unless we have to.119
The employment of independent producers and technical resource staff within STV
may be seen (in the ACTT/STV minutes) as a historically difficult and complex
process.120 By the late 1980s the employment of Harry Urquhart as General Manager
signalled a change in the relatively restrained and non-confrontational style of
management and which had characterized the ‘Way Ahead’ negotiations in the period
up until 1988. Urquhart was concerned about high levels of downtime within STV,
and initiated a radical reshaping of the relationship between management and the
ACTT at individual franchise level. David Elstein said of the move by STV to
restructure its approach to industrial relations;
STV was by no means unique in what it went through. I think all of these labour
relations were driven by the structure of the industry…and the collusion between
trade unions and weak management – then the shock of Thatcherism, Wapping and
independent productions.121
In essence the business functions required to produce programming came to be seen
as a separate rather than an integrated processes (Berkeley, 2003). Such departures
from the traditional way of organizing television production led to a radical alteration
in working lives and a concurrent change in the way in which relations between
workers and managers were mediated. After the challenge to union control, (what, in
effect, amounted to a form of managerial control over the studio floor including such
areas as the construction of sets) the operation of studios and the outside broadcasting
of sports events were not returned to management. Flexibility was the key demand of
managerial control and became the watchword (Tunstall, 2001:194-202). Producers,
as noted earlier, were the net beneficiaries and emerged as the new powerbrokers
within the UK broadcasting industry. For as Mangum & Mangum (1986:12-20)
119 Interview STV manager.
120 See STV PLC – ACTT ‘Way Ahead’.
121 Interview with David Elstein.
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contended in relation to the drive for flexibility – an end to rigid work rules and high
fixed costs in terms of the movement of labour within individual franchises became a
key requirement for managers.
As has already been established – the broadcasting trade unions were largely
decimated by the rapid changes which occurred in the period 1985-95 (see Ursell,
2000:805-825). The job controls which had been established over almost three
decades were obliterated. Process innovations were no longer ‘digital islands in a
mechanical sea’ and by the mid-1980s represented a complete system. Whereas the
broadcasting unions had used their control over the entire production process to
appropriate specific new technologies, the modular nature of digitalisation rendered
this kind of union control strategy obsolete. Similarly, the unions’ control of entry to
and movement within technical grades was swept away by the floodtide of
casualization. Broadcasting technicians were no longer insulated from change by
National Agreements or able to exert control through occupation of strategic points of
production. Senior management constantly reminded employees of the highly
competitive operating environment in which they now operated.
Production people, like researchers for example, do not have their hours explained in
advance and they have been totally shafted because they have contracts which specify
to be on call at all time.122
Coupled with the assault on internal labour markets it became apparent that the
collapse of formal and informal bargaining power was complete. There was no
collective regulation of redundancy nor were workgroups able to withstand the attack
on job controls. Paradoxically, it is a fact that in STV aggressive management and the
introduction of individual contracts unregulated by collective bargaining actually
helped to reorganise the workforce.
Given the institutional vacuum which was collective bargaining in broadcasting after
1989, BECTUs local officials’ emergent strategy was to regain their credibility by
representing their members during individual contract negotiations. Securing
122 Interview STV video editor.
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significant, and sometimes dramatic, salary increases for both contract and permanent
staff was critical in restoring the unions’ presence in determining terms of
employment. Individual representation was symptomatic of their new strategy of
going with the grain of current employment practices and so installing union
membership as a central feature of the emerging identity of broadcasting employees.
Pragmatism, (and not principle), also dictated the unions’ approach to the continuing
introduction and synchronisation of digital technologies. For BECTU, resistance was
simply unrealistic and inside STV the union pursued a strategy of constructive
engagement, of insisting that core or contract employees could adapt existing patterns
of work organisation to assimilate new technologies. In the emerging discourse of
collective bargaining, maintaining programme quality was the unions’ most powerful
defence of job territories. This was both a tacit acknowledgement of their
powerlessness and the continuing fluidity of the broadcasting division of labour. In
contrast to the period before the ‘Way Ahead’ agreement, the technicians’ unions
could not use formal bargaining or custom and practice arguments to capture new
technology. This profound powerlessness was expressed in a vote to strike against
excessive hours and managerial autocracy in late 1996. For union members, this was a
cathartic moment: ‘the worms have turned’, insisted one senior contractor.123
However, the governance of collective bargaining remained virtually unchanged.
STV made a tactical adjustment, encouraging individual employees and contractors or
their union official to appeal directly to executives if the demands of front line
managers were excessive.124
5.3
Work and employment relations in the late 1990s and beyond.
Employment relations during the 1990s were transformed from highly regulated
working environments – characteristic of both the public service broadcasting
industry and the traditionally regulated commercial ITV sector. There was now a
pervasive and general commitment to the principle of ‘flexibility’ (Baumann,
2002:28). This flexibility has been traced through the literature with a concentration
123 Scotland on Sunday, 11 November 1996.
124 Interview STV Director of Corporate Affairs.
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on areas such as networks, outsourcing and the marginalization of the principle of the
vertically integrated broadcaster model (Tempest, et al, 1997). Regulatory pressure,
and the consequent changes in organizational structures and working practices, saw
thousands of permanent employees leave the industry or withdraw to the freelance
sector (Saundry, 2001:31). Flexibility was accompanied by significant changes in
internal employment relations (Saundry & Nolan, 1998:422). Only by peering beneath
the meso-level of the ITV sector and into the working lives of individual firms could
the impact of corporate strategy on work processes be determined. The change in the
way labour and managers interacted within the ITV sector (and STV in particular)
may be understood more fully through a brief study of the manner in which an STV
programme is produced to-day. During visits to the STV studios over a three day
period and at an outside broadcast for the production of a children’s television
programme, the operation and management of a crew making television in the
relatively new deregulated environment of ITV was seen and analysed.
5.4
Game Show 1.
During the recording of the children’s ‘Game Show 1’ the Director worked from an
OB truck parked outside the hall. Inside the darkened truck he faced a bank of eight
monitors, each linked to one of the cameras on set. To the Director’s right the vision
mixer responded directly to his instructions to cut between cameras. On his left was
the ‘logger’ who noted the time of shots for reference during the critical post-
production period. All the basic shots were covered by four cameras. Two of these
cameras were allocated close up’s of the competitors, the other two camera operators
were on dollies and instructed to work with the competitors’ movement. Four other
cameramen were given a ‘roving’ commission to move throughout the complicated
set, to look for unusual angles which could be used to augment the basic four-camera
structure. The logger recorded any possible ‘character’ shots to drop into the basic
narrative of the game or to fill out the programme. This particular programme’s
central motif was a race on three-wheel motorbikes. The four key narrative
cameramen followed clear repertories with two remaining tightly focused on the
competitors’ faces and the other two panned across to give a sense of space. The
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illusion of high speed was captured/ created by the four roving camera operators who
moved around the racetrack. Inside the truck the atmosphere was frenetic and
contrasted sharply with the pre- recording calm. After the sequence was completed
there was a short pause – the Director said a polite ‘thank you’ to the camera
operatives.
Prior to the re-regulation of the ITV sector in the late 1980s agreements between the
respective franchise holders and the main trade union (ACTT) allowed for a relatively
stable working environment but, as noted earlier, this stability was (partly) dependent
upon a fixed supply of skilled employees entering the marketplace. The increase in
freelance workers entering the market (from almost 40 per cent in 1989 to 60 per cent
in 1996) encouraged very significant competition for skilled positions within
television (Skillset, 1996). The increase in the numbers of such skilled personnel led
to a subsequent reduction in training and as a consequence, an opportunity for the
remaining skilled employees to re-regulate the employment relationship to their
advantage (Saundry & Stuart, 1999). While one might endorse the views of those who
contend that the late 1990s witnessed a qualified reversal in the employment fortunes
of skilled technicians within the independent and commercial sectors, any suggestion
that the process was a straightforward one is open to challenge (Blair, 1998).
Industrial relations remained fractious within SMG (Scottish Media Group) – the
umbrella title for the group of media companies including STV. The new trade union
BECTU – formed after the merger of the ACTT and BETA in January 1991 – began a
fresh policy of attempting to challenge the status quo by giving equal parity to
freelance workers (Campling, 1997:215). Saundry (2001) contended that substantial
evidence of permanent employees’ abilities to resist management initiatives was
growing – suggesting that the increasing number of strikes and general industrial
unrest proved the point and, certainly, there was evidence of a ‘flexing of industrial
muscle’ at SMG (STV) in the early part of 2000.
At two well-attended meetings held in the canteen at STV in Glasgow in April/May,
2000 the BECTU representatives informed the assembled gathering that a recent vote
on strike action in the Aberdeen office of Grampian TV had returned a 100 per cent
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vote (NUJ) in favour of strike action.125 The figures in Glasgow (STV) were 80 per
cent (NUJ). In STV the (BECTU) vote (on a 75 per cent turnout) was 51 per cent in
favour and 20 per cent against industrial action. The local BECTU representative (P.
McManus) proposed a detailed and wide ranging strategy to ‘take on’ management,
and this included.
I. 24-hour stoppages.
II. Working time regulation, i.e. a form of ‘work to rule’.
III. Identifying the critical dates which would cause management maximum
difficulty.
IV. Picketing everywhere STV was filming in one twenty-four hour period.
We have to play hardball with management…honestly if we move (i.e. capitulate) on
this one we have had it.126
It was agreed at the meeting that when the days of action were confirmed then both
stations (Glasgow and Aberdeen) would act in harmony. Freelance workers who
attended the meeting were encouraged to support the dispute and some of these voiced
concerns that their future employment status would be jeopardized by involvement in
industrial action. In response to a question from the floor of the meeting regarding the
efforts being made to terminate the employment of ‘individual employees’ it was
suggested by McManus that management was trying to;
get rid of programme makers.127
The Scottish TUC (STUC) had urged the union to ‘get around the table with SMG’.
This proposal contrasted with the entrenched position of management who sought
seven redundancies within the SMG broadcasting division. SMG managed to meet
125 Study completed April/May 2000, STV Glasgow by permission BECTU Scotland.
126 McManus, P. April 2000, STV strike meeting.
127 McManus, P. April 2000, STV strike meeting.
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this target through negotiation, with two of those redundancies being compulsory.
McManus argued that SMG management wanted to reduce salaries to include what
they (management) termed ‘ an evolving pay structure’. Critically this meant that
future salary agreements would be based on the median industry salaries and would
also be dependent on the local market rate for technicians. During the meeting, a vote
(by a show of hands) was taken and with two exceptions there was complete support
for industrial action. Seven days notice was served on management and volunteers
were asked to nominate themselves for organizing placards and the development of a
rota system for picketing.
All workers will have to take a pay cut or take to the road…it’s a pay cut without
choice…management will come back and demand more. Let’s reinforce the message
that it’s not acceptable!128
Employees (on the picket line at the SMG building in Cowcaddens, Glasgow) spoke
of their concerns that existing positions would not continue in the same format after
two years if they did not ‘make a stand’. People spoke of concern for not just their
own careers but also for the prospects for younger employees within the company.
There is a sense here that we are the last of a breed – if we don’t take a stand now no
one will.129
The picketers spoke of their families and their worries for the future. One woman told
of her husband, a former stage production worker, being tired of the constant struggle
and what she termed the petty ‘nastiness’ of management and who had already
decided to take the early redundancy package on offer. There was real evidence of
bitterness directed towards particular individual managers who some employees
termed ‘poachers turned gamekeepers’. However the clear evidence of a restructuring
of the employment relationship was evident with huge numbers of administrative/
clerical and ancillary staff crossing the picket lines to work normally. While some
employees crossing the picket line were clearly embarrassed, and muttered quiet but
128 McManus, P. April 2000, STV strike meeting.
129 Interview with picket at STV, Cowcaddens, Glasgow, April 2000.
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genuine apologies at the pickets, many others did so in a very confident and
belligerent manner.
Strike action was equally common at other ITV franchises in the late 1990s and
industrial unrest broke out in LWT in November 1999 – as it had earlier in Granada in
August of the same year (Saundry, 2001:32). Following the STV/Grampian TV
disputes a moratorium was placed on the issue of compulsory redundancies and which
had inflamed both unions and employees. A working party (not unlike the original
‘Way Ahead’ working parties of the mid to late 1980s) was set up to examine
proposed changes in working practices. At the same time the SMG group, and in
direct response to a perception of poor industrial relations throughout the group,
launched an employee opinion survey.130 Employee surveys are sometimes treated as
a luxury (within the literature), designed both to encourage employees to display a
positive attitude towards possible organizational change and to suggest that the
organization is ‘people focused’ (Walters, 1994). Human resource strategies which
encourage employee involvement are seen as providing opportunities for employees
to have a form of input into decisions affecting individual workplace incentives to
‘expend discretionary effort and the means to acquire the appropriate skills’ (Perotin
& Robinson, 1998:559). It is apposite, however, to question whether employee
relations’ surveys are an important element of what have been termed ‘participation
schemes’ or whether they are more a lightweight strategy – a simple cosmetic
consultation process (Ben-Naer & Jones, 1995: 532-54).
5.5.
SMG Opinion Survey;
The results of the SMG survey are briefly considered below under four main
headings, these are – work organization and quality, management effectiveness,
leadership and direction and communications.
130 Author obtained copy of the results of the SMG survey in the summer of 2001, unpublished
document.
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Work organization and quality.
The SMG opinion survey (‘SMOS’) was directed towards the entire range of SMG
companies and the SMG Television group (‘SMGTV’), which included the former
independent production company ‘Ginger Productions’. The survey suggested to
potential respondents ‘that the organization too often sacrifices the quality of our
products/services in order to cut costs’. It transpired that 92 per cent of SMGTV
employees agreed, while an impressive 100 per cent of Network Production staff
agreed with the statement. 96 per cent of Network Production employees agreed that
they had a very clear conception of their daily job responsibilities – 94 per cent of
SMGTV employees were happy to endorse that view. These figures are hardly
surprising as individual job specifications are very clearly defined within the SMG
group. Downtime, which was a traditional problem of the broadcasting industry, had
been replaced by a strict adherence to work routine. It was found that 58 per cent of
Network Production and 42 per cent of SMGTV employees agreed that they felt
excessive pressure in their jobs, a total of 77 per cent of Network Production
employees believed their physical working conditions were satisfactory, while only 64
per cent of SMG people were in agreement.
Management Effectiveness.
In general, 76 per cent of Network Production employees and a substantially lower
figure (52 per cent) of SMG employees considered that management was doing an
effective job. The clear differential in levels of satisfaction with management
performance between the two arms of SMG was significant. The results of the section
of the questionnaire devoted to the question of management encouraging flexibility
and creativity within the workplace gave an insight into the differences between the
two directorates. ‘The management style in my division encourages creativity and
experimentation’ was agreed by only 29 per cent of SMG and by 65 per cent of
Network Production. The smaller Network Production sector, which employed few
highly skilled workers with very specific job specifications, was satisfied to allow
skilled and experienced technicians the flexibility to make decisions about workplace
organization. ‘My immediate manager supports people in developing their skills and
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abilities’ – this statement was agreed by 52 per cent of SMG and 80 per cent of
Network Production. Critically, the figures relating to the ability of managers to
communicate effectively with individual staff members varied between the two
‘directorates’. A total of 80 per cent of Network Production staff agreed that their
immediate manager communicated effectively while only 59 per cent of SMG
employees agreed with the statement.
Leadership and Direction.
It was found that 6 per cent of Network Production and 49 per cent of SMG staff
‘understand how the objectives of the division fit into SMG business goals’. Approval
figures began to drop considerably in both directorates once the issues of corporate
goals and direction/leadership emerged. The results would tend to point to either
considerable confusion, or a reluctance on the part of employees to associate
themselves with the corporate goals of the organization. Some 38 per cent of
respondents of both directorates agreed that senior management of SMG provided a
clear sense of direction for the organization as a whole – a very low figure.
Employees appeared very concerned by a lack of clarity on issues of long-term
strategic thinking. A total of 64 per cent of Network Production staff and 29 per cent
of SMG staff agreed that the corporation provided leadership. Similarly, 60 per cent
of Network Production and 32 per cent of SMG staff concurred that management
were good at making decisions. The one variable which ran counter to the pattern set
above is that of employee perceptions of adequately managing change (46 per cent of
Network Productions and 32 per cent of SMG had a positive perception). Both sets of
positive responses were low, as indeed were the figures for planning for the future –
58 per cent of Network Production and 35 per cent SMG being positive.
Communications.
The area of corporate communications is one which, again, provided disappointing
results for both directorates. The statement ‘the organization does an excellent job of
keeping us informed about matters affecting us’ received a low positive response of
35 per cent for Network Productions and 28 per cent for SMG employees
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Conclusion.
Digital production technologies were fundamental to the remaking of the broadcasting
labour process. Initially, when individual items of digital equipment were introduced,
they were used to mimic, rather than displace, existing electromechanical techniques.
The strength of National Agreements and local trade union bargaining permitted the
introduction of new technologies so as to enhance programme quality but not to
displace labour. From the mid-1980s, however, the management objective and intent
behind the extension of digital technologies rapidly moved to reducing/eliminating
labour. Controlling the labour process had moved from a marginal concern for
commercial television stations to being the essential element in achieving
competitiveness. This shift was marked by the articulation of increasingly fine-
grained financial tracking of the individual constituents of programme costs.
Crucially, these shifts in management strategy and practices were underway before
the Thatcher administrations’ deregulation of the industry and which was signalled by
the 1989 Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report on trade union restrictive
practices. These reforms did not initiate the management assault on the broadcast
trade unions but, rather, accelerated processes already being played out inside the
commercial television companies. The reduction of labour costs rapidly displaced
programme improvement as the rationale of digital technologies.
The past fifteen years have seen a substantial reduction in the level of collective
bargaining with a growth in individualized contracts and a very well documented
increase in managerial discretion (see Evans & Hudson, 1994:305-314). Industrial
relations within the ITV Network veered from the highly regulated environments of
the period up until the mid 1980s to a deregulated era in which the basis of the
National Agreements which controlled working conditions and salaries within the
industry were hollowed out. While highly skilled and experienced technical labour
took advantage of a skills gap in ITV franchises (such as STV) – new entrants to the
ITV sector (with few if any marketable or unique skills) were vulnerable to the
casualization process.
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The poisonous industrial relations which had been the hallmark of STV have,
unfortunately, remained largely intact.
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Chapter 6.
Marketizing a Cultural Bureaucracy:
Negotiating Organizational Change in BBC Scotland
1982-2002.
Introduction.
Many BBC insiders believe that the cuts being piloted in Scotland will provide a
template for downsizing news and current affairs across the Corporation.131
During the 1980s the UK’s PSB industry became increasingly commercialised
(McQuail, 1998:107-127). Historically, most national public service television
providers were non-commercial and were organized to serve the public (and not
private) interests. The UK broadcasting industry – in both the BBC and the ITV
variant of public service broadcasting – was an inherently stable one. In terms of work
organization and financing this stability led, not just to a role in the articulation of the
UK’s national identity, but also provided a lead in the manner labour and new
technologies were employed. The BBCs influence on broadcasting extended well
beyond its own programmes. Through its training schemes – in journalism, studio
management, technical skills and programme production – it directed the nation’s
skill base (Barnett & Curry, 1994:9). As a result, BBC employees developed a very
strong occupational identity which management were keen to encourage (up until the
late 1980s) as it provided the basis for the maintenance of a strong skill base within
the Corporation.
The BBCs approach to broadcasting – as considered in Chapter 3 – was highly
regulated by government (and with a surfeit of White and Green papers) with a firm
commitment to PSB. The major factor influencing this highly regulated approach to
broadcasting was the maintenance of clearly articulated occupational identities
(Burns, 1977:63). The BBC was regulated by shop-floor work rules and was similar to
131 P3, Media Guardian 25/9/06.
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the labour process within the ITV Network with specified and precise conditions for
individual tasks and strict patterns of crewing on particular programming. This highly
regulated operating environment was to undergo organizational restructuring in the
early 1990s through a combination of legislative change and intense competition from
other terrestrial and satellite broadcasters. Ironically, the broadcasting industry (which
had been caricatured as ‘the last bastion of restrictive practices’) was, by the mid
1990s, lauded as an exceptional exponent of organizational flexibility (Barnatt &
Starkey, 1994:251-60). In short, the last quarter century presented the UK
broadcasting industry with a series of regulatory shocks – with the BBC, in particular,
enduring a series of challenges to the way it had historically conducted its operations.
In the period after 1984, management in both the BBC and the ITV companies were
on the offensive regarding staffing levels, conditions of employment and control over
new appointments (Sparks, 1989).
Public sector broadcasters throughout Europe faced severe difficulties in terms of
maintaining audiences and revenues (Traquina, 1998:167). Over the previous
ten/fifteen years a debate had taken place over how to maintain public broadcasting in
the face of increased competition from existing and new commercial and
satellite/cable broadcasters. In the early1990s it was believed that a critical factor in
the future of public broadcasting in Europe would be the level of financial support
offered by governments (Brants & Siune, 1992:101-115). The UKs Communications
White Paper published in 2000 had proposed that, in the run up to Charter renewal in
2006, the BBC would need to demonstrate its commitment to delivering high quality
and innovative programming in the digital era. However, the White Paper had
indicated that the costs of moving towards digitalization should be covered by the
Corporation itself (Papathanassopoulos, 2002:11). The debate on the future of the
BBC had, in the space of a little over a decade, moved to a position where it was
accepted by management that rationalization and restructuring of internal labour
markets was essential if the Corporation was to uphold its commitment to the broad
values of PSB. It is proposed to examine how internal restructuring of BBC Scotland
impacted upon the labour process of those employed within two of its directorates,
namely Production and Resources. [Directorates were the result of the restructuring of
the vertically integrated production structures which historically defined how
programming was produced (see Cofrey, 1997]. In addition it is proposed to consider
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whether this restructuring of the organizational culture of BBC Scotland had an
impact upon the occupational identity of its employees. The relationship between
occupational identity and work was explored in Chapter 1, 1.4.
As these interviews indicated, the 1990s were to see a large-scale rejection of the rigid
and bureaucratic corporate structure of PSB (Barnatt & Starkey, 1994). Corporate
restructuring resulted in a fashion for small production companies with networks of
freelance agents and a limited core of permanent staff (Tempest, 1997). Staff who
remained within the BBC were subject to a rigorous reappraisal of their roles and their
contribution to the profitability of the various directorates. Until the emergence of
Producer Choice (in the early part of the 1990s) the nature of BBC bureaucracy
supported the growth in teams of employees working together. The BBC encouraged
the development of networks of working relationships in contrast to a culture of
individualism and pure bureaucracy (see Wegg-Prosser, 1998).
A broad cross section of BBC employees were interviewed – including individuals
from the two central BBC directorates – and the study of BBC Scotland is split into
three Sections. The first provides an organizational backdrop to Producer Choice (the
creation of a form of internal market for services and labour). The second part
considers the impact of the reorganization of the Resources directorate on a
commercial basis, while the final Section addresses the development of the Talent
Pool which saw the formation of an internal labour market for creative and production
staff within the Production directorate. At the heart of this reorganization was an
effort to quite deliberately restructure the occupational identity of BBC employees –
an identity which some Resources managers, in particular, believed contributed to
inefficiency and uncompetitiveness when contrasted with private resource providers.
6.1
The Organizational Context.
The implementation in 1993 within the BBC of the market led initiative, Producer
Choice, led to the creation of a series of internal cost structures .The commercial
rationale for Producer Choice was to provide a transparent account of the trading of
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services between the two main directorates. Producer Choice was grounded on a
conviction that the BBC lacked appropriate mechanisms for proving that it was
financially rational (Born, 2004:107). The Corporation made a commitment to operate
in a more efficient context because of its concerns regarding a flattening level of
income. Producer Choice was intended to encourage producers to choose the best or
cheapest service supplier available – irrespective of whether that supplier was a BBC
internal service or an independent vendor. The effect would take the BBC from a
hierarchical and vertically integrated bureaucratic organization, (in essence what
might be described as a command economy), to one which separated out the various
elements of programming production, distribution and commissioning (Wegg-Prosser,
1998:30).
The UK broadcasting industry had been insulated from the fashion for corporate
restructuring common throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. The deliberate
strategy to exclude broadcasting from the debate over public sector reform was
intended to protect the integrity of the BBC (Mulgan, 1996). It would be untrue to
suggest, however, that Producer Choice was the first attempt in the BBCs history to
reorganize its bureaucratic structure. The McKinsey reforms of the late 1960s and
early 1970s were formulated in order to move power away from the centralised
structure of BBC corporate centre. Articulating the need to refocus on the use of
resources is, in retrospect, a clear pointer to further and deeper efforts at restructuring
during the 1980s (See Burns, 1977). As indicated, the McKinsey reforms resulted in
the movement of financial and practical management from the centre to the divisions
of Television, Radio and External Services – overall financial responsibility was to be
held by the managing directors of these divisions (Born, 2004:71).
Problems of over manning and remuneration were two fundamental difficulties which
the BBC faced as it moved into the 1990s.The ITV companies, in particular, had
decided to adopt a set of positions which inevitably set them on course to
confrontation with the broadcasting unions. Although under pressure from successive
administrations to tackle rising production and labour costs, the BBC found itself
forced to take a different approach to industrial relations. Section ‘13’ of the
Corporation’s charter required management to establish a suitable environment for the
operation of arbitration and conciliation procedures and which meant that it had a
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clearly defined (and constraining) process for dealing with potential industrial
disputes. The basis for the Corporation’s predictable working environment lay in a
highly regulated internal labour market. While the prime motivation of BBC
managers, from the early 1990s onwards, was to eliminate practices which inhibited
flexibility, it was a consequence that the move to a directorate system placed new
fiscal, creative and labour restraints upon programme makers. It also provided for a
very significant set of effects upon the occupational identity of BBC workers (and this
consequence will be a major preoccupation of this Chapter). Identification with skill,
craft and the settings in which identities had been allowed to flourish are critical to the
study of the UK television industry since the 1950s. While close attention will be paid
to the development of craft status and employee identity formation within the BBC,
an examination as to how these identities were deliberately managed and/or altered by
senior management teams will also be undertaken.
The three central operating directorates, Resources, Production and Broadcast were
established in order that the BBC, as it stated in the document ‘Extending Choice’,
would;
have an obligation to focus on performing a set of clearly defined roles that best
complement the enlarged commercial sector (BBC, 1993:24).
The decision, taken during the 1996 reorganization, to move from vertically divided
directorates to horizontally divided structures is at the heart of the project of Producer
Choice – the change in the way employees perceived both their occupational identity
and their role within programme making. Proponents of the policy argued that the
move to horizontal integration had been a relatively straightforward process with the
effect of reducing levels of downtime (non-productive time) amongst Resources and
Production staff in particular. Indeed it could be argued that what was happening was
not horizontal integration at all, but rather a splitting up of the BBC into a distinct
business chain incorporating commissioning, production and resource facilities across
the entire network. Management would use the threat of competition from other
programme providers to change the way in which their employees worked – in
essence to alter the way in which they identified with their craft. Flexibility was
rewarded by managers while the implied threat of a further incursion of a form of
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marketization into the employment relationship between the Corporation and
individual employees was ever present. The broadcasting industry as a whole had
suffered in an extreme form what other British industries had already experienced
(Willis & Dex, 2003). Managers had sought to explain away resentment and
resistance against changes in the labour process as resulting from a lack of knowledge
on the part of employees and which might be remedied through further training.
There was no ambiguity on the part of managers to this process of restructuring
workplace relationships. For shop-floor managers within the Resources and
Production directorates, the enemy of improved employment relationships was not
unionisation (which lessened the sense of dedication of employees to the BBC) or,
indeed, managerialism but, rather, a refusal to be party to multi-tasking (Burns, 2001).
For one Resources manager (at least) the language of the re-branding of the BBC
workplace was not encumbered by any consideration of a negotiated settlement with
labour;
I would say there is a great trend of people being taken out and shot at dawn (or
downsizing as the Americans put it). Basically I would say most of us here would be
doing at least three jobs – different layers of management have been collapsed
down.132
In 6.3 the working environment of the Resources directorate under conditions of
Producer Choice will be addressed – but what of the working environment within the
Corporation before the introduction of Producer Choice? 6.2 will include empirical
contributions from BBC managers – in essence, a description of the BBCs
organizational structure before Producer Choice.
132 Interview with senior Resources manager, 6.1.
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6.2
The Working Environment Before Producer Choice.
Where the BBC was coming from pre-Producer Choice was the factories (studios)
determining what could be made and then handing it over to the scheduler and saying
– ‘make the most of it.133
As previously noted, the late 1980s and 1990s saw a radical shift in the structure of
employment and the nature of regulation within both the BBC and the commercial
broadcasting industry. New technology had played a large part in the restructuring of
the broadcasting industry (Hazelkorn, 2001:217). The BBC had, however, been under
constant political pressure for almost thirty years to improve its operating efficiency
(Burns, 1977). In this respect it can be argued that relatively recent changes in
corporate organization and the acceptance of external contracting were part of a much
longer historical process, and not simply driven by Conservative political priorities.
The McKinsey reforms of the 1970s predated some of the key areas of concern of the
Birtist period. Producers and editors were allowed to control budgets and were
expected to develop tight cost control strategies. It is important to acknowledge that
the reforms of programme production/ finance and resource allocation, which
originated in the early ‘90s, were not the first changes since the reign of Lord Reith to
the established protocols of BBC programme making (Barnett & Curry, 1994:100).
Substantial change had been made to the organization of the Corporation during the
1960s – this period ushered in a new awareness of the cost basis of programming.
However, the restructuring of the 1960s and 1970s largely reinforced the producer as
the dominant force within the BBC. During this period personnel functions and
technical staff (which included sound and camera operators) came under the control
of producers.
The split at the heart of the Corporation, between those employed in creative
programme making and those employed in administrative tasks, emerged as far back
as Lord Reith’s first reorganization in 1933. By the late 1960s administrative
133 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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departments and employees actively colluded in the process of subordination in
relation to the creative directorates (Burns, 1977:217). Despite the shift in the way the
Corporation was organized, programme makers (producers) remained largely
insulated from managerial intervention and tight cost controls. Up until the mid 1980s
the Corporation had retained its traditional gold plated attitude to resource planning
and production. A senior BBC Scotland policy manager concluded that administrative
and policy change over the course of the last twenty-five years had not diminished the
ability of the BBC to make judgements about resource allocation, primarily in terms
of programme quality;
What is interesting about Public Service Broadcasting is that, unlike commercial
broadcasting where in the end you can probably make decisions based on profit,...our
dividend is the programmes we deliver to the audience...so one is dealing with a much
more multi-dimensional set of benefits that one can deliver ...and not a single
financial one.134
However the complexity and, indeed, uncertainty of the calculations involved in the
BBC's resource allocation process left considerable scope for decisions to be taken on
issues other than cost. Not only was it almost impossible to calculate the true cost of
an individual programme, but economic decisions were balanced and/or clouded by
judgements of public service and aesthetics (Lury, 1993). The benefits of accounting
procedures which spread the cost of programming production across many different
departments had the effect of keeping costs down amongst programming genres
which did not attract significant viewing figures (Barnett & Curry, 1994:67). There
was a distinctive view amongst creative BBC employees – producers in particular –
that professionalism meant a dedication to craft alone and cost considerations were, at
best, marginalized. Burns (1977:221) referred to the ‘unending game of prestige-
poker’ which producers engaged in so as to be successful in the ‘gruelling competition
to gain the edge over the others in technical qualifications, or in expertise, or in flair,
or in artistic insight’ .
134 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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Initially the contradictions between the positions adopted by management and
production staff (in relation to the structure of work organization) appeared to be
irreconcilable .One senior manager referred to the ‘Bertie Wooster’ (i.e.
unprofessional and indulgent) approach to programme making which had pervaded
certain production departments;
Yes, certainly we had problems with producers who said [well] I cannot make cheap
television darling – I've never done it.135
However, it was a fact that the apparent dichotomy between managers and production
staff was never quite as significant as it appeared. Traditionally, individual managers
were not completely aloof from their production colleagues as they tended to be
drawn from the ranks of production staff. Unofficial and complex internal markets
had existed within the Corporation since its foundation and producers traded on, what
amounted to, an undefined ‘black-market’. The winners within this system were those
people who could develop good working relationships with those who had the skills
necessary to make programmes. Producers who had not developed particularly good
interpersonal skills (e.g. an ability to barter with other departments when required)
tended to suffer through the downgrading of their respective departmental managers
during negotiations with controllers. One senior BBC Scotland manager, while noting
that the introduction of Producer Choice had encouraged the development of rivalries
between competiting departments, argued that internal departmental conflicts had
been an ever-present element of life within the BBC;
The nature of the BBC is one of internal rivalry and perhaps it will always be like that
but it is a sibling rivalry…it is possible that those rivalries have come out more under
Producer Choice but I suspect they were always there and the stories that one hears
about what things were like before the restructuring where producers had to charm
the Resources people so that you got a technician who you could work with.136
135 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
136 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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The old system of unofficial trading between different sections or departments within
the Corporation was an expensive and cumbersome methods of structuring
production. BBC managers argued that those resisting organizational change did so
because they sometimes ran their own unofficial fiefdoms within the Corporation.
They were the power brokers and the creation of directorates would, and did,
challenge this nucleus of power. The directorate system did, however, replicate in
structure the unofficial demarcations between the different skill centres within the
BBC. The main reason for resistance by some producers to the formation of the
directorate system was based upon the transfer of power from producers (or heads of
departments) to Channel Controllers. There was a shift of creative and commissioning
force within the BBC which resulted in a new centralisation of power around the
controllers. This contrasted with the traditional system which placed the producer and
other senior programme makers at the top of the programme power pyramid. This
diminution in the power of producers within the Corporation provided for a renewed
interest in the study of occupational identity and which gave the organization its
transparent career and management structure.
The Channel Controller would sit down with the head of drama, documentaries ...and
say we want ‘x’ number of series, ‘y’ number of single dramas. Heads would go back
and deliver. The Channel Controller had much less say – they just had to schedule
and transmit what was given and in-house producers had quite a lot of power. But
when [Alan]Yentob became Controller of BBC1 power shifted to Controllers, a more
traditional buyer-seller position. We'll tell you what we want. (Keighron, 1999, April
30, p6).
A senior strategy manager compared the planning of programme production prior to
the implementation of new relationships (within BBC Scotland) as something akin to
Marxist-Leninist State planning;
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In the past the BBC worked on a trust model whereby as a producer you were given a
sum of money and you were trusted to go and make a programme. But actually you
didn’t have control over the resources – that was ‘funny money.’ 137
The move to a more formally structured directorate system was based upon a desire to
remove the element of ‘fumbling in the dark’ (as one manager put it) and the
encouragement of a coherent use of all resources.138 Experienced staff recognised
another reason for the introduction of Producer Choice – employees who chose not to
embrace the language of commercialism were jettisoned in favour of a more flexible
workforce. For BBC managers, Producer Choice was clearly vindicated through the
improvement in labour productivity. While such a development would be very
significant to management, the set of interviews conducted here revealed that the
central point of Producer Choice for managers was, in fact, a desire to break up the
personal fiefdoms which permeated the Corporation.
We have been very tough on our staff. We have had some real falling-outs and there
was a shakeout in the newsroom – we have had fallouts of 100 or more. The attitude
[of directorate staff] can be summed up…. If there is no wolf at the door why the
bloody hell should we change.139
The introduction of the internal market had been parralled by the injection of a new
managerialism. Competition within the British terrestrial broadcasting market during
the 1980s defined a new set of competitive pressures which broadcasters had to deal
with regardless of their position within that market. As noted in Chapter 3 the Peacock
Report was a watershed in the shift in power away from the broadcaster towards the
consumer, and a further erosion of the traditional labour process which had also
influenced the UK commercial broadcasting industry. Indeed the language of the
Peacock Report helped to provide a policy platform for the BBCs move to a form of
internal market. In other industries which also experienced radical change at this time,
a critical part of the evolutionary process was the demonization of the past in order to
legitimise the present (see, Towers, 1987; MacInnes, 1987). This ideological
137 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
138 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
139 Interview with senior Production manager, 6.4.
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dimension was a part of the shift towards the creation of an internal market. The
highly regulated production environment in which trade unions had played an
important role in planning television production was now viewed as an historical
anachronism by many mangers. A senior strategy planner at the BBC in Glasgow
explored that demonization;
It seems to me that the central failing of the trade unions is their essential
conservatism (with a small ‘c’), that it seems to put protection before or above
adaptation. What I think is driving business at the moment is Moore’s law, which
states that every eighteen months the memory chips will double in capacity for the
same price, therefore you need people doing ever more skilled tasks. We are in the eye
of storm.140
Managers appeared to accept that the quality of programming produced in the period
prior to the introduction of Producer Choice was of a high quality but they did
question the level of resources required to produce such output. Questions of
programme quality were considered amongst programme makers to be the only real
consideration during the period up to the early 1980s. Programming budgets and the
length of time provided for their completion were deemed to be extremely flexible. A
BBC Scotland manager remarked of the traditional style of programme production;
There are many stories of documentaries coming in at an hour or longer when they
should have been 45 minutes. It was entirely supply driven. With the advent of a more
competitive market this was not acceptable .One must move to a demand side model
of production. 141
In moving to a demand side model of cultural production (an essential element of
which was the reconstruction of the Resources directorate) the BBC began to reshape
the way labour was organized. The Resources directorate was, by the late 1990s,
staffed for production troughs and not production peaks, as was traditionally the case.
Importantly, the redefinition of crewing levels had not been an exclusively top down
140 Interview with senior Production manager, 6.4.
141 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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process. Rather, the reshaping of the BBCs internal labour market and of work
organization was mediated by the allocative decisions of Resources and the
accumulation of small-scale changes on the studio floor. BBC Resources was not the
only directorate to have experienced radical change in its structure but because of its
location and technical basis it had borne much of the consequences of the
experimentation inevitably triggered by Producer Choice.
I guess Resources came first. It represents the technical infrastructure, cameras,
sound, transmission equipment, buildings and vehicles etc.. They became a wholly
owned subsidiary of the BBC on 1 January 1999, the idea was to release money, so
John Birt set up Resources in terms of a stand alone division within the BBC which
was allowed only to trade at the margins, so it could do a little bit of work...but under
the Treaty of Rome it was only allowed to trade at a very low level.142
It is the contention of this work that of the three main BBC directorates, Resources
was the exemplar of restructuring of occupational identity within the Corporation. In
Section 6.3 the consequences for the labour process of skilled Resources personnel are
addressed – in many cases these people had spent their working lives simply as BBC
employees and not Resources personnel.
6.3
Working Within G51, BBC Resources and Producer Choice.
I think what has happened in Resources is a cutting back of the supply base to meet
demand [because] as long ago as when I joined the BBC the Resources base had not
really adjusted to the amount of work which had gone to the independent sector.143
The Birtian revolution within the Corporation was accomplished, in part, through an
expansion in the numbers of senior and middle managers employed and which
transformed the prevailing values of the Corporation (Born, 2004:227). The
introduction of Producer Choice was central to that change – producers should have
142 Interview with senior Production manager, 6.4.
143 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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the option of using in-house production resources or going outside the BBC to use
freelance staff and equipment. Another consequence was that it would radically affect
the way the Corporation was perceived as the trainer of craft skills for the industry
(Wegg-Prosser, 1998:145). The concept of Producer Choice was predicated, to a
degree, on the notion that producers were spendthrifts who used BBC assets
extravagantly and who ignored the constraints of budgets. The result was a crackdown
on the cost base of the BBC and, in particular, its Resources arm. In the period up
until the mid 1980s the perception that BBC costs were higher than those of the
independent sector remained unproven. This stemmed from the fact that the BBC –
like some of its commercial competitors – separated out the direct cost of making
programmes from the cost of resource provision (Barnett & Curry, 1994:67). BBC
inputs were analysed during the period between 1990 to 1993 in a project entitled
‘Resources Review’ which measured inputs/outputs in an attempt to measure output
efficiency (Wegg-Prosser, 1998:148). This particular review provided the basis for a
wholesale shift in the management of technical and resource staff and in the way in
which skilled resource staff (and other BBC employees) understood their rapidly
changing occupational identity.
Resources Ltd was set up as a separate directorate in order to provide technical
support and services for both BBC and independent production staff, and it was to
become a wholly owned subsidiary of the BBC. This change was considered
necessary if the Corporation was to position itself as a commercial enterprise and
move away from the constraints imposed by its alignment with the traditional BBC
high cost structures. One of these constraints was a view expressed by management
that the occupational identity held by long standing technical employees, in particular,
made competing with commercially structured service providers extremely difficult.
Within the Corporation, occupational identity had taken on a form unique to itself and
trade unions played a very limited role. Those seeking employment within the
Corporation tended to do so for creative rather than commercial reasons (Barnett &
Curry, 1994:7). By the late 1950s, the BBC had accepted four trade unions for the
purpose of collective bargaining. Those trade unions had begun, by the late 1960s, to
operate as a second tier of management and which was, de facto, running in parallel to
the official system (Burns, 1977:187). Traditionally the loyalty of most BBC
employees was divided between the Corporation itself and the particular occupational
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sub-groups which had begun to form. Indeed, control over complicated production
technology was critical to the development of a coherent occupational and group
identity for both ITV and BBC employees.
Within both the public and private UK television economy, managers generally
sought to shape, and in some cases alter, occupational identity. Critically, managers
within ITV and BBC were beginning the process of altering occupational identity –
from subtlety different positions. ITV managers sought control over the labour
process as an essential contributing factor to increased competitiveness, while
simultaneously legitimating a new managerial regime from the mid 1980s. In contrast
BBC managers were urging a complete shift and a reinvention of the organization
from a resource-planned system, to one where labour and production flexibility was
the central tenet (Paterson, 1993:19). At the heart of the restructuring of the BBC was
an implicit threat of de-collectivization – that the traditional organizational identity of
trade unions and occupational sub-groups would be fractured (Saundry & Stuart,
1999:2). The threat of de-collectivization was two-fold – it was present in
management strategies seeking to individualize the employment relationship, and was
also present through practices attempting to establish new organizational identities
and a team driven organization. The dependence upon highly skilled workers who
were required to make complicated technology operate smoothly contributed to a very
powerful sense of occupational identity and camaraderie amongst technicians.
Electricians and others – most notably camera operators – gained enormous
occupational bargaining power because of the unreliable technologies with which they
operated. Work groups were particularly cognisant of any incursions into established
job controls, and developed intense loyalty to fellow members of those work groups.
A Resources manager spoke of his personal experience of change within the area of
resource technologies in BBC Scotland;
Technology has changed enormously and that has been quite well documented in the
nature of the business units that I have worked in. I joined a department called
‘television recording’ and it did literally what it said, we recorded programmes and
turned them around and now we are in post-production so the technology has
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changed so much that one is now creating programming from scratch, you are taking
tiny little fragments and recreating large programmes.144
As noted earlier, the BBC had not been at the forefront of industrial relations
confrontations, whereas the ITV Network had witnessed serious industrial unrest in
the period before the great confrontations of the 1980s (Sparks, 1989:25). Producer
Choice changed that situation and impacted greatly on the labour process within the
BBC. Its introduction meant that the newly established business units such as
Resources and Production would have to bear significant overheads (because of the
public service remit of the Corporation) on a continuous basis. This resulted in
profound competitive difficulties with the leaner, exclusively production service
providers who emerged in the period after the Broadcasting Act, 1990. This constant
overhead retrieval would make it difficult, if not impossible, for Resources to compete
with independent producers on the basis of cost alone.
In every sense the formation of BBC Resources was a groundbreaking decision for the
Corporation and its emergence was a response to the fragmentation of its share of the
viewing and listening audience. At the time of its launch (in October 1991) Producer
Choice was broadly welcomed at junior producer level and, in particular, amongst
those who had experience of employment outside the BBC. Conversely the BBC
resource supply departments were not enthusiastic because of the comparisons which
would be made between their costs and those of independent suppliers. The Producer
Choice guidelines encompassed a fundamental restructuring of the management
system within the BBC. Organizationally it meant a decentralised structure with
distinct business units which would trade with one another and also trade with other
firms or independent producers. Financially, Producer Choice demanded transparency
in terms of costs of its main activities and which meant that, operationally, it would
have the effect of transforming the BBC into a mixed economy (BBC, 1993).
The Broadcasting Act, 1990 provided the political and regulatory basis for the
splitting up of the Corporation into the directorate system. The legislation stipulated
that a minimum of 25 per cent of all commercial and public television programming
144 Interview with senior Resources manager, 6.3.
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should be provided by independent production companies (See, inter alia, Campling,
1992; Campling, 1997). The effect of that element of the legislation was very
significant for those involved in, what were later to become, the directorates – BBC
Production and Broadcast. The legitimacy of the traditional way in which the process
of television production was organized was brought into question and the large
commercial and public broadcasters were no longer the only suppliers of
programming for managers.
In addition, the Broadcasting Act, 1990 contributed to an alteration in the relationship
between in-house producers and BBC production/technical resources. In this regard
in-house producers were no longer restricted to employing internal resource suppliers
and this represented a watershed in the deconstruction of old established relationships
throughout the BBC. Producers were given the chance to use people whom they
already knew and had worked with. The creative producers often chose to recruit staff
from outside the BBC because they were aware that people from outside were usually
cheaper. ‘Meanwhile, you had departments that had to be paid for, so the overhead
had to be put somewhere’ (Berkeley, 2003:110). One senior manager elaborated on
this theme – arguing that the 25 per cent quota for independent productions
encouraged a debate to take place about manning levels within the Corporation’s
different directorates;
[We] were not allowed by law to compel people who were outside to use internal BBC
Resources. When Producer Choice was brought in and the Resources study was done
prior to it, Resources had not reduced its capacity even to take account of the 25 per
cent loss…. There were tremendous filibusting sessions between Resources and the
Resources review committee – where the Resource people were saying, of course, we
need as many o.b's as before.145
It is evident from interviews with Resources staff and management that the
implementation of Producer Choice within the Resources directorate provided the
battleground for skirmishes to redefine work organization. Senior Broadcast manager
6.2, suggested that the key effect of Producer Choice was that it forced people to find
145 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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out how much things cost. At one level this was simply a finessing of internal
accounting procedures, but it also implied a certain public responsibility within the
Corporation. Civic responsibility in the BBC was no longer solely about the range and
content of programmes, but was also about efficiency and effective management.
However, for many BBC employees this was a very significant departure from
accepted practice and a current BBC Scotland strategist defended the implementation
of Producer Choice during interview;
It was simply about good management/good husbandry – that if you take money from
the license fee what do you give back? Well it ain’t bloody studios, it’s the
programmes ....so every pound that you spend on a studio that ain’t working is a
pound less spent on programming.146
Establishing and extending management controls was not solely about breaking with
the Reithian past but was also about upholding public service broadcasting. Only tight
resource control could deliver the space necessary to sustain high quality
programming, and managerialism – far from being the enemy of the classic BBC
culture – became necessary to its survival in however limited a sense. Resources was
considered to be at the forefront of organizational change because of its significance
in contributing to the high cost base of the Corporation (Born, 2004:306).
I'm not sure that Resources was [at] the leading edge of flexibility, it’s rather that
Resources was one of the most inflexible parts of the ‘Beeb’.147
Senior Broadcast manager 6.2 quoted above, provided a clear managerialist view of
Producer Choice, but even this is tempered by concerns relating to programme quality
and public service. What of the BBC staff who actually delivered resource contracts
and maintained production schedules? In this connection it is useful to consider the
people who worked in ‘G51’, the day-to day axis of Producer Choice. G51 (simply
the room number in the Glasgow studios where BBC Resources is largely based) was
at the coalface of the introduction of Producer Choice. On entering G51 it appears to
146 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
147 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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be something of an amalgam of a call centre and a job centre. Large, low desks which
are equipped with computers predominate, with telephones and fax machines to
facilitate several people simultaneously. Traditional office skirmishes over ‘turf’ (the
ownership of desks and space) were made irrelevant by the employment of ‘hot areas’
and where workers can take possession of any area, desk, and phone or fax when
dealing with clients or potential clients. Space was at a premium and in early 1999
BBC Scotland employed a freelance project manager to examine the use of space
within their Glasgow base. The employment of ‘hot-desking’ was born of a desire to
fundamentally change the working culture within the Resources directorate, but was
also motivated by a more functional and basic requirement to utilize space to best
advantage. A freelance consultant employed to manage the implementation of a
policy for the use of space within the cramped confines of the BBC Scotland base
explained his role;
The problem with the BBC is that it is such a broad spectrum. You will have your
accounting office and you will have a children’s programme production office….We
would like to look at providing facilities for ‘nomadic workers’, e.g. engineering
managers and those who show low utilization levels. We would look at trading off
that space, e.g. providing them with better facilities out of the office.148
By no means all of the employees of G51 had followed conventional BBC career
paths, e.g. clerical operatives were drawn from a range of external sales related
organizations with no experience of programme making either in the BBC or other
media companies. A BBC Scotland Resources manager acknowledged its unique
position within the Corporation;
The idea behind G51 was a good one in that all of the Resources people are there and
the booking staff and the way that it keeps being reorganized. They change it almost
monthly…although it still has the BBC name on it, Resources is in every sense an
independent organization both in theory and in spirit with the problem of carrying
BBC overheads.149
148 Interview with freelance manager, 6.6.
149 Interview with senior Resources manager, 6.3.
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Resources was to play a critical role in directing organizational strategy within the
Corporation. During visits to the BBC Scotland offices it was apparent that Resources
staff processed what seemed to be interminable enquiries from independent
production companies or potential external clients. The intensely busy office was
quite unlike any other section of the BBC and the contrast with what can be termed,
the traditional structure of BBC administration, was deeply revealing. In one critical
way, however, the result of the formation of the directorate system – the emergence of
Resources – reflected a continuation of organizational change within the Corporation.
Over thirty years ago a former BBC producer said of the reality of negotiating
programme making within the Corporation;
The only way to get effective programmes inside a structure like the BBC is to have
lots of little kingdoms, even if there’s a certain amount of duplicating and mutual
antagonism (Blakewell & Garnham, 1970:207).
The anonymity of the physical environment, the type of personnel in situ and the
frenetic pace of work were unprecedented for the BBC. However the term Producer
Choice did not mean producer sovereignty for, as Checkland argued, it meant freedom
and responsibility – freedom to purchase resources internally/ externally allied with a
responsibility to be accountable for programme budgets (BBC, 1991:1). While the
argument was made that savings were ploughed straight back into programme making
the fact is that, in truth, the employees of the Resources directorate were being
challenged to reflect on demands to alter their labour process and their identity as
BBC employees. In part, attempts to separate Resources employees’ occupational
identity from those in other directorates was achieved by the physical separation of
the Resources from the rest of the Corporation. The changes encouraged by Producer
Choice were designed to challenge the bureaucratic structure of the BBC. Producer
Choice introduced new methods of resource allocation which mirrored those within
the private sector. Internal enquiries would often by-pass the newly formed Resources
directorate and personal (not quasi-market) relations, formed through the experience
of dealing with individual Resources staff, remained at the heart of the continuing
relationship between Production and Resources. The commercial purpose and
structure of Resources was offset for BBC insiders whose relations were mediated by
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social rather than market exchanges. A senior manager (Production directorate)
developed the notion of separation between Resources and the other two directorates
when he noted that;
The main difference between the BBC of old is that people think of themselves as
working in either Broadcast or Production, I would imagine that the situation has not
changed substantially within Resources because they had separated themselves [off]
anyway.150
His contribution was revealing, emphasising as it did a belief in the inherent
distinction between Resources and the other main directorates. It is important,
however, not to think of the Resources directorate as being entirely distinct or
divorced from Production and Broadcast. Internal producers in search of technical
support staff tended to express a preference for BBC Resources staff over independent
resource providers. Close personal relationships between experienced Resource and
Production staff were expected to continue providing Resources with a loyal customer
base. BBC Broadcast management pointed out during interview that when what they
termed ‘old friends’ (i.e. experienced BBC producers) move on, the competition for
the Resources directorate’s customers would become intense.
There were few competitors within Scotland who could offer the range of services
which BBC Resources (Scotland) provided although it should be noted that it was
only a medium size player in the provision of technical resource support to
broadcasters within the UK as a whole. However in recent years Scotland has seen an
expansion in small-scale independent companies involved in film and video post-
production. These new micro-media entrepreneurs are well represented in at least two
levels of the market, namely niche post-production services and inexpensive or basic
editing tasks services and which often undercut BBC Resources. A manager spoke of
the position of Resources Scotland within the local media services industry;
We clearly benefit from being in Scotland – there is not an enormous amount of
competition and there is definitely an ethos within the BBC. Our customers want to
150 Interview with senior Production manager, 6.4.
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support BBC Resources within BBC Scotland. There is a predisposition within the
BBC to using Resources, that is great but I would not want to rely on it.151
Following interviews with senior management an important element of the
relationship between Resources and Production was identified – namely, the process
by which contracts for servicing the technical requirements of BBC Production were
agreed upon. Senior manager 6.2 suggested in relation to the level of networked
programmes provided by BBC Scotland, that there were no firm guarantees to
Production. In terms of the level (if any) of guaranteed contracts to Resources,
managers tended to repeat the mantra that there were no guarantees to that directorate.
A senior manager suggested, however, that 50 per cent of the income of the Resources
directorate was largely ‘non-volatile’ (i.e. guaranteed income) – further, that this level
was achieved through fair competition with the independent resource provision sector.
Privately, however, BBC managers (even those who are forceful supporters of
Producer Choice) conceded that the full rigour of market competition was mitigated in
practice. Senior manager 6.2 argued that there were strategic production centered
reasons why producers did not go outside the Resources directorate for technical
assistance. The following argument to critique the effectiveness of Producer Choice
was also put forward;
In reality there were a lot of reasons internally why we were not given the power, [the
power to engage in full commercial style contracts with independent resource
suppliers]. If we had all gone outside we might not have a studio because we all could
have got it cheaper. There were political in-house reasons for remaining in-house,
that’s why in my opinion Producer Choice has not worked.152
Employment within the Resources directorate should not be caricatured as an
overwhelmingly negative experience for all employees. Resources managers, while
perhaps not unexpectedly, outlined the rapid career progression open to all employees
irrespective of age or seniority. In 6.4 the impact of organizational change within the
Resources directorate is detailed.
151 Interview with senior Production manager, 6.4.
152 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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6.4
The Impact of Organizational Change – Resources.
The challenge which the BBC Resources directorate faced in the period after the
Birtian revolution began was twofold. It had to structure itself along the lines of a
commercially driven technical support company whilst at the same time maintaining
the skills required to support the production programming, which varied from
complex period drama to relatively straightforward news programming. This dual
challenge was explained in the following terms by a senior BBC Scotland manager;
The BBC is not a commercial organization – it’s essentially involved in a process of
rationalization.[Our]job is to find ever more sophisticated means of making sensible
investment decisions …what’s interesting about the BBC is that there is not a cash
bottom line. Our dividend is the programme...[this job]...is an endless quest to divide
up the cake.153
As indicated earlier, managers had argued that the fundamental reason to pursue
managerialism within the BBC was to protect the quality of programming. BBC
management believed that it was up to employees and management of Resources to
balance the demands of organizing the directorate along the lines of a stand-alone
commercial enterprise while simultaneously respecting public service programming
commitments. The argument was clearly made that the two objectives were not
mutually exclusive. In reality, Resources managers were under pressure to cut costs,
maintain quality and enhance training. Resources employees were strongly
encouraged to maintain and develop excellent interpersonal bonds with existing
internal BBC clients while also cultivating relationships with external customers. The
language of the marketplace had been alien for some Resources staff who were not
used to dealing with external customers. These were very significant changes for
Resources staff to make and were acknowledged by one manager;
153 Interview with senior Broadcast manager, 6.2.
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The key issue for a lot of craft staff is that if you were a video tape editor fifteen years
ago you are working with the same equipment in roughly the same area with the same
sort of people, technology has provided you with new equipment and new techniques
to consider but, by and large, there has not been a fundamental shift in what
individuals have been doing. The big shift has been in how you are supposed to
behave, the extra responsibilities and the level of business responsibilities that you
are supposed to have.154
The issue which attracted particular attention – in equal measure from both BBC
Resources management and their employees (albeit for different reasons) – was the
attempt to mould Resources workers into creative, flexible, customer driven and cost
conscious technicians. The 1992 Green Paper commented on what was considered
unnecessary bureaucracy within the Corporation with overly rigid structures for
decision-making. It suggested that the BBC needed to be a much more flexible
organization with better articulation between its limbs (DNH, 1992). It is a fact that
the BBC, in common with many other public service broadcasters within Europe,
faced considerable pressures during the late 1980s and early 1990s and which if not
addressed, would have terminally damaged the UK PSB model.
Organizational restructuring undertaken within the BBC in the period since 1993 had
been driven by a determination by management to move from a closed production
environment in technical (and other) services – where providers were exclusively
BBC personnel, to a situation where BBC staff became suppliers of services outside
the confines of the Corporation itself. The changes in priorities for new teams of
managers within the directorate system placed a new emphasis on altering and
managing occupational identity. Resources managers moved through direct
intervention with individual staff members to change both the way employees worked
and the way they themselves understood their role as developers of new business. The
language of Resources managers was couched in explicitly commercial language;
154 Interview with senior Resources manager, 6.3.
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We are now in a commercial operation where we have absolutely zero sources of
funding apart from what we sell and the key instruments for that are the people at the
coalface. The truth is that a large number of them let us down on a regular basis.155
The then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport said of the incorporation of
Resources in 1998; ‘I want to make sure this (incorporation) cannot be used as a ramp
for privatisation’ (Guardian, 20 February, 1998:12). While there was no implied
desire on the part of government to privatise the provision of technical and studio
services, Resources had to react to intense cost cutting of established resource tariffs
in the market place. In a BECTU submission on the BBC to the Select Committee for
Culture, Media and Sport, it was noted that Resources was the largest single craft and
skills base in British broadcasting (BECTU:14). Resources managers were quite clear
that they would compare the working practices of their directorate with more
narrowly based commercial and ultra-lean resource suppliers and not with the
traditional resources supply of the pre Producer Choice era. Managers spent a
significant proportion of their time engaged in what they termed, ‘the softer issues of
staff discipline’, so as to bridge the gap with private sector firms. A Resources
manager spoke damningly of some past colleagues;
Even some of the most talented engineers would be sitting there moaning at their
conditions in front of their clients. Maybe they have to work some overtime during the
week when they wanted time off.156
In stark contrast to the view expressed above, one other senior Resources manager
indicated that much of the poor attitude which pervaded Resources (until relatively
recently) had now disappeared. At the core of the dismissal by individual managers of
the old culture of BBC production, was a view that it reflected a period of continuous
conflict. The systems of production (pre the Directorate system) depended upon
skilled, autonomous workers who were loathe to give up control of their various skills
(Toliday & Zeitlin, 1985:270). A BBC Resources managers spoke of the effort to alter
working practices;
155 Interview with Resources manager, 6.7.
156 Interview with Resources manager, 6.5.
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A lot of poor attitudes have disappeared, partly because people have left the
organization and communication strategies have improved to encourage people to
change direction. But where I have a big problem with attitude is where people still
think that they are working in traditional BBC conditions of service and every meal
break must be accounted for with money. That is a huge challenge for me because the
customer cannot afford to pay for traditional conditions.157
Since its inception, Resources aimed to provide a middle level range of technical
services to both private and internal BBC clients. Managers conceded that the level of
investment required in new technologies in order to compete with some well funded
private resource suppliers – in terms of the provision of high level skills – was not an
option open to them. Internal BECTU documents back up this assertion and it is a fact
that much of Resources’ equipment was older than the industry average.158 In Scottish
terms, BBC Resources was the largest supplier of a broad range of production
services and was a crucial financial element in the restructuring of the entire
Corporation. The cost savings accrued through the ongoing rationalisation of
Resources enabled the Production directorate to significantly reduce the cost of
programming provided for Broadcast. Managers argued that because the level of
income flowing to Broadcast was relatively fixed, (i.e. through the licence fee),
savings accrued through the employment of Producer Choice would be critical to the
process of maintaining the programming quality which the BBC demanded. During
interviews, Resources managers affirmed that targets set for maintaining and
developing new business had to be met. In order to return minimum acceptable profit
levels Resources managers demanded a more basic level of service from their staff.
Managers made it clear that, as the confidence of the Resources directorate grew, they
became more determined than ever to take on the established working practices of
Resource employees. Publicly, managers were scathing of the input (both creatively
and technically) of staff who felt they had earned the right – through seniority or
simply because they had always worked in a particular way – to direct the way the
Resources directorate operated. In addition managers were utterly dismissive of the
157 Interview with Resources manager, 6.7.
158 BECTU, Note number 12.
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role of the producer as the alleged hub of employment and/ or creative processes
within the BBC.
In the period immediately after the introduction of Producer Choice – in the early
1990s – efficiency savings grew at approximately 9 per cent per year (BECTU).
Where budgets were being continually squeezed, the skills of Resources’ employees
in contributing to the production of cost-driven television (albeit with a substantially
reduced workforce) became even more important. In 1990, for example, the
Resources directorate was operating with 11,000 staff, but by 1996 (when Resources
management announced plans to create a limited company) there were only 7,000
employed. The attack on established BBC working conditions and the very sensitive
cost base of Resources had a significant effect on the career structure in place (before
the directorate system was imposed). Promotion would now be determined on
technical ability, together with a willingness to engage in the creative aspects of
production and the development of interpersonal skills. While the established career
structure had been effectively dismantled Resources managers did, however, stress the
fluidity of the new career structure. Age, it was suggested, was no bar to promotion or
career progression;
If you are a senior cameraman it does not mean you are here twenty-five years, you
can get a senior cameraman’s job if you are here six months.159
Resources managers were at pains to always encourage their employees to offer their
views to external clients on aesthetic and cost saving matters. Despite these
developments one of the central difficulties facing staff was the commercialization of
the relationship between themselves and their former colleagues within Production,
allied to a need to provide a complete customer centered environment for new
independent clients of BBC Resources. Indeed the birth of Resources could be
explained in terms of a change in culture within the BBC itself. In contrast to the
traditional BBC business structures, departments became business centres while those
people who had been considered colleagues now became competitors. The
consequential loss was, perhaps, intangible and unquantifiable but one could take
159 Interview with Resources manager, 6.7.
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issue with the finality implied. Producer Choice, in practice, was significantly
different from a full-scale marketization of the BBC and the motives underlying the
Corporation’s managerialism were much more complex than a simple adoption of
market values. It is this complex amalgam of a continued adherence to the concept of
public service broadcasting and a new managerialism which now underpins BBC
management thinking and practice on the ground. In a memorable turn of phrase one
serving Resources manager said simply of the change in organizational culture
wrought by Producer Choice;
At the beginning of Producer Choice our staff were not used to thinking of people as
customers and there was a lot of resentment. 160
Working practices based on those of the freelance sector were drawn up by senior
management but were considered by many in the newly formed Resources directorate
to be unacceptable and barely tolerable. There was, in short, no transfer into the BBC
of working practices developed in the freelance sector. Neither was this simply an
exercise by the Resources directorate in the evaluation of the technical possibilities of
new working practices. Equally important was Resources’ judgement (largely
implicit) about how far working practices could be altered without provoking passive
resistance on the studio floor. The labour intensive nature of television production
made it difficult to reduce costs without targeting labour (Sparks, 1989). The tension
within the role of Resources (to radically remake work organization but, also, to
maintain production) was overlaid by the introduction of strict appraisal systems for
Resources personnel. The essential aspect of the appraisal process was the actual level
of demand for the services of individual technicians. This was the sharp end of
marketization with the individualisation of the technician's contract and his
dependence, at least in part, on market selection rather than bureaucratic allocation. A
senior Resources manager spoke of how the appraisal process worked in practice;
Their hours are being recorded continually and that makes them feel vulnerable. We
have also had some issues around the notion of socialization, we have client
managers who are actively marketing our staff.161
160 Interview with senior Production manager, 6.4.
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Despite what might appear as the rhetorical prioritisation of the producer as the
critical internal customer of the Resources directorate, Producer Choice did not,
somehow, magically convert those producers into knowing consumers – nor, indeed,
were producers at the cutting edge of redefining work organization. It was the
Resources directorate which was crucial in developing costing and financial
monitoring techniques and in gradually altering crewing norms. A senior shop
steward suggested that the term Producer Choice was, in fact, misleading. While
Resources could offer its services to the private independent production sector,
Production (the programming making arm) could only offer its programme ideas to
Broadcast. Nevertheless the extension and deepening of the marketization of
production services remained a powerful ideological motif and a real and interesting
possibility. In 6.5 – following – the impact of a form of marketization on the
Production directorate of BBC Scotland is addressed.
6.5
Producer Choice and BBC Production.
In a clue to the tension resulting from the suggestion offered by some Resources
employees and managers that BBC Production should not be exempt from
restructuring – a senior Production manager said;
I have heard Resources people say that you could make efficiencies in Production
because they want people to clock in and out. Some of the best programme makers
just don't work like that – they may go missing. But they come back with new ideas.162
If the essential element within the restructuring of the Resources directorate was the
introduction of something akin to the operation of a market mechanism, then the
central vehicle for change within the Production directorate was the implementation
of the Talent Pool initiative. A senior Production manager explained the rationale
behind the formation of the Talent Pool;
161 Interview with Resources manager, 6.5.
162 Interview with senior Production manager, 6.8.
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The ethos of the talent pool is that everybody belongs to Production talent – they no
longer belong to individual departments. What used to happen was that each
department thought of their own staff requirements and didn’t look to other
departments to help during periods of staff shortages so what was happening was that
somebody was going out the revolving door while somebody else was coming in.163
The Talent Pool initiative was an attempt to extend a variant of the market forces
principle (previously adopted by Resources) to the Production directorate. The
difficulties in applying methods of appraisal or output measurement within Production
(but which were designed for the Resources directorate) were predictable and
significant. Work undertaken by those employed in the Production directorate (i.e.
those involved in producing, directing or in research) did not lend to a simple method
for measuring output. As this Chapters opening quote makes clear, BBC Scotland was
seen by some Production employees as being fertile ground for organizational
experiments. The Talent Pool initiative was designed by a senior member of the
Production directorate within BBC Scotland and quickly became a favourite
management buzzword within the Corporation. It was also adopted by BBC
Manchester, and Network Centre London (at the time of interview) was also
considering adapting the scheme within its Production directorate. When Producer
Choice was launched in 1991 it was understood to be a system which producers had
demanded (Wegg-Prosser, 1998:511). The system encouraged, in theory at least, the
process of buying resources internally or externally – including labour and
technical/studio services. The intention was to benchmark the costs of internal
resource provision against those of independent producers and others (Deakin &
Pratten, 2000:332). Critically, BBC management accepted the difficulties inherent in
simply comparing basic cost figures of Production and Resources staff, and the two
groups differed considerably in their susceptibility to appraisal procedures as a
business unit/directorate. Here again, the target of measurement was labour – it was
recognized that, for example, Production’s utilization levels of approximately 35 to 45
per cent were an obvious source of further efficiencies. Programme makers had, it was
suggested, become complacent and lazy under the old dispensation and the
163 Interview with Production manager, 6.9.
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insecurities and realities of the marketplace would boost the creative process of BBC
production departments (Born, 2004:181).
Irrespective of the practical difficulties involved in any managerial remaking of the
internal labour market, the implications for labour were almost immediate. While
participation in the Talent Pool was nominally voluntary for low ranking staff (e.g.
research assistants) former staff positions and conditions of work were simply written
out of programme schedules. Adhering to existing tasks and terms and conditions was
not an option and to do so was to effectively render oneself unemployed. If production
assistants wished to remain with the Corporation they had to be totally flexible with
regard to their job descriptions and their schedule of work undertaken. The role of the
broadcast assistant had changed from being a largely secretarial position to one which
developed to a support role encompassing both technical and production elements. A
broadcast assistant spoke angrily of the way her originally research based position had
moved into a quasi-technical role;
I wanted my job to go more in the direction of research in order to go into production
and now it’s going into a mish-mash of pseudo technical jobs because I work on news.
If I work on the weekly strands you have much more time so, yes, I am directly
involved in the content of the programme. For example this morning I was working on
‘Good Morning Scotland’ and I have been doing morning studio shifts and I will have
absolutely no involvement with the content of the programme.164
This broadcast assistant developed her perspective by arguing that those of her peers
who did not work in what she termed, the ‘pigeonholed’ environment of news, had a
greater input into the creative aspects of production. She was quite pessimistic about
the likelihood of transferring her skills to another part of the organization and when
asked where she thought her career was going, said;
Nowhere! Most of the people have been doing the job for years and they are stuck in it
and it annoys me that management refer to us as junior staff. We have often kept
164 Interview with Broadcast Assistant, 6.10.
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programmes on the air when inexperienced staff could not cope, our career
development has been ignored.165
The Talent Pool concept sought to avoid the duplication of staff within different
departments throughout BBC Production. However, the possibility of the broadcast or
research assistant within the realm of the news department, for example, being able to
take advantage of other work opportunities within the Talent Pool was limited
because of the unique nature of work within the news room. The high level of
freelancing and the employment of short-term contracting within the Corporation’s
production staff had significant repercussions for individuals and for the organization
itself – for BBC employees freelance status resulted in a restructuring of their working
lives. The lack of incentive (on the part of those contracted to the BBC) to produce
their best work for an organization in which they had only a passing relationship had a
profound impact on the Corporation’s attitude to training and support. The contrast
can be made with those employed within the Talent Pool (mainly full time contracted
workers) who worked at full capacity – intellectually and creatively – in order to
encourage demand for the re-employment of their services by producers. If the
resources reviews were inspired originally by the need to save money then they had
been transformed, under the auspices of John Birt, into an accounting mechanism to
shrink the resource base prior to the introduction of Producer Choice. The
introduction of the Talent Pool may be seen as a further marketization of the
relationship between managers and creative personnel. One former BBC employee
suggested that;
Creativity has been managerialized. Amateurish, but enjoyable collegiate discussions
no longer happen. An underclass of jobbing producers, or even totally casualized
researchers, doing the hunting and gathering are hired at short notice to deliver to a
brief using their own recording equipment – it’s a new type of alienation in the
production process (Wegg-Prosser, 1998:166).
Senior Production manager 6.9 agreed that the Talent Pool project had been less
applicable to the news and current affairs departments where skills were less
165 Interview with Broadcast Assistant, 6.10.
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transferable but denied that, in any sense, the strategy was flawed. He argued strongly
that these changes would not damage the career aspirations of Production employees;
I would suggest that the crossover is stronger in some sections – notably children’s
and features while weaker in current affairs. The most transient individuals are
production assistants, researchers and some directors.
It is disingenuous to include directors amongst task groups which were exposed to
greater transience. There is a very significant difference between research assistants
who often work long and unsocial hours and have little room for skill development,
and highly prized creative directors who frequently move from one well-paid short-
term contract to another. Production manager 6.9 tacitly acknowledged the gulf which
separated the experience of routine and creative employees when he said;
We do have a lot of individuals who are core to one area, we cannot have everybody
moving around the system, but we have people who are transient and who I need to be
transient.166
No effective collective bargaining took place over the introduction of the Talent Pool
– either at the formal or informal level. There was, for example, no buy-out of
existing contractual clauses for staff included in the Talent Pool. Despite the lauded
transparency and equity of the centralised skills database, which regulated the new
internal labour market, those with the greatest flexibility had the least valuable and
least specialised skills. Even the staunchest managerial supporter of the Talent Pool
offered only the most highly qualified praise;
They get greater skills, their contracts may be lengthened and some of them enjoy it. If
you were to ask some of the people who have come into the BBC since the Talent Pool
was established they will think it is a reasonably good thing. But I do not think we are
totally there yet.167
166 Interview with Senior Production manager, 6.8.
167 Interview with Senior Production manager. 6.8.
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There was a significant divergence between some of the rhetoric employed by
Production managers in an attempt to explain the implementation of the Talent Pool,
and the views expressed by certain senior BBC policy managers. Managers on the
ground were at pains to suggest that the Talent Pool was structured so that all
production employees were given an opportunity to move across different
departmental boundaries and to develop their expertise. However, one senior policy
manager suggested a more sinister perspective;
We have created the Talent Pool in order to establish why there are problems with
certain individuals, why certain people are not used. Is it, for instance, a problem
with perception or does it run deeper? Is it a social thing, or are people chosen purely
on the basis of ability? We want to know who is popular and who are the miserable,
the difficult ones.168
For part-time and contract staff seeking work it appeared that networking (i.e. in
contrast to conventional methods) was only a realistic possibility for certain
production staff operating at a relatively high level of desirability. Indeed, few
producers could decide not to engage Production employees – even though many
would have preferred to work with a small core of experienced staff chosen from the
freelance market. With the utilization of staff within the Production directorate
running at between 35 and 40 per cent it was not surprising that managers were keen
to encourage external producers (working on programmes commissioned by
Broadcast) to employ Production staff. Concerns were expressed (particularly from
the position of those managing Resources) that any further erosion of the base of
programming using technical resources supplied by Resources would have a
detrimental effect on the Corporation as a whole. Comparisons were made,
unfavourably, with UK commercial television;
The BBC is in danger of going the Scottish Television route because Resources and
Production are getting further away from each other and looking at each other, as
they have to, as customer and supplier.169
168 Interview with Senior Production manager, 6.8.
169 Interview with Resources manager, 6.7.
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The procedure for the measurement of performance within the Production directorate
did not appear to vary from the senior creative individual to the most junior of
researcher – output being the common link. It was clear that junior staff were
expected to be highly flexible in their approach to the work environment while senior
creative employees were given significant opportunities to develop ideas and
programme suggestion. Those opportunities were simply not open or available to
most Production employees. One can readily conclude as to the reason why external
producers decided not to use internal Production employees when completing BBC
commissions in-house;
During the commissioning cycle we get notification of the fact that we get a
commission in week one and they expect delivery of it in week eight and in that period
of time the producer needs somebody who can deliver.170
The implication appears to be quite clear – external producers felt they could work
quicker and more profitably by cultivating their own small team of experienced co-
workers. Production managers could attempt to cajole independent producers into
employing internal Production staff but for many external producers the use of
internal staff was considered to be something that was done only as a last resort. Born
provided a further interesting explanation for the reluctance on the part of some elite
independents to use BBC Production personnel – suggesting that the standardised
nature of many programming ideas (where programme ideas were fixed on to both
Resources and Production templates) had resulted in a stultifying uniformity of
contemporary programming (Born, 2004:311). To suggest, however, that the
independent sector was a bastion of freewheeling programming expression in which
creativity was given the opportunity to develop unhindered was an unrealistic and
inaccurate description of the independent sector. It was not unrealistic to expect that
Production managers would seek to maximize the output of its directorate employees,
and to manage levels of downtime – the argument that such a strategy would damage
the creative process of television production remained unproven.
170 Interview with Production manager, 6.9.
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The commissioning process within BBC Scotland and organized under the directorate
Broadcast played a crucial role in the actual performance of Production. Their
corporate decisions about the type of programmes which got made and which
production company made them (i.e. internal Production or external companies) were
vital to the success (or failure) of the project of Producer Choice. Decisions were
made on the joint basis of cost and quality but one should not minimize the
importance which the Broadcast directorate attached to supporting Production.
Conclusion.
The basic infrastructure of Producer Choice and the Directorates (which distinguished
client and provider) – in conjunction with accounting systems to track transactions
costs and contracts – were successfully put in place within BBC Scotland. However
there remained a significant gap between the market ideology of Producer Choice and
the BBCs organisational capability to accurately monitor contracts and allocate
resources. Within this gap lay the informal negotiation of resources allocation and the
social networks which tied BBC staff to independent contractors. Neither market nor
bureaucratic relations (both policed by G51) fully exhausted the process of
negotiation. The fact was that employees constituting the Talent Pool were exposed to
both sets of processes – formal and informal, both market and network. The process
was triggered and dominated by programme makers and commissioners and to this
extent, at least, Producer Choice became a reality within the BBC. This was tempered
by the Corporation’s need to maximise utilization of its internal resources while not
destroying their intrinsic qualities. In the document ‘Extending Choice’, the
Corporation contended that it would continue to focus on ‘developing services of
distinction and quality, rather than on attracting a large audience for its own sake’
(BBC, 1993:84). Cotemporal with the commitment to maintain programming quality
was an increased role for markets within the Corporation.
The role of G51 was the embodiment of such a marketization. It established and
tracked contracts with external providers nominated by the programme maker and
negotiated the extent to which producers drew on the BBC's Resources directorate.
Resources managers engaged in negotiating on behalf of their staff in an attempt to
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ensure that in-house and independent producers used BBC technicians. In theory no
producer was obliged to use any of the BBCs technical staff. In practice, the unwritten
rule was that only elite producers might insist on a contract technician in preference to
a BBC nominee. Freedom to use external technical staff was extended only to
independent producers making an unusual programme or those with an exceptional
reputation. For workaday productions it was a fact that independent and BBC
producers largely accepted and utilized BBC technical staff. Only the most
experienced producers had the reputation, personal experience and standing to permit
even a limited degree of choice. The choice (insofar as there was any real choice)
between internal staff and external contractors was also contingent on work volume –
during peak periods bringing in outside contractors was, obviously, a much less
contentious issue.
Most programming required simple technical ability and which all resource suppliers
– including BBC Resources and private sector firms – could provide. Price and
quality were largely homogeneous throughout the industry for a range of standard
services and, consequently, competition amongst resource suppliers was at the
margins. A senior Resources manager endorsed this view;
I say to staff, you are doing really well on craft skills, but that is a given. If we are
going to have any edge because of competitiveness we are going to have to bring
something new to the task. Staff don’t like the term ‘customer service’ because they
say, ‘we give great service’. They do, but they don't always charge for it.171
Within the Production directorate a barometer of change was the introduction of the
Talent Pool directive and which instituted a market led attitude to the deployment of
staff as a whole. Broadcasters required substantial internal staffing levels for large -
scale investigative or complex drama programming. The managerial rationale for the
Talent Pool was the desire to combine the aesthetic qualities of BBC productions with
a managerial attraction to the fat-free strategies of independent production companies.
However neither market, hierarchy or network governance systems were subject to
effective collective regulation. The formal system of collective bargaining remained
171 Interview with Resources manager, 6.5.
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largely intact at the corporate level but there was no effective formal bargaining at
studio floor level. BECTU primarily negotiated with management teams assembled to
deal with a specific issue and agreements were then passed to the directorate and line
management. Just as the directorate did not have the decisive voice in collective
bargaining, neither did production managers engage in local negotiations with
BECTU lay officials. On the studio floor, BECTU shop stewards saw production
management routinely side-stepping negotiated settlements over task or crewing,
Changes in job title or job design were normally proposed by management as being
voluntary but, in practice, neither individuals nor BECTU stewards had any real
possibility to resist such offers - the choice was ‘take it or leave it’.
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Chapter 7.
Networking and the Independent Television Production Sector
in the United Kingdom
1982-2000.
Introduction.
I don’t know who it was who coined the phrase ‘independent producer’ but it is a
ludicrous way to describe what we do. Firstly, we are no more independent than a tick
burying its head in a gorilla’s arse. Basically, you go where it goes (Agran, 2003:7).
Employment patterns in the labour market within the broadcasting industry received
increasing attention as a potential barometer of future trends in the organization of
employment (Baumann, 2002). Industrial restructuring within the UK economy in the
period since 1979 contributed to a series of substantial changes in the organization of
television programme production and the labour process of broadcasting workers.
New broadcasting technologies led to significant changes in media production
techniques and practices and, most notably, to smaller crews and simplified post-
production activities (Hazelkorn, 2001). As seen in the previous three case studies – a
comprehensive restructuring of the television production environment occurred in the
1980s and 1990s. The development of the independent production sector within the
UK brought these very substantial organizational changes into sharp focus.
Before the opening of Channel 4 in 1982, the UK broadcasting industry was vertically
integrated with two main broadcasters and ITV and the BBC produced, financed,
broadcast and marketed the majority of television programming (Willis & Dex,
2003:124). Employment in the UK television industry was available only in a very
limited number of production companies and most of these were within a vertically
integrated broadcaster structure (Paterson, 2001:204). The transformation of the
market for television programmes in the period after the election of the Conservative
government in 1979 – in particular through the legislative support for a fourth channel
– contributed to an enlarged demand for programming outwith the two vertically
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integrated producer broadcasters. There was a clear determination from the newly
elected Conservative administration that the domination of the commercial
broadcasting industry by ITV should not be replicated with the fourth channel (The
Listener, 1979:23).
The political and economic context of the UK broadcasting industry and the
legislative consequences upon the structure of the industry throughout the 1980s and
1990s were considered in Chapter 3. In short, a succession of government
broadcasting policies had, over time, helped to shape and direct expansion in the
provision of programming and technologies (Franklin, 2001). Many of the
institutional and regulatory changes which impacted upon the UK broadcasting
industry were justified on the grounds of extending market or market-like relations to
the Fordist television economy (Deakin & Pratten, 2000:321). The critical piece of
legislation which broke apart the rigidity of the television industry was the inclusion
in the Broadcasting Act, 1990 of a requirement that the major terrestrial broadcasters
purchase 25 per cent of their programming from the emergent independent production
sector. This element of the 1990 legislation was critical – not just for the independent
sector, but for the industry as a whole. An empirical examination can usefully be
undertaken of this shift in the supremacy of programme production where power
appeared to rest with a host of new entrepreneurial programme makers and small,
loosely linked networks of television professionals. The thrust of government policy,
expressed both through the quota system for independent productions and the auction
of ITV franchises, broadly adopted the ‘flexible specialisation thesis’ – the term given
to efforts that sought;
To convert the traditional highly integrated corporate structure into a more supple
organizational form capable of responding quickly to shifting market conditions and
product demand (Piore, 1986:146).
The government’s regulatory programme sought to increase competition, intensify
pressure on costs and remove the certainty with which broadcasters had previously
been able to plan programme production (Saundry, 1998). The flexibility offensive
was wide-ranging and directed not just at the rigidities of the work rules of television
production – e.g. fixed numbers of workers on location filming. Flexibility required a
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complete reworking of the industry’s internal and external boundaries and which
included employment contracts and the labour process (Guest, 1987). One of the most
revealing aspects of the shift to flexibility within the UK broadcasting industry in the
period after the Broadcasting Act, 1990 was the emergence of significant numbers of
Producer Owners who produced and sold programming to broadcasters from within
their own structures, i.e. privately owned companies. For, as will be seen later, these
producers had taken over many of the key functions within British television
traditionally performed by the terrestrial broadcasters themselves. Flexibility
manifested itself in a number of ways and the end of the closed shop contributed to a
huge rise in the number of people seeking work within the industry. Entry to the
industry was controlled prior to the 1980s and most available posts were, what might
be termed, staff jobs. The emergence of many new independent production companies
(IPCs) led to a huge increase in the number of inexperienced entrants content to work
within the freelance industry (Paterson, 2001:203). This change alone contributed to a
period of real uncertainty and reorganization within the industry.
It is important to consider how two distinct groups of individuals endeavoured to
manage the impact of industrial restructuring upon their respective careers within the
independent production sector. The fashion for referring to the period after the
Broadcasting Act, 1990 as one where flexibility reigned supreme does not shed light
on how the industry emerged from its regulated past. The emergence of
individualization within the independent production sector will be examined by
detailing the experiences of two different groups of broadcasting workers. The first
group, termed Producer Owners, were self-styled cultural entrepreneurs encouraged
by the legislative requirement for a quota of independently produced programming
and who set up or expanded their production companies. The second group,
designated Broadcasting Professionals, were largely freelance workers who sought
employment on a contract basis from both established terrestrial broadcasters and the
group of Producer Owners. In order to avoid glib assertions of occupational flexibility
and organizational deregulation, it is important to trace the development of careers
outwith the confines of the two main established broadcasters. The highly regulated
nature of work and employment within both the BBC and the ITV Networks can be
contrasted with the nature of work within independent production units. However, to
simply contend that the regulated nature of work within terrestrial broadcasters was
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replaced by a system whereby Broadcast Professionals/Producer Owners offered their
technical and production services on a one-to-one basis without interference from any
third party, is overly simplistic. This Chapter will conclude that regulation of work
(previously a lifelong career within the terrestrial broadcasting system) was latterly
provided by the existence of networks amongst groups of Broadcasting Professionals
and Producer Owners. The central link between the two groups was the employment
of a strategy of networking – by Producer Owners so as to procure commissions from
broadcasters, and by Broadcasting Professionals seeking employment from Producer
Owners. While it clear that LPT output is well stocked with a series ‘point-of-
production’ studies of the workplace (see, inter alia, Reed, 1992), LPT has tended to
ignore the activities of networking, one may go further and state that LPT has
discounted, by and large, other kinds of work. As networking activities are essentially
invisible forms of labour they have been ignored by many LPT theorists, thus much of
the literature pertaining to networking comes outwith the LPT body of work. The
further difficulty for LPT studies of networking processes is that networking is, if one
is to be entirely accurate, outside the employment relationship as traditionally
understood. However, it is because that networking practices are largely invisible that
make them an attractive sources of study in an industry which demands very
individualistic forms of labour process by both Producer Owners and Broadcast
Professionals.
An examination of the available theoretical contributions to the area of networking
was undertaken in Chapter 1 in order to provide a theoretical framework for the
notion that the move to deregulation simply resulted in a completely individualized
employment relationship for both Broadcast Professionals and Producer Owners. A
number of questions now arise. Were broadcasting networks always open, dynamic
and inclusive? How were networks constituted, sustained and altered? Did an
acceptance of the role for networks (within the independent production sector) mean
that broadcasting employees might enjoy a return to collective representation? In
addressing these questions this Chapter is divided into three parts. 7.1 will trace the
shift from a regulated TV production environment (in which programming production
was almost exclusively the preserve of the two terrestrial networks) to where a
plethora of small, medium and large scale IPCs sought to service the programming
needs of all broadcasters. 7.2 will address the organizational realities of the IPC sector
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from the 1990s onwards and, in particular, with how relationships or networks were
constructed and operated in respect of the group of Producer Owners. Finally, an
examination will be undertaken (7.3) of the role which networks played in providing
essential access to employment opportunities for production/research/ and technical
resource personnel (i.e. the group of workers previously described as Broadcast
Professionals).
Within 1.5 (Chapter 1) networks were identified by media workers as a method of
keeping up-to-date with industry information. Two essential phenomena now
characterize the contemporary UK independent television labour market – workers
organize and maintain their own personal labour market, while large numbers of those
employed within the freelance production market operate within a very limited
employment relationship (Ursell, 2000). Individuals who formed their own television
production companies carved out a very significant market in the period since 1990 –
but did so by engaging a completely different business model. Critically, the core
groups of independent production companies (IPCs) in Scotland, who granted
interviews, were at pains to disassociate themselves from any suggestion that the
industry was dominated by any type of cosy relationship between the IPCs and the
commissioning departments. One former employee of both BBC Scotland and STV
offered the following view;
I worked for the BBC for 10 years and also STV, I was well known and trusted and if
at that time I had set up an independent production company I would have been
running straight back to the controller and commissioning editors who I was very
friendly with…so I could have done very nicely thank you, I would have brought a
really nice team around me and its quite an interesting relationship, don’t you
think?172
172 Interview with independent producer 7.3.
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7.1
The Move to open up the Regulated TV Market for
Programming.
If you didn’t work for the BBC or ITV in whatever guise you simply didn’t make
television programmes – period.173
In describing the operation of the television production market in the period up until
the mid 1980s – the senior IPC manager quoted above noted the difficult environment
which existed for those outside the core production facilities of the BBC and ITV. The
structure of programme making had been institutionalised within the two competing
public service broadcasters and there were few opportunities for external programme
makers to access the commissioning editors of BBC and ITV. Despite a loosening of
the grip on the levers of commissioning within the BBC and ITV – through, inter alia,
the emergence of competing new satellite, cable and digital channels – the opportunity
to achieve significant commissions for those outside a few prominent IPCs remained
very limited. Broadcasting Professionals were often forced to use networks in seeking
employment opportunities and some Producer Owners viewed the proposed new
channel (Channel 4) as an opportunity to challenge the hegemony of the BBC and
ITV. The new channel would also be seen as providing a conduit which could give
power and influence to individual programme makers or, at the very least, the
opportunity to carve out a successful television career.
The independent sector began tentatively in the early 1970s due, in part, to an
expanding market outside the UK. A growth in demand for industrial and commercial
training videos and a clamour (not from viewers) for a substantially increased
numbers of advertisements (due to the rise in the number of programming hours
broadcast on ITV) had a very positive effect on growth within the sector. Channel 4
commissioned over 50 per cent of its first year transmissions from independent
producers (Dex, et al, 2000:3). The view, which became almost immediately
173 Interview with independent producer 7.6.
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fashionable, that independents were a source of significantly cheaper productions –
was given some support by the 1988 White Paper, Broadcasting in the ‘90s:
Competition, Choice and Quality. This document noted that;
Independent producers constitute an important source of originality and talent which
must be exploited and have brought new pressures for efficiency and flexibility in
production procedures (1988:Cm 517).
As mentioned previously, the rise of the independent sector in the UK can be partly
attributed to the development of new, lighter, more compact and sophisticated
technology. There is also merit in the suggestion that independent Producer Managers
sought freedom from the restrictions of expensive traditional broadcasters in order to
produce more cost effective programming (Crissell, 1997:208). Although the desire to
break free of the restrictions imposed upon traditional programme makers by
managers within the BBC and ITV was real and tangible, the new independents were
largely concerned with exploiting their newfound freedom to negotiate contracts and
terms for themselves. Creative freedom, in terms of the ability to devise and structure
the content of programming, was not a primary consideration for many in the rush to
secure commissions. The chance to structure and edit a programme from start to finish
would, ultimately, become less important to many nascent independent programme
makers as they grappled with the realities of the private sector production market.
Most were more than willing to accommodate the commissioning department’s
demands in order to maintain or develop a relationship with a broadcaster. Those who
were not willing to accede to the demands of the commissioning editors were unlikely
to be included in the small band of trusted companies receiving regular and repeat
commissions. This was not a relationship of equals but, rather, for all but a small
number of favoured IPCs, one in which networking skills were not an indulgent
exercise, but an everyday and essential business practice.
The relationship between IPCs and commissioning editors was described as one
involving a long-term network or contracting relationship between independent
parties (Barnatt & Starkey, 1994). The longevity and depth of those relationships are
examined later and it will be seen that networks were critical to the success of the
independent sector – in at least two fundamental ways. Firstly, they (networks)
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contributed to a narrowing of the marketplace and acted as controlling agents for
those seeking entry to the programming market. Secondly, networks acted as a
regulating mechanism on the labour market for television workers, while
simultaneously encouraging and supporting broadcast professionals in their search for
employment or information about possible future contracts. Networks which met
regularly (or exchanged information through electronic form) and communicated
effectively could build trust and allow for informal information exchange – the
literature is quite adamant in this regard (see, Ahuja, 2000). The potential for the
creation of evolutionary policy formation existed or, at a minimum, moved to reduce
the risk of conflict between different jurisdictions [in this case, between IPCs and
Broadcast Professionals and commissioning editors (Maher, 2000:117)].
Membership of a network was, and remains, critical for those whose livelihoods
depend upon employment within the independent production sector. Informal
networks – particularly for Broadcasting Professionals – can be viewed with a degree
of scepticism because of an inherent inability to facilitate or guarantee regular
employment or to impact in any meaningful way regarding the manner in which
labour is employed. However, in the absence of direct influence in the regulation of
the labour market for television workers by workers themselves, (except for a small
number of sought after freelance workers), loose networks of skilled Broadcasting
Professionals can influence the regulation of pay and conditions of employment. The
culture of the network is critical and can provide a way of regulating the organization
(for Producer Owners) and labour process (for Broadcasting Professionals). Informal
networks can influence which ideas (i.e. labour regulation) are ‘in’ or ‘out’ and
provide both an opportunity and a constraint for the various actors (Marsh & Smith,
2000). The informality of worker/entrepreneur networks is always driven by a desire
for the next contract. Thus, the process of networking itself comes a distant second to
the fundamental concern of attaining commissions. As will be detailed, it is difficult
to imagine, for example, direct competitors for commissions or particular job
vacancies sharing sensitive information about specific work opportunities.
For the group of cultural entrepreneurs, the Producer Owners, who made up a
substantial proportion of the independent production sector (either in terms of a loose
relationship with other Producer Owners or commissioning editors) networking was a
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pre-condition for success in the UK broadcasting industry. Those outside such
networks could struggle and were often embittered at their lack of access and
increasing marginalization and, on occasion, very quick to blame a nascent ‘old boys
culture’ for failure to receive commissions. Some of the larger companies who came
to dominate the industry in the period after1990, complained that smaller firms
believed, somehow, that they had a right to be given commissions. The larger IPCs
suggested that this was a perverse form of free marketism where the new independent
production marketplace was only considered a fair and equitable system by smaller
IPCs if broadcasters commissioned a significant number of all programmes pitched by
the independents. Medium and large companies were particularly critical of what was
described as ‘a level of inexplicable arrogance’ displayed by some of the smaller
firms. Despite the unenviable position of being poorly financed, small IPCs regularly
attempted to compete with larger and well-funded firms. Small IPCs believed that one
successful programme or series would give them the opportunity to expand quickly.
The corollary was that work which was unpopular with commissioners (perhaps for
reasons of cost or failure to keep to the editorial brief) could irrevocably damage a
company’s reputation. At the beginning of the boom in independent productions, after
the Broadcasting Act, 1990, small firms were idealistic and strove to produce serious,
important or challenging programming which would provide a bulwark against the
rising tide of cheap and frivolous television. A senior IPC owner/manager in Scotland
spoke damningly of the arrogant views and business practices of some independents;
It’s a funny sort of capitalism when the commissioning editors says…what we want is
eight part comedy dramas and then the production companies say what you really
need is factual programmes. So the market mechanism is completely out of
kilter…your bread and butter has to be what the market wants…the Scottish
independent industry complains when it doesn’t get commissions… it’s absolutely
laughable.174
The activities of what owner managers of large IPCs referred to as ‘lifestylers’, i.e.
people attracted to the industry because of the perception that it can deliver an
exciting working environment are reflected above, but the industry did begin to attract
174 Interview with independent producer 7.3.
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significant numbers of highly motivated and professional entrepreneurs who entered
the industry simply to make profit. While creative motivations were given by many
Producer Owners as an important reason for entering the industry, the economic
realities of a difficult trading environment had begun to harden already disciplined
attitudes;
I’ve long since stopped worrying about having my name attached to a great piece of
investigative documentary, I simply don’t care what I make as long as it makes
money.
The individuals who left the employment of mainstream television in the 1990s to
pursue an entrepreneurial career within the independent sector did so for three main
reasons. Firstly, they left before they were made redundant by the restructuring of the
UK television industry during the early 1990s and, consequently, the idea of forming
an independent company was born of necessity. Secondly, they left by choice and
were anxious to operate independently because they saw the opportunities which the
new market offered in the period after the Broadcasting Act, 1990. Thirdly, they left
the employment of the BBC and ITV because they were disillusioned with the market
driven environment within the mainstream broadcasting industry. They felt that they
were unable to dedicate themselves to aesthetic concerns and found that their
identities as purely programme makers were being eroded.
If broadcasters were hubs of the cultural economy, then independent producers
became the entrepreneurs who sought opportunities from them. The very existence of
such firms altered the expectations of workers within the cultural economy. While life
within these organizations was ‘not nirvana’ and was a constant search for the next
commission, it provided choice, autonomy and satisfaction for the two categories of
independent entrepreneurs. Independent production was about much more than just a
new source of television programmes and it appealed to a new ethos in broadcasting
(Robins & Cornford, 1992). It has been suggested that independent production was to
be the third force in broadcasting – one which would bring with it new forms of
expression along with gains in quality and creativity (Robins & Cornford, 1992:191).
The suggestion was further made that TV production was being increasingly
undertaken by networks of agents (i.e. skilled artists and technicians) and not by the
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rigid bureaucratic corporations of the 1970s and 1980s (Barnatt & Starkey, 1994:253).
The broadcast commissioners were the axis of this new arrangement and were
determined to retain their dominant position – denying attempts to pigeonhole them as
cruel and domineering individuals who sought to extract every conceivable ounce of
cheap programming flesh from a weak and compliant independent sector. During
interviews with a selection of small IPCs, it emerged that they believed that only a
favoured few of their number were granted access to the hugely important informal
networks and contacts which formed the relationship between broadcaster and
independent. As noted previously, some small IPCs suggested that access should be
structured in a more formal and democratic manner and this can be interpreted clearly
as resentment at being excluded from particular networks. What is very clear is that at
the beginning of a small IPCs working life, informal networking arrangements play a
very important part in finding jobs or commissions within the production industry
(Blair, 1999).
The importance of informal networking as a method of gaining access became clearer
as the industry began to develop during the mid 1990s. Only a small number of IPCs
had a track record of delivering the required programming within budget and on time.
Most IPC managers recognized as far back as the early 1990s that very few
commissioning editors would be willing to risk engaging an unknown and untried
company to produce peak time programming. Small companies were thus given an
opportunity to provide programming at the margins of scheduling and late night or
very early morning slots were made available. This should not be seen as some sort of
benevolent act on the part of commissioners – because to allow relatively insignificant
organizations produce their best work as a form of advertisement for their
programming abilities gave broadcasters access to cheap and, often, below cost
product. One small Glasgow based independent producer spoke of a certain weariness
with the competitive business environment in Scotland;
To be honest, with the fight on all sides for ratings and with the pressure to cut costs,
it is a fact that few if any commissioning editors are likely to risk their record, and
perhaps even their jobs, by choosing new talent over the same old faces. At this point,
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few if any genuine ‘indies’ have the resources to survive long enough to establish a
sufficiently reassuring record for commissioning editors.175
If the continued existence of many small independent companies in the UK was
dependent upon a significant amount of self-funding of programme ideas (and
sometimes of the programmes themselves) then there could have been little room for
optimism about the future sustainability of small and truly independent companies.
The constant refrain from sole trader IPCs was that they were seen as exploitable
individuals who lived at the bottom of the production chain with little chance of
evolving into more substantial firms. From a point at the beginning of the 1980s
where there were only a handful of IPCs, to the early part of the new century – the
owner/manager of one of Scotland’s premier IPCs could say of the market place
which evolved;
There are too many companies in the UK now. It’s too fractured and they are mostly
too small. Interestingly the companies are also far too hostile to each other…one
company said about us ...[they] could put s**t in an envelope and it would get
commissioned. Why do they think like that? If someone says we will take another 25
per cent of the company and it will take you into a whole new arena I would say
great…the problem is our competitors don’t like sharing but we think it’s
important.176
Some IPCs operated at the very margins of the industry and survived on as little as
one commission per year, and sometimes less. These individuals came to be
understood as life-stylers, i.e. people who enjoy the fragmented, short-term
employment structure of their working lives. The corollary of those firms were the
larger, well-resourced and highly professional independents dedicated to securing
funding to allow themselves to grow their firms in order to compete internationally.
The following Section will trace the growth of IPC’s in the period since 1990.
175 Interview with independent producer 7.5.
176 Interview with independent producer 7.2.
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7.2.
1990 – The Year of the Independents and the Development of
Networking for Producer Owners.
I would feel sorry for anyone starting up a company now. I think it’s interesting that
when we started up, ‘X’ also started up …I don’t know of any companies in Scotland
which have started up in the last five years.177
The independent production sector led the way in terms of an attack on traditionally
established rules of labour process within the television industry. As will be detailed
later, these very significant onslaughts on work rules and were undertaken, for the
most part, by the cultural entrepreneurs of the new television economy – the Producer
Owners – and to a lesser degree by the skilled creative and technical resource workers
who helped produce the independent programming, i.e. Broadcast Professionals. Thus
any reading of the new broadcast economy as being one in which a generation of
producers/directors/resource personnel were forced outside the mainstream or
established terrestrial broadcasters is, at best, a very partial view of the history of the
UK industry. Many of the Broadcast Professionals and Producer Owners were made
redundant from the terrestrial broadcasters in the 1980s and 90s – however others
choose to leave of their own accord (Paterson, 1993).
It is a fact that the broadcasting industries’ workforce moved from a position where
almost all professionals worked within the two established broadcasters, to a situation
where 25 per cent of current industry employees are now freelance (Skillset, 2004).
To argue, however, that all of these employees were forced out of the established
mainstream ignores the very strong evidence available which suggests that a
significant number choose to escape what, they perceived to be, the straightjacketing
effect on creative endeavour. By ‘creative endeavour’ IPC owner/managers meant not
just to the output of the established broadcasters, but also the way in which
programming was produced – including the process of organizing and hiring labour.
The growth of new flexible working practices and flexible organizations gave rise to a
177 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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number of theoretical attempts to explain such change (Antcliff, etal, 2005a:6). As
previously stated, networking was the single most significant process undertaken by
Producer Owners in their search for programming commissions. What is less clear,
however, is how this form of networking operated at firm level.
As noted in Chapter 1 (1.5.), networks play a fundamental role in the determination of
how information is exchanged. The actual information exchanged may be quite
simple and it may initially appear unimportant to the recipient. Conversely, it may be
as important as specific and current information about job opportunities for television
workers (Boorman, 1975). In terms of networking strategies for Producer Owners, it
is clear that the successful development of a new entrepreneurial venture is dependent
upon the accurate deployment of a network strategy. At the beginning of the life cycle
of an IPC, (when funds are invariably in short supply), the employment of networking
is critical in order to keep costs at a minimum. An effective network strategy can
make the difference between short-term failure and success for the nascent IPC
(Saxenian, 1991:424). However, the theory of between-firms networking within the
IPC sector requires empirical research as there is little evidence of sharing of sensitive
programming information with other firms. While the concept of ‘industrial clusters’
gives some support to the view that there is sharing of industry information within a
small geographical area, there was little evidence available from interviews
undertaken, that such inter-firm activity was other than superficial. Castells, (2000)
also explored inter-firm networks or what he termed ‘communications based
capitalism’ – the move from individual firms to business projects based around
transitory networks, or alliances/partnerships.
Cultural entrepreneurs’ networks are primarily about searching for the next
commission or keeping in communication with a loose band of trusted technicians so
that that they will be contactable when required. Access to the commissioning process
itself is complex, and to get to a position where one is formally rejected for a
commission can, in itself, be considered an achievement. Access to the basic process
of making comprehensive submissions to the broadcasters’ commissioning
departments demanded considerable skills which the experienced practitioner could
more readily deploy than the inexperienced newcomer (Cottle, 1997). Commissioners
wanted to be able to hand over responsibility for programme production in its entirety
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to IPCs and programme makers who were deemed troublesome and requiring constant
management were universally unpopular.
From the initial explosion in the number of IPCs in the period after 1990, there was
little evidence of any emotional investment in terms of relationships being formed
between individual IPCs. Well-connected individuals and larger well funded firms
were conscious of the need to maintain and develop those relationships while small
firms, and those without access to social networks, remained on the margins of the
industry. A small IPC owner/manager spoke of his cynicism about the role of Channel
4 – historically the largest purchaser of independent programming in the period since
1990;
The broadcasters, including the supposedly ‘indie’ friendly C4, stick to the same
short-lists [of IPCs] for serious funding and continue to offer chump change to the
rest. They manage to offer insufficient funds to actually pay for projects whilst
demanding all the rights. Your average ‘indie’ can’t afford a full-time legal rep, and
can’t afford to go back time after time to clear new contract details.178
The main types of programming produced by independent producers may be split (for
both simplicity and accuracy) into three categories. Low cost programmes which are
produced for approximately GBP 10,000 to GBP 20,000 per slot, mid range
programmes which cost on average GBP 120,000 (and where a substantial number of
the Scottish firms interviewed derive their profits) and high end documentaries where
costs begin at GBP 200,000 – these latter were of minimal importance to many of the
firms interviewed. Producer Owners were fully aware of the implications of any cost
overruns and there were very few opportunities to hide any financial miscalculations
within the budget for an average production. For most Scottish IPCs, strict adherence
to cost control was the most important tool commissioning departments employed in
regulating the production of programming. One senior IPC owner said;
We know what we are doing. We have a lot of experience and I have a good team here
and some of them have been with us for a number of years. But I’m under no illusion
178 Interview with independent producer 7.5.
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[that] we are rigorously audited and they [the broadcasters] are acutely aware of
how much these sorts of programmes cost so we can’t in any sense pull the wool over
their eyes.179
At costs running in the order of GBP 120,000 per hour, producers freely
acknowledged that technically superior programming could only be produced
profitably by using all their creative organizational and craft knowledge. A producer’s
ability to win commissions and to deliver the finished product on time and at, or
below, budget depended on a mix of track record and personal contacts with
experienced production and technical personnel (Saundry, 1998:156). The
relationship between commissioner and IPC is almost universally without depth and
commitment – with the exception of the very specific relationship enjoyed by the
large and regularly employed IPC. The buyer/supplier relationship within the UK
television industry was, and remains, characterized by an almost total dependence on
the handful of large broadcasting corporations, with Channel 4 relying on
approximately 30 major programme suppliers for in excess of 70 per cent of their
output (Saundry, 1998:157). Thus, close relationships or networks between core IPC
and commissioners reduce costs for broadcasters by externalising in-house production
processes and guaranteeing minimum quality levels. IPCs are often given an implicit
promise of repeat contracts upon reaching and maintaining a high quality threshold of
production (Starkey, 2000:299). With the relatively limited number of outlets for their
medium sector product IPCs depend upon networking in order to remain in the
information loop.
As indicated, for the new and burgeoning IPCs the issue of costs was at the forefront
of a strategy designed to carve out a role within the broadcasting marketplace. While
IPCs were keen to articulate their commitment to the quality of programming, a
constant refrain was that comparisons between themselves and the BBC and ITV
resulted in programming which was cheaper to produce and, at least, as technically
competent as that produced by the big two broadcasters. Despite claims of programme
quality, Producer Owners acknowledged that the commissioning departments of both
179 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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BBC and ITV devised very tight budgets for programme producers which allowed
very little room for cost overruns;
We do a number of series which are in their third and fourth series. You might think
that by the time a programme gets to that level you would have worked out how to do
it…you would have cut down all the experimental stuff…all the mistakes you make,
you ought to make a big profit, but you can’t.180
Some IPCs attempted to overcome the difficulties of low budgets and commissioners’
high quality expectations by deciding to specialize in a particular genre of
programming. This coincided with the abandoning of specific departments within
some of the ITV franchises. STV, for example, closed down its religious
programming department in the late 1990s and transferred almost all of its production
requirements in this field to a large Glasgow based IPC. For many of the successful
IPCs the starting point of their business plan was the view that the two terrestrial
broadcasters (and the BBC in particular) were responsible for significant wastage in
terms of numbers of skilled professionals employed and technical resources used.
Repeat commissions from broadcasters, and the comfort for IPCs which came from
having a block of programming work each year, provided some financial stability in
an industry which had, by the mid 1990s, become increasingly cost based.
[Independent TV production is].. not very attractive – the margins are low and terms
are dictated by the broadcasters (Guardian, 2000, August, 8:9).
Employment structure in the IPCs in the period up until the mid 1980s had provided
an organizational template – this being, in essence, a skeleton workforce
supplemented by flexible part-time staff. While the terrestrial broadcasters may have
looked with envy at the cost base of production within the independent sector, the
high fixed costs which the ‘big two’ broadcasters carried meant that competition on
cost-based terms alone would never favour the established broadcasters.
Independents, it was suggested offered a unique opportunity to ITV companies, in
particular, to pass the effects of cyclical advertising revenue down the line to
180 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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production companies (Sparks, 1994:147). The suggestion put to one medium sized
Scottish IPC was that in order to offer cheaper programming, per-hour salary costs
should be cut and labour subjected to intensive measurement of performance. This
proposition was firmly rebutted by the owner of the company who said;
Our people are well paid but I expect results for that…people in here can come in
when they want as long as they do what they have to …nobody who has left [company
X] has left voluntarily…people who have left have done so because I have moved
them on, they have not performed.181
Some Producer Owners interviewed were content to acknowledge that an ultra-
flexible approach existed in relation to staffing issues. Significant demands made on
Broadcast Professionals were conveniently hidden within references to a spontaneous
working culture and which did away with unnecessary regulation – e.g. the length of
the working day for contract staff. Producer Owners praised their working
environment with its almost universally young workforce, contrasting it with the over
regulated terrestrial broadcasting arena;
It’s a young workforce…which is beneficial in one sense…but it means that people
cannot plan for the future, it’s not all great. We have a core staff of nine but up to
about thirty freelances.182.
In a very explicit condemnation of the regulation of labour which preceded the
Broadcasting Act, 1990 two Glasgow based Producer Owners were scathing in their
comments on the suggestion that freelance Broadcast Professionals (including senior
producer directors) could be active members of a trade union. They strongly defended
the casual nature of employment within the IPC sector while simultaneously praising
the individualistic nature of work within the industry. In contrast to the apparent
disregard for ongoing collective networking activities by Broadcast Professionals,
some Producer Owners were engaged in a process of deliberately ignoring the reality
of fresh attempts by Broadcast Professionals to control their labour process. While
181 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
182 Interview with independent production company owner 7.6.
214
labour process theory produced a range of important ideas concerning the nature of
management-labour relationships under capitalism, the fundamental tenet of the
theory is a belief in the inevitability of conflicts of interest between management and
labour (Brown, 1992). Contrary to the view expressed by Producer Owners – that the
relationship between Broadcast Professionals and themselves bypasses conflict –
Producer Owners defined the concept of flexibility as a process which provided few
benefits to Broadcast Professionals;
None of the workers here are members of trade unions, I think they would consider it
anachronistic, it’s incredibly casual…the average wage of a producer is thirty
thousand pounds. I was in the ACTT, which it was called then, I felt it was terribly
anachronistic. There were all these things that I couldn’t do and when it gets down to
the people who work in this industry [they] don’t think of themselves as working in a
big group or sector. They [Broadcast Professionals] think of themselves as
individuals.183
Despite the rhetoric of networking, the theme of individualism ran through many of
the responses given by owners of the larger IPCs. The view expressed above by two
Producer Owners, that many Broadcast Professionals considered themselves part of a
‘network of one’, was revealing. As will be shown in the following Section,
networking was, and is, a critical part of the daily working lives of many Broadcast
Professionals. Whereas on the studio floor – within the old regulated environment of
ITV – managerial authority was largely a blend of skill and adherence to craft, the
deregulated environs of a late 1990s independent production company offered no such
comforts. The development of the collective organization of which Seglow (1978)
speaks, (Chapter 1, 1.5), was replaced by a requirement to use networking as the only
respite against rigorous cost cutting and output measurement by IPC management.
Any networking undertaken by Producer Owners was on very particular terms which
sought to maintain relationships formed with commissioners, together with a sharing
of contextual industry information with small groups of peer firms. This kind of
networking emerged as a development of personal or friendship networks which
183 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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linked firms through social contacts and were the starting point for social networking.
As was noted in 1.5, these networks often had a particular resonance for entrepreneurs
(Grandori & Soda, 1995:184). The entrepreneurs of the IPC sector attempted to
change the culture of older Broadcast Professionals in order to attune these loose
network of freelance broadcast workers to the needs of the entrepreneurial class of
IPC owners.
While pressure from broadcasters caused Producer Owners to demand a high degree
of cost awareness from Broadcast Professionals, a further reason for good financial
housekeeping was the inherent fragility of many of the IPCs themselves – in terms of
their financial stability. Gutteridge (1995:7) noted that, even by the mid 1990s, most
IPCs were unable to develop their businesses due to a chronic lack of capital. The
amateurish employment of what little capital investment was available meant that
‘independent production in this country is nothing more than a cottage industry’
(Gutteridge, 1995:7). Managers and owners of IPCs were further organizationally
constrained by the need to maintain a constant throughput of programming proposals
with a very limited number of broadcaster outlets. By 1997, 84 per cent of UK IPCs
did not produce for more than two channels and many IPCs had moved into the field
of genre production, i.e. production of only one type of programming. From the late
1990s a growing contrast is evident between small, poorly funded IPCs and better-
financed operators. Larger Producer Owners reserved their harshest criticism – not for
the Broadcast Professionals who serviced the IPCs – but, rather, for the groups of
small IPCs who permeated the industry. One senior Scottish IPC manager said of the
very small companies;
To be honest they [the smaller companies] aren’t going to survive. I’m sorry about
that but my sympathy is somewhat limited because it’s not like they haven’t been told,
they have refused to get the message…I have sat through far too many PACT
meetings where the reps from Channel 4 have explained that they are not getting the
ideas they want. Get real! We work for our access.184
184 Interview with independent producer 7.3.
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Most IPCs had, by the late 1990s, institutionalised rigid control over programming
budgets for two central reasons. Firstly, because budgets provided by the broadcasters
were tightly controlled, and secondly because industry margins were at best an overall
10 to 15 per cent on an annual turnover of between GBP 3million and GBP 5million
185. Creativity and entrepreneurship were essential in sorting out the important issues
of cost per task and fitting the appropriate individuals to particular tasks – and not
always about originality of programming content. IPCs needed to find new ways of
operating which would enable the entrepreneur to delegate responsibility for
operational tasks and to focus more on planning the firms’ development. Interview
responses repeatedly mentioned the need for IPCs to recruit non-creative individuals
to manage the daily business needs of the firm;
There is no doubt that we have to start looking beyond our own settled community for
people to drive this business on and to make the harsh decisions when and if required.
I think [we] are making progress in that direction – but I accept it’s slow.
Some of the IPC managers suggested that they needed to become creative with the
company itself – however the use of the term ‘creativity’ appeared to refer to a
rigorous and underlying determination to continue to monitor costs while also keeping
open the option of selling parts of the business to outside investors. The option of
refusing to change the structure of the individual IPC was accepted by most Producer
Owners as not being viable. While small or niche operators would remain they would
compete in a very specialized segment of the marketplace.
The future for the very small companies …the analogy that I used when I wrote the
business plan is that you either become Tesco or Sainsbury’s, i.e. you become a one
stop shop or you become the Italian centre in Glasgow i.e, a niche operator. If you
are a specialist you will survive and if you are a superstore you will survive. The
analogy, is of course, you could become the Co-Op carrying all of the overheads and
none of the glamour! 186
185 Interview with independent producer 7.3.
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The cultural entrepreneurs of the IPC sector – i.e. the Producer Owners – may
originally have had very individualistic values but they were increasingly required to
engage in highly collaborative working practices or networking. As noted in Section
1.5, networking provided increased labour utilization and product improvement
(Gemunden, et al, 1996). Partnership and team working became very important to
business plans, despite the often essentially selfish nature of developing programme
ideas. Once a programming idea had been transformed into a programme proposal
(and then, perhaps, into a commission) teams of producers, directors and resource
personnel could work together and pitch in so that the programme was completed in
time and within budget. IPC managers demanded absolute commitment to the
production process and employed the language of the team and/or the family when
groups of disparate workers combined for a one-off project. The commitment
demanded was often accompanied by a vague promise of further employment in the
future for the Broadcast Professionals.
As noted previously, the independent production entrepreneurs interviewed were
anxious to remain fully focused on developing programme ideas and to maintain a
desire to develop the company and secure new investment. IPC managers strongly
rejected any suggestion that the organizational structure of their firms simply
replicated the structure of the newly slimmed-down terrestrial broadcasters. A
recurring theme amongst the larger IPC Producer Owners interviewed was that of
taking a back seat in terms of future creative direction and to focus on building the
business. A generation of television producers had matured from simply being excited
about programming itself to being exercised about the ownership of the rights to what
they produced, even if the product was sold to the broadcasters.
We used to concentrate on making all the films and documentaries ourselves. But then
we realized we could be creative with the company rather than the product. Instead of
pursuing an ambition to be a big director I decided to focus on building the company.
We want to be able to develop our own content and own the rights. We want to go
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from supplying a service to owning a product. However that is more complex, risky
and time consuming.187
The market place for independents in the late 1990s, and in the early part of the new
century, reflected these concerns. Three types of independent producers were
operating in the UK marketplace – (a), broadcaster/producers – examples of which
include Granada, Talkback, Bazal; (b), studio and production village projects (where
some of the larger UK independents operated as partly or wholly owned subsidiaries
of larger media organizations) and (c), what were previously termed ‘life-stylers’.
Ownership of rights to programming – because of the costs involved – had by the
early part of this century become a central point of debate amongst regulatory
authorities, ITC, the broadcasters and the IPCs themselves. There were significant
limits to the potential for growth – for even the largest of Scotland’s IPCs – without
access to profits from distribution and ownership of programming.
By 2002, the ITC had reviewed programme supply and had decided to employ the
ITV model of ‘terms and trade’ for IPCs. This was in direct contrast with the model
employed by Channel 4 and the BBC. In essence, the ITV terms included a binding
agreement to acquire only the UK rights for terrestrial broadcast, while the supplier
would meet all production costs. As detailed in Chapter 4 the emergence of the ITV
Network Centre – which had no funding arrangements to provide for acquiring rights
to programming – meant that such terms of trade were appropriate for it alone. The
model (of terms and trade) for Channel 4 allowed a significant degree of negotiation
to take place between commissioner and IPC, while the BBC and Channels 4 and 5
retained some rights to programming. Format rights, namely the right to the
programming idea and concept, were defined by Channel 4 as part of any deal for
funding provision, this included remake and sequel rights, while the BBC allowed
these rights to remain with the IPC. Such complicated and technical contract law
increasingly demanded exceptional professionalism on the part of IPC’s – the days of
the ‘enthusiastic amateur’ which had for so long been the cornerstone of the industry
were coming to an end.
187 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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You’ve got the ‘Talkbacks’ and ‘Bazals’ punching their weight around the world, then
there are small operations also doing very well. The market is tougher, but it’s
healthy (Guardian, August 23, 2000:9)
In contrast, larger firms were constantly under pressure to maintain and increase the
number of commissions obtained. If, for example, a larger independent failed to at
least maintain the level of commissions attained in the previous twelve months then it
could struggle to keep key staff who might be attracted to or poached by competitors.
Failure to retain critical creative staff remained a constant worry for many IPCs – the
most talented researchers and producers were continually being attracted to the larger
companies where greater opportunities to obtain commissions existed. Broadcast
Professionals – as will be seen shortly – were attracted to the most successful IPCs
which could guarantee longer contracts at higher rates of remuneration. However, in
Scotland the IPC arena was unique and larger IPCs were able to access very personal
forms of networking which were not available to smaller IPC and/or individual
suppliers of programming ideas. A senior Scottish IPC owner admitted that the
process of networking for him was a very personal process;
Bob… of BBC 1/ 2 stayed with us over the weekend. In the forty-eight hours I didn’t
pitch a single thing to him and now that level of access means that if there is a
meeting of two hundred independents it’s a case of, ’hi Bob how are you?’ Now how
do you put that in a business plan…these guys (commissioners) have seen me in the
line of battle and they have seen how I deal with pressure. They want to make sure
that I won’t arrive in his office on the day the programmes are due, half cut with a
bottle of gin in one hand and no programmes in the other.188
188 Interview with independent producer 7.2.
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7.3
Broadcasting Professionals and the Role of Networks.
Here, the labour process of the other core group of workers emerging in large
numbers from the deregulation of the industry in the aftermath of the Broadcasting
Act 1990, namely, freelance Broadcast Professionals, is addressed. Deregulation of
the broadcasting industry had emerged in tandem with the redundancy of national
collective bargaining within the ITV sector. Networks of rigid, nationally organized
blocks of workers gave way to new flexibly organized technicians and production
staff who would negotiate their own terms and conditions. This group of workers
defined, in part, as post-Fordist artisans (who contested the discourse of Taylorist
inspired labour control) have been described as ‘active, creative, reflexive, risk taking
workers with a certain degree of autonomy in how they defined and achieved their
work goals, engaging in practices of social entrepreneurship’ (Edwards, 1998:387).
Describing Broadcast Professionals as creative workers is unlikely to give rise to
significant debate and is largely accurate, but the issue of autonomy for Broadcast
Professionals within the independent production arena is substantially more complex.
State of the art technologies and a new culture of work have, it is suggested, moved
from what has been termed ‘specialization of knowledge’ to what can only be
described as a ‘multiplicity of roles’ – in essence specialization is giving way to
flexibility (Casey, 1996:327). This flexibility is the central work ethic within the IPC
sector and may be better understood through a description of the networking activity
by IPC staff.
It is a fact that in the period since the late 1980s television workers experienced a
change in the way labour is organized – namely, a change in the way work is secured.
This has been overwhelmingly, and correctly, treated as an attack on the collective
experience of broadcasting work. While one can accept the thesis that deregulation
has impacted negatively on the traditional idea of a career in broadcasting and that
individualization is pervasive, this does not fully describe what is happening in the
area of the UK broadcasting labour markets(s). There is evidence that employees have
made tentative attempts to act collectively and to restructure their employment
relationship. However, to suggest that the employment of networks by Broadcast
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Professionals will significantly alter the move to ever-increasing flexibility or will
restructure the industry in a way which mirrored the way labour was organized is
quite incorrect.
The broadcasting industry has undergone such a significant organizational
restructuring that any hopes of collective action on the part of Broadcast Professionals
is seen only at the margins of the industry. Freelance broadcasting workers who have
made such an important contribution to the IPC sector, have seen a revolution in the
operation of labour markets for television professionals. The fundamental change in
the way broadcasting institutions within Germany and Britain were organized during
the 1990s required individuals to gain membership of some sort of work group in
order to soften the realities of the restructuring of the broadcast labour market
(Baumann, 2002:30). Networking became the perfect antidote to the individualizing
tendencies of the employment relationship within the independent production field.
For the multitudes of technical and production staff who flooded into the industry
after the transformation of the television labour market in the latter part of the
twentieth century – after the removal of the closed shop in broadcasting – some
method of accessing information about labour markets was essential (Paterson,
2001:203).
The recurring theme throughout the previous three Chapters has been the acceptance
of a radical overhaul in the way careers were structured within the UK broadcasting
industry. From an industry historically noted for its strong entry regulation – the past
twenty-five years have seen an unprecedented growth in the number of freelance
workers. By the mid 1990s – of the 28,000 people estimated to be working in the UK
television industry – 60 per cent were employed on a freelance basis (Skillset, 2004).
At a time when there was active deregulation of trade union power within the
industry, the significant growth in non-traditional forms of labour entry had,
necessarily, a profound effect upon methods of representation for individual media
workers. As indicated in both Chapters 4 and 5, broadcasting trade unions during the
1990s had been subjected to falling rates of membership at a time of unprecedented
growth in the numbers of those entering the industry (Paterson, 2001). Within the ITV
sector, the significant fall in union membership had resulted partly from a failure of
union management to engage with new freelance workers. Networking became an
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offensive and defensive tool for broadcasting workers in the search for both contract
employment opportunities and in negotiating the boundaries of existing employment.
As a result of these new approaches to labour representation and organization,
enormous changes were made to trade union attitudes in relation to recruitment within
the casual freelance media environment. (These have been detailed in Chapter 4).
The importance of networks became clearer for Broadcast Professionals because of
the structural limitations of the Scottish independent industry. The initial explosion in
IPCs numbers after the 1990 legislation was not maintained. There was also
consolidation within the Scottish industry with mergers between the two most
important Scottish IPCs in 2004.189 The concept of a risk-taking class of cultural
entrepreneurs had succumbed to organizational pressures, and by the late 1990s many
Producer Owners were forced to retreat to maintaining a core network of employees.
The relationships that did endure between Producer Owner and Broadcast
Professional were largely those based upon a mutual need and trust. Despite the
individualistic nature of many Producer Owners, they were prepared to draw on
personal networks to extend their strategic competences – the concept of the ‘address
book’ format for recruitment and retention of key staff was continually referred to. In
turn, this helped to resolve acute operating problems by supplementing the
organization’s internal resources. For Broadcast Professionals who made up the bulk
of the workforce within the independent sector, it was apparent that the rationale and
experience of networking was significantly different to that practiced by Producer
Owners.
As previously indicated, the absence of traditional collective organization – namely,
the failure of trade unions to adequately react to the growth of non-traditional forms
of employment – had left a vacuum for the collective representation of Broadcast
Professionals. They required, at a minimum, involvement in networks of like-minded
professionals or with those who could provide work opportunities (Deery & Walsh,
1999). In an attempt to link available theory on networks, and which are appropriate
to the study of the nature of freelance media work to the everyday employment
189 The merger between Wark Clements and Ideal World, the resultant new company is known as ‘Ideal
Wark Clements’.
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concerns of Broadcast Professionals, one could usefully refer to the concept of ‘social
capital’ (Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993). Individual Broadcast Professionals were
disposed to investing their ‘social capital’ in processes aimed at developing methods
of gaining access (as a primary activity) to information networks while also
tentatively employing networks as a basis for collective attempts to improve industry-
wide employment terms.
Networking for Broadcast Professionals was, and is, centered upon what has been
termed the ‘advice network’ and this process identified experienced Broadcast
Professionals from whom others could seek assistance. The trust network can reveal
patterns of sharing information about future vacancies and the communication
network may identify patterns of employees who talk to each other on a regular basis.
There is no expectation from literature sources that regular communication between
prospective Broadcast Professionals and Producer Owners results in continuous (or
almost continuous) employment contracts. As pointed out in Chapter 1, it is not
simply the activity of building a network which is important for those seeking
employment but, rather, that the individual is not excluded from labour market
information (Il & Mann, 1977). It is essential to note, however, that the sense of
collegiality – which by implication emerges from the usage of networks – can fail to
reveal the competitive nature of the labour process within the broadcasting industry
(See inter alia, Knights & Willmott, 1985; Antcliff, 2005b: 4). It remains a matter of
conjecture as to what degree individual Broadcast Professionals adapt networking
strategies in the collective interests of their peers.
Significantly, therefore, it appears that an apparent contradiction exists at the heart of
the labour market for groups of Broadcast Professionals. The labour process of the
Broadcast Professional is one based on an essentially selfish desire to achieve
continuous employment in what has, and continues to be, a labour market which is not
undersupplied with production and research staff and with those seeking entry into the
industry. Therefore, the Broadcast Professional must develop a network of ties and
network exchanges with other Broadcast Professionals in order to remain in the
information loop. As indicated in Chapter 6 resource managers within BBC Scotland,
for example, were most forthcoming about the importance of reputation as a
contributing factor to continued employment and productivity levels. The work done
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on the area of private labour markets (PLMs) is an important contribution to this
subject matter (see, inter alia, Fevre, 1989). In essence, Fevre’s treatise upon labour
market segmentation provided an explanation as to how some workers fare better than
others within labour markets in terms of the development of employment related
networks (Antcliff, 2005b:7). The popularity and/or the professional reputation of the
individual Broadcast Professional was, and remains, a critical part of both the theory
of PLMs and the daily activities of those actively seeking work. One major
consequence of the increasing uncertainty associated with an industry reliant on a
casualized workforce has been the rise of multi-skilling (Paterson, 2001:204). The
adoption of networking became another element of the increasingly broad multi-
skilling thesis. Access to fully established and functioning networks of Broadcast
Professionals who trade industry information amongst one another, both in a local or
national context, is not automatic; indeed within the independent production sector in
Scotland the ample supply of willing labour has provided opportunities for very
selective groups of technical and creative labour to emerge.
As noted in Chapter 1 (1.5), Broadcast Professionals may be fortunate to access weak-
ties after a form of apprenticeship or, rather, once a suitable period of time has elapsed
(if they have been accepted informally into a network of broadcasting professionals)
(Granovetter, 1973). Granovetter’s argument is that large networks of weak-ties are
critical to the individual’s opportunities to develop regular or continuous employment.
In contrast, strong-ties will allow for little new information to disperse along the lines
of communication and will contribute to the development of professional cliques
which can hinder information flows. Empirical evidence from the series of interviews
conducted confirms the importance of membership of networks for Broadcast
Professionals. The difficulty for Broadcast Professionals remains the quality of the
network to which they have been granted access and whether that network is properly
collective in nature, or whether it is a simple collection of individuals who share
common skills.
It is possible to sub-divide the (occasionally bland) term ‘network’ – and two different
types of networks for Broadcast Professionals are considered here. One network type
can be termed an occupational-identity network – horizontal networks of similarly
skilled individuals who may have received a technical training at one of the large
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broadcasters but who exited the industry after deregulation. Their experience with a
broad range of equipment (both classic and contemporary) meant that their skills were
in constant demand. The quote below, from the manager of a large Glasgow based
IPC, reaffirms the point that for many IPCs the difficulty was not in attracting staff
per se, but in maintaining the strong relationships built up between trusted
individuals. Management within terrestrial broadcasting and the IPC sector were
satisfied for these employees to define themselves as part of a core and elite network
because without these social networks the process of recruitment would become
lengthier and more expensive (Ursell, 1999:5);
We can’t advertise because we will get tons of replies...so I put the word around with
people I know who put out the word around and pretty soon you hear who is
available…who is appropriate, who you can afford and who you can work
with…those are all incredibly important.190
For the groups of Broadcast Professionals outside the tight, trusted networks of
occupational-skill networks which dominate the independent production sector (a
second network type), their labour process was largely concerned with joining
established networks and becoming trusted freelancers. Networking as a support
mechanism for skilled professionals is recognized as a defensive strategy. The strong
contention is that if possessors of knowledge form themselves into groups or networks
then they may begin to be able to standardize and control that knowledge or skill
(MacDonald, 1995). Unfortunately for many Broadcast Professionals (excluding the
very sought after technicians and production personnel) this theoretical perspective
does not correctly describe the reality of labour process within either the IPC sector
or, indeed, the broadcasting industry as a whole. Those workers subjected to regular
bouts of unemployment, or membership of what may be termed secondary networks
(i.e. less favoured networks), are encouraged to define themselves as ‘enterprising
selves’. The premier networks of Broadcast Professionals who are in continuous
demand because of reputation, or other reasons, do not need to subject themselves to a
form of entrepreneurship (du Gay, 1996). The fashion and requirement for flexibility
in the labour market for Broadcast Professionals has, in some cases, also engendered
190 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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exploitation. There is now a common expectation that freelance work, particularly in
the development phase, may be unremunerated (Paterson, 2001:210). The Broadcast
Professionals’ lifestyle is critiqued as requiring exceptional flexibility on his/her part
– the realistic expectations of a professional worker are often foregone in the name of
flexibility. The optimum employment and network scenario for these workers is
membership of a specific project network which moves from project to project, but
without any definite sense of when (or where) the next project will materialise. The
difficulty for many Broadcast Professionals is that the specific project networks are
not easily accessible. A senior Producer Owner dismissed the argument that the
importance of occupational or project networking was critical to the success of a
Broadcast Professional’s career. He argued that such individuals enjoyed the
flexibility which the industry offered;
Ask anyone why they work in television and ask them if they have ‘any more’ than
they had at University and they will probably say ‘no’. So why do they do it? It’s not
about security…you trade your security for this sense of freedom and there are a lot
of people who get to thirty-five and are very proud of their life…and although you
might be scared of the lifestyle some people say I have just been to Thailand for six
weeks, I don’t want a ‘f*****g’’ house, I’ll just rent.191
This Scottish independent owner believed that Broadcast Professionals are not
concerned by their lack of rootedness in the industry. They relished the freedom to
move from one IPC to another, and sometimes spending as little as one or two days
working on a project. It is acknowledged that IPC employees must be able to use their
qualifications across a range of different companies in order to secure employment
over their careers (Baumann, 2002:30). Employees of IPCs are now promoted as
freewheeling entrepreneurs who can dictate the path of their own careers and are no
longer held back by the rigidity of the television industry which prevailed prior to the
late 1980s. The current crop of Broadcast Professionals are encouraged to take
responsibility for the development of their own career. Theoretical contributors to this
area have suggested that new organizational forms (namely the decentering of
traditional hierarchical structures and which reflect the organizational strategy of the
191 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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IPC sector) result in strong psychological contracts between employer and employee
(Guest, 1998). The proposition that any deep or genuine relationship could exist on a
significant scale between the freelance employee of an IPC and Producer Owners
seems hopelessly optimistic. Further, the suggestion that managers can expect
employees (freelance) to act in the best interests of the organization to which they are
only loosely tied seems very unlikely (Guest, 1998). One Producer Owner said of the
labour process of the class of Broadcast Professionals;
You are the CEO of your own life and you have got to work out what is attractive to
people. It’s about being able to present it [a programme proposal]. It’s about having
people skills…it’s about pitch. People don’t care what sort of shirt you have on but
you have to be able to handle people.192
Broadcast Professionals band together in a search for work through necessity and,
whether contrived or not, networking is an important factor in the success of
individual strategies for career advancement. Personal networks – if they are to
develop into a major source of competitive advantage for Broadcast Professionals –
must become as flexible as required by changing strategic demands of the major
broadcasters or the IPCs themselves (see Johanisson & Paterson, 1984:). During a
number of interviews Broadcast Professionals expressed concern that membership of
networks could place them at the heart of a conflictual relationship with Producer
Owners. According to many Producer Owners, support was provided to Broadcast
Professionals in a personal and individual way. The significant demands made of
Broadcast Professionals were balanced (according to one significant Glasgow based
Producer Owner) by the promise of a division of profits to those employees who
helped devise the programme idea;
People come in and talk about what they want to do. In the future it will be more
formal…a nominal working week is forty hours but nobody works less than fifty…we
have a contract here where people get twenty per cent of the profits of any
192 Interview with independent producer 7.1.
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programme which they develop…people are here because they are working here,
there is not a culture of presentism’.193
Broadcast Professionals use social networks to improve their position – with the tacit
approval of IPC managers who reap the benefits of a highly motivated staff. Where,
then, does the notion of collectivity emerge from these seemingly individualistic
networks of skilled Broadcast Professionals? The fact is that it does not emerge from
a vague or intangible network of individuals operating in isolation, but through the
critical role which internet based networks of Broadcasting Professionals play in
setting terms and conditions to apply within the UK freelance market. (The three main
websites for freelance Broadcasting Professionals are ‘Mandy.com’,
‘ProductionBase.com’ and ‘Broadcasterfreelancer.com’.) Freelance Broadcast
Professionals, having paid a subscription fee, are able to advertise their skills to
potential employers and to maintain a close relationship with their peers. Websites
also help to provide information about work opportunities and allow the swapping of
information regarding pay and conditions. It is the usage, and increasing importance,
of these E-networks which is now the single most important forum for networking
within the UK freelance sector. Despite claims that collective action is taking place
within the primary broadcasters, (BBC, ITV and Channel 4) empirical evidence
suggests this action is very limited in relation to remuneration and conditions of
service issues. These E-networks are a variant of the previously outlined concept of
the ‘advice network’, where Broadcast Professionals share concerns with colleagues
and more senior freelance workers. Interviews with Broadcast Professionals provided
evidence of the critical role which seniority and longevity play when offering advice
to junior staff;
When I moved to producer/director level I spoke to several people at that level about
what I could expect in terms of salary, but there were no hard and fast rules about
salaries it was just really what you could negotiate for yourself…for me networking as
you call it is really mainly just ‘back-biting’ and ‘bitching’, you are on your own I
think.
193 Interview 7.1.
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Conclusion.
Networking is a fundamental, unavoidable and essential aspect of labour process for
those working within the IPC sector. It is, further, an entirely appropriate element of a
contemporary and full account of LPT. Both the Producer Owner and Broadcast
Professional classes depend on networking, detailed case studies which show how
managers and employees adapt to new situations, away from an exclusive concern
with production are essential.
A Producer Owner spoke in damning terms of the attitude of smaller lifestyle IPCs
failing to grasp the importance of networking. He offered this piece of advice for his
competitors who bemoaned their lack of success in achieving commissions:
Be nicer, lose the attitude – work harder, and for God’s sake, take advice when it’s
offered or at least listen to people.194
The larger IPC managers interviewed were significantly more successful at managing
their relationships with commissioning editors. Such relationships might be thought of
as having been the simple outcome of networking but, in short, the critical element
existing in a successful partnership between IPC and commissioner was that of mutual
trust. However trust is a fragile concept, and the issue of budgets which are becoming
increasingly tight and being scrutinized very closely, looms large. There was an
acceptance on the part of some Producer Owners that, while they may currently be
part of an elite industry network, their continued presence in that exalted position was
not a given and would only be maintained by constant endeavour;
We are only one ‘cock up’ away from losing our reputation. When Michael Jackson
joined Channel 4 he cancelled ‘Film Night’ and ‘Space Cadets’ [a million and a half
pounds worth of business in one week]. We just sat there and said ‘oh-dear’…we did
a lot of fire fighting and it’s only now you know, that we have got back to the same
level [as] we were before that.195
194 Interview with independent producer 7.2.
195 Interview with independent producer 7.2.
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In a further critique of some of his less successful colleagues within the independent
sector, a leading industry Producer Owner completely rejected the assertion (repeated
occasionally during interview by smaller IPCs) that his firm had simply networked its
way to domination of the Scottish marketplace;
People say we can just walk straight into Channel 4 and speak to Stuart Cosgrove but
when I was born in Stranraer thirty-eight years ago I wasn’t issued with a passport
for Channel 4. It is such a ridiculous suggestion…we work hard for our access.’ 196
In all interviews undertaken there was an outright rejection of any suggestion of a
corrupt form of networking between commissioning editors and Producer Owners.
However, there was an implied acceptance, both in the quotation above and in much
of the empirical evidence gathered, that networking – developing ties of association
both between Producer Owners and commissioning editors – was critical to the
survival of the individual firm. A large network of weak-ties is, undoubtedly, of
benefit to a firm’s profitability or its access to contracts, but strong-ties are, in fact,
the critical factor in the success of the group of Producer Owners (Granovetter’s,
1973). Below the new premier league of ‘super IPCs’ remained a core of resolute
small operators and, while these were sometimes responsible for innovative
programming, they were often self-employed ‘lifestylers’ with no realistic plan to
develop their business interests.
There is little doubt that the independent production sector offered, and continues to
offer, certain creative freedoms to the class of workers entitled Broadcast
Professionals. These freedoms do, however, come at a cost – namely, job insecurity,
relatively low levels of remuneration and the requirement to continually engage in
networking as an essential labour process with Producer Owners and other
employment hubs. One Broadcast Professional spoke of her reputation as a hard
worker, but also as somebody with a reputation as being ‘difficult’;
196 Interview with independent producer 7.2.
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I have to be careful, there are people in this city [Glasgow] who simply won’t employ
me anymore because I tell the truth. If I think it won’t look good – I say so, but there
are so many egos to stroke, it really gets on my wick.197
The requirement of groups of Broadcast Professionals to network is the result of an
employment lottery in which informal E-networks have replaced the more formal
processes of recruitment and the role traditionally undertaken by trade unions.
Freelance Broadcast Professionals are encouraged to be reflexive, creative and active
– not just in their daily activities as freelance workers – and to utilize these qualities in
the search for work (Edwards, 1998:387). Further, they are encouraged to disregard
learned knowledge (i.e. knowledge appropriate to a more regulated broadcasting
industry) in favour of being ultra-flexible workers who (if they are hard working and
willing to work at times which suit the IPC managers) make faster career progress. At
best, freelance Broadcast Professionals are reduced to attempting to soften the most
extreme elements of a flexible workplace but on a very individualistic basis.
197 Interview with Producer Director freelancer.
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Chapter 8.
Summary and
Conclusions.
Introduction.
This work has sought to illustrate the significant changes in management,
organizational restructuring and employment practices within the UK broadcasting
industry in the period after 1979 and their consequences for individual groups of
workers and specific broadcasting institutions. It is widely accepted that changes in
the competitive and regulatory structure during the 1980s and ‘90s resulted in an
increasingly uncertain environment for both individuals employed in television and
those charged with operating and managing broadcasting and television production
institutions (Dex, et al, 2002; Born, 2002). Less clear, however, was how those
changes impacted at individual firm and employee level and it was this lacuna (in the
study of the production of programming by broadcasting organizations) which offered
the opportunity to undertake a case study examination of organizational change across
the UK industry. Competition and industry restructuring within the broadcasting
industry was intensified by two sets of parallel reforms, those instigated by
government legislation (tracked through Chapter 3) and, secondly, by internal
structural reform which included attacks on collectivity within the ITV sector, the
impact of de-skilling within STV, the introduction of market led reforms within the
BBC and the emergence of the independent sector.
The period since 1979 witnessed substantial organizational change within the
broadcasting industry and which reflected, at least in part, the political and economic
priorities of the time. Other national institutions (for example the National Health
Service) underwent significant organizational restructuring during the 1980s and
1990s and the impact of such reforms has been well tracked (Dixon, et al, 2003).
Before the mid 1980s the UK television industry was partly regulated through the
domination of the industry by the two vertically integrated public service and
commercial broadcasters, BBC and ITV (Deakin & Pratten, 2000). The independent
television production sector, which emerged after 1982 amid the development of
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Channel 4, did not, until the Broadcasting Act, 1990 make the breakthrough in terms
of altering the industry duopoly. However, by the mid 1990s the substantial numbers
of employees exiting the established broadcasters to set up IPCs or in becoming
freelance employees, had the effect of altering the structure of the industry. The
development of the concept of the vertically disintegrated production and broadcast
environment was at the heart of the revolution within the industry (Christopherson,
1996). The labour process of broadcasting, industrial relations management and
organizational strategy were, as a result, comprehensively redrawn during the 1980s
and later. Indeed, it is possible to identify the establishment of the Peacock Committee
Report as a critical factor in moving the industry towards vertical disintegration.
As has been outlined, the broadcasting industry was viewed as having an essential
relationship with the national and cultural identity of the nation and was treated
through legislation (up and until the late 1980s) as a special case. The Peacock
Committee Report set the tone for the institutional, political and regulatory change
which would radically restructure employment relationships within UK broadcasting
and reformulate the media policy of all subsequent administrations (Foster, 1992:46).
Peacock’s findings were nothing short of a radical remaking or re-regulation of
cultural/ broadcasting concerns in a language which adopted the fashion for market
led reforms. The Report (as detailed in Chapter 3) sought to place consumer
sovereignty at the centre of future broadcasting policy (Wegg-Prosser, 1998:25).
While the concept of consumer sovereignty was central to the ideology of neo-
Liberalism, the proposition that the Peacock Report would turn the established view
of public service broadcasting on its head (and reformulate it along strictly
commercial or market lines while completely marginalizing the role of skilled
workers) is to misunderstand the evolution of organizational change within the UK
terrestrial sector. There was certainly a planned and executed process of
organizational change within both the terrestrial broadcasters and the independent
industry, but these organizational changes impacted across the sector in a variety of
manners and in degrees of intensity. While Peacock noted that the BBC and the
regulated ITV system had done well in articulating and meeting the needs and desires
of the broadcasting market at reasonable cost – the Report concluded that
organizational improvements (at labour level) would significantly improve the cost
base of broadcasting. This work has tracked those changes at firm level and in
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exploring the differences in how ITV, BBC and the independent sector adapted to
industrial restructuring has sought to explore the actuality of change within the UK
broadcasting industry without recourse to unquantifiable assertions of flexibility.
While a brief summary of the findings pertaining to the case study Chapters will be
provided here, the four applied themes of LPT (as detailed in Chapter 1) will also be
revisited so that the central empirical conclusions of the four case studies can be
compared with the core theoretical elements of the four themes of LPT. (This is
undertaken so as to explain why the UK broadcasting industry is a particularly
interesting example of the core issues of LPT in action).
8.1
Case Studies.
In preparation for the four case studies, Chapter 3 detailed the organizational/political
context of the industry, with particular reference to key pieces of broadcasting
legislation in the period since 1979. The Broadcasting Act, 1990 was identified as the
critical piece of deregulatory legislation – stipulating that 25% of BBC programming
be sourced from the independent production sector. It was envisaged that this
stipulation would significantly contribute to an enhanced independent sector – both
organizationally and creatively. In short, the industry was being gently moved in the
first instance by legislative actions from a highly regulated format to one in which
partial de-regulation was clearly evident.
In Chapter 4 the restructuring of the ITV Network in the period after 1979 is set out.
Evidence was provided that the setting up of the Independent Television Network
Centre (‘ITNC’) as the central vehicle for commissioning ITV programming – which
provided a more transparent costing policy for commercial programming – had the
effect of driving down fixed costs for ITV companies. However, in a recent obituary
of a former Chairman of Granada TV (David Plowright) it was noted that in the
aftermath of the 1990 legislation, the demand from the incoming Granada Chairman
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(Gerry Robinson) to slash costs continued and became overwhelming.198 The battle to
re-regulate the ITV Network was fought over the issue of control over the shop floor.
It will have been noted that the reduction of programming costs were a consistent
theme throughout the four case studies undertaken. By employing archive materials
Chapter 4 traced the remaking of industrial relations within the ITV sector – the
formation of a strategy aimed at the institutionalisation of labour and production
flexibility. This was achieved through industrial relations policy articulated by a
newly confident ITVA. In the period up until the mid 1980s, high levels of union
involvement in formal collective bargaining (or top-down regulation) had
characterized ITVs industrial relations. The formality of the industrial relations
system had been augmented by a highly developed system of union organization at
shop floor level which improved conditions and salary levels on a firm-by-firm basis.
Managements, as noted earlier, were satisfied to concede the control of labour to the
shop floor in return for a (relatively) harmonious industrial relations environment. The
most minor attempt to rework the relationship between trade unions and management,
(even to make minute changes to production) involved painstaking negotiations.
Archival documents pointed to the dissatisfaction of the ITVA with the system for
managing work, but managers recognized it as a necessary condition for the
continuation of production. The complexity of the production technology involved in
programme production contributed to the maintenance of that highly regulated work
environment. Up until the late 1980s issues of industrial relations within the ITV
sector were dealt with through the well established procedures of national collective
bargaining – involving the Labour Relations Committee of the ITVA and
representatives of trade unions. The National Agreements were the ultimate source of
union power and (as was noted) the ACTT’s most potent weapon was to encourage its
members to adhere strictly to these formal agreements – critically rejecting short-term
inducements in favour of maintaining the entire fabric of agreements.
As Chapter 4 sets out, by the early 1980s various figures within the ITVA began to
question employer compliance with the accepted norms of work organization and
began a concerted policy of attacking the National Agreements. These were no longer
198 Obituary of David Plowright, Daily Telegraph August 30, 2006 p25.
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accepted as non-negotiable and were regarded as terrain upon which the politics of
production could be altered. Employers gradually shifted their labour and technology
strategies – from a grudging acceptance of the limits placed upon their discretion by
collective bargaining – to recognizing few limitations. ITV franchises began to
aggressively remake industrial relations within the ITV sector. The description in
Chapter 4 of the collective assault during the1980s by ITV employers (on established
work organization) was not driven simply by the political imperatives of neo-
Liberalism. In fact the ending of national collective bargaining within the ITV sector
must be seen as being largely consequent on the commercial imperatives of the ITV
franchises themselves. However government was not redundant in the process and
provided a regulatory environment (through a series industrial relations Acts in the
first Thatcher administration) by which the political and regulatory environment for
the ending of the National Agreements within the ITV sector could be achieved.
By the mid 1980s, industrial relations archive documents pointed to a rigorous assault
on the industry’s formal and informal collective bargaining. From being of only
marginal concern, the control of the labour process moved to being the central issue
for ITV management. The importance of the supportive political environment should
be acknowledged, but the Thatcher industrial relations reforms did not initiate the
management assault on the broadcasting trade unions – rather they accelerated the
change which began within the ITV franchises themselves. Collective bargaining – in
giving way to what became known as a peculiarly British version of individualization
– was the single greatest contributing factor to the re-regulation of work within the
ITV sector (Brown et al, 1998). At the heart of the move to reshape the industry’s
formal and informal structures of collective bargaining was a desire to restore
competitiveness. Franchise managers argued that there was a moral imperative
involved and suggested that they were being held to ransom by aggressive union
negotiators – such a situation (they contended) could not be allowed to continue. The
paradox was that the restoration of managerial prerogative at firm level was
predicated upon enhancing the strategic and operational role of the ITVA. Thus
responsibility for the restructuring of industrial relations at ITV was, once again,
removed from individual franchise holders.
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In Chapter 5 the specific franchise based organizational changes within the Central
Scotland ITV franchise, STV were identified. The long dominance of complex and
unreliable electrical technologies and the very slow introduction (by comparable ITV
firms) of digital technologies during the mid to late 1980s meant that STV was highly
dependent on the skills and craft of production workers. This regulated environment
made the organization and management of production a straightforward process, but it
also made television production unnecessarily expensive, requiring detailed and
painstaking planning and preparation. Programming concerns were as much about the
cost of deploying nationally negotiated crew levels as they were about the creative
aspects of production. The complexity of production procedures meant that it was
entirely rational for management to collude with trade unions in the construction and
maintenance of ‘balkanised’ internal labour markets. The policy at all times (as was
established) contained a management directive to maintain a peaceful industrial
relations environment in order to maintain uninterrupted broadcasting. What could not
be countenanced was a ‘blank-screen’ and the essential management strategy was
‘peace at any price’. However by the mid 1970s, new technology advances in the US
and Japan had given management hope that a challenge could be made to what they
viewed as the ‘immoral hegemony’ of the ACTT’s role within commercial television.
The potential of new broadcasting technology could be realized only if the ITV
sector’s historic settlement with the ACTT (based upon a requirement to satisfy the
demands of the highly skilled workforce) could be undone. STVs (initial) strategy was
to engage in highly detailed negotiations with shop stewards and union representatives
and to steadily increase pressure as parallel ITV organizational change moved ever
closer to an acute restructuring of the industry. Archive documents reflected an inert
leadership within STV during the early 1980s – barely reacting to the power struggle
taking place between some ITV franchise holders and the ACTT. STV was not
engaged in an attempt to reserve its assault on organized labour until other franchises
had started a policy of undermining the ACTT. STV used the strength of the sea
change in the ITV sector as a tool in convincing the ACTT of the need for change, but
only after other franchises had acted. (Archival documents relating to STVs
contribution to the industrial relations strategies of the ITVA clearly make this point).
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After the initial moves of the ITVA in altering the landscape of collective bargaining
STV began its inevitable change in the strategy and structure of its industrial relations
policy. By 1986 the defining feature of industrial relations within STV was the
managerial emphasis on cost control, namely reshaping the employment relationship
and work organization. A new deregulated and flexible production regime emerged
with a strict management led commitment to production de-skilling. If STV had been
slow to engage in radical corporate restructuring in the 1980s, it subsequently (by the
early 1990s) readily embraced restructuring. The numbers employed at STV fell
sharply between 1989 and 1994 and the piecemeal approach of STV management
during the early 1980s to organizational and labour process change was replaced with
a fresh determination to manage change. Empirical evidence for the depth of those
organizational changes within STV during the1990s was provided through an analysis
of SMG (Scottish Media Group). The contrast between the regulated STV franchise of
the early 1980s – with a management prepared to cede control over production to a
skilled workforce (with highly tuned craft abilities) – and the deregulated production
economy of the late 1990s was most revealing.
The impact of organizational restructuring within BBC Scotland was considered in
Chapter 6. Noting the difficulties which national public service broadcasters faced in
the period since the 1980s and the challenges confronting the BBC through direct
regulatory pressure – an outline of the working environment within the Corporation in
the period before the advent of Producer Choice was provided. Introduced in April
1993, Producer Choice ‘…consisted of a purchaser/provider split at the level of the
relationship between programme makers and suppliers of production resources’
(Deakin & Pratten, 2000:9). The changes introduced at the BBC relating to the
concept of Producer Choice were part of a trend directed at restructuring the public
service (Wegg-Prosser, 1998:15). While the BBC remained part of the public sector,
the decision to attempt to introduce a quasi-market into management processes
(previously dominated by the principle of planning) had a very significant effect upon
the Corporation – particularly in terms of the occupational identity of groups of
skilled workers employed.
Attempts during the late 1960s and ‘70s (the 1968 McKinsey reforms) to restructure
the organizational makeup of the Corporation (a precursor to the Birtian reforms) had
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been seen as counterintuitive by many staff and managers alike (Born, 2004:221).
During the 1970s, producers and editors had been given some control over budgets
and the Corporation had also developed a new awareness of the issue of costs in order
to develop tight managerial strategies (see, inter alia, Burns, 1977: Curry, 1994).
Producers undertook – by the 1970s – a new quasi-managerial role in the production
and managerial pyramid, but it was not until the 1990s that producers themselves
were subjected to managerial intervention and tight cost control. In the period after
the introduction of Producer Choice, the Corporation rejected the policy of having
scheduling and programme production dominated by the inability of studios to make
room for specific programming. Programming quotas were fixed annually and this
highly regulated production environment becoming increasingly unattractive to a
management class who noted change within the ITV and independent sector with
increasing envy.
BBC managers whose interviews were recorded in Chapter 6 vigorously attacked
what they saw a quasi-Stalinist approach to the regulation of Resources throughout
the Corporation. They also argued that to recapture the right to manage work
organization was a moral, and not just a production/managerial, imperative. Despite
its size and prominent position within the industry, the BBC failed to undertake any
substantial restructuring of programme production until the mid-to-late 1980s. The
ITV and independent sectors were the industry leader in terms of attacking the
organizational and employment status quo within UK broadcasting. Producer Choice
was grounded on the notion that producers were spendthrifts with little regard for
scarce resources and the Corporation had been largely content to trail behind the
aggressive tactics of ITV management during the early 1980s (Born, 2004:227). The
constant refrain of the reformers in the period since the 1970s (when Lord Hill had
invited the McKinsey team into the BBC) had been a desire to separate out or
decentralize the various product divisions. The ultimate objective of these
organizational changes was not to completely reconstitute the identity of BBC
employees as low-cost workers, but to erase the perception that some BBC staff saw
themselves as ‘gold-plated’ providers of specialized technical services. This policy
was intensified with the decision to divide the Corporation into three separate and
distinct directorates, namely Resources, Production and Broadcast.
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Producer Choice impacted in a very profound manner within Resources and
Production. Despite protestations from at least one BBC Scotland (Broadcast)
Manager, the Resources directorate provided the lead towards flexibility within the
Corporation arguing, rather, that Resources had been one of the most inflexible parts
of the Corporation and that restructuring efforts would, by definition, have a very
significant impact upon the culture of work within the directorate. Evidence for these
significant organizational changes were provided by a study of G51 (the relevant
location in BBC Scotland Glasgow where Resources managed its operations) was
undertaken. There was a marked contrast between G51 and the creative and other
management/ commissioning departments throughout the Corporation. The role of
G51 was the embodiment of the marketization within the BBC and its very existence
set it apart from other directorates. Evidence was provided of the difficulties, which
both Resources staff and managers faced in coming to terms with the ending of the
highly regulated labour market which had existed within the Corporation since its
inception.
Attempts to reorder the occupational identity of Production workers was particularly
manifested in the development of the Talent Pool – this was the term given to all
Production employees within BBC Scotland below the rank of producer. Managers
contended that the Talent Pool could provide the necessary supply of specific
personnel required by the Corporation. It was a mechanism for managing and
controlling the movement and cost of creative labour. Interviews with Production
managers provided evidence of the impact which the imposition of the Talent Pool
had upon the modicum of remaining occupational identity of researchers and
broadcast assistants in particular. The Talent Pool meant that those with highly
generalist skills endured constant shifting from one administrative task to another and
were rarely given the opportunity to learn new skills. The Talent Pool was a further
attempt by Production managers to harmonize employees within the directorate and to
mould them as a group of flexible workers. A contrast can usefully be made with the
block of regulated labour within the ITV sector in the period up until the mid 1980s.
The Talent Pool members were managed by the twin programmes of work
intensification and increased flexibility (Hodson, 2001:172). Managers (in a process
very similar to those within the ITV sector) began to actively monitor downtime
amongst production staff in an effort to raise low productivity levels – this desire for
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flexibility impacted in very different ways depending on the seniority of the staff in
question. Highly specialised producer/directors were spared an intensive and complete
marketization of their skills and professionalism, lower ranking staff were subjected
to intensive measurement of their performance and usage levels, while significant
pressures were applied to the remnants of their occupational identity as a contributing
factor towards flexibility.
At the same time as these market-like relations were being introduced into the BBC,
the IPC sector was growing in importance within the UK industry – both as a provider
of programming and as an exemplar of organizational change within the broadcasting
sector more generally. The emergence of the independent production sector and the
labour process of two distinct groups of television workers were traced in Chapter 7.
The move to de-regulate the television market in the early 1990s provided an
opportunity for entrepreneurial programme makers to move outside the traditional
boundaries of the BBC and ITV production centres. The examination of the sector in
the UK was undertaken in tandem with consideration of the development of
networking strategies in terms of both Broadcast Professionals and Producer Owners.
Prior to the introduction of Channel 4 in 1982, programming was produced by two
large and vertically integrated organizations, namely the BBC and ITV, but during the
1980s and ‘90s, legislation designed to introduce competition (by separating
production from broadcasting) resulted in the emergence of significant numbers of
small independent companies (Antcliff, et al, 2005b:2).
Chapter 7 traced the emergence of the IPC sector as a significant force in UK
broadcasting, further, it also explored how networking became part of the daily
activities of Producer Owners and Broadcast Professionals. The development of
networking (as a strategy for Producer Owners) did not include the sharing of
sensitive information, i.e. sharing creative ideas which could be easily adopted by
competitors. However, in a small production environment where almost all of the IPC,
Producer Owners were, at the very least, aware of one another, networking emerged
as an essential day-to-day form of labour process. Channel 4 relied on approximately
30 suppliers to secure in excess of 70 per cent of its original programming and trust
and reputation became a central element for commissioning editors when searching
for IPCs with which they could do business. Commissioners consistently noted the
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importance of IPCs having both a track-record with broadcasters and developing
networks of trust in order to gain access to the tight or closed networks which dictated
where many of the commissioning contracts went. Despite warnings regarding the
potential of clique formation within the IPC sector, closed networks were
synonymous with success within the sector (Coleman, 1990.).
It was established that networking played an important role in the success of
Broadcast Professionals in search for regular employment. However, the success or
otherwise of such a strategy was difficult to measure and evaluate. Broadcast
Professionals continued to be subject to an employment lottery which made entry to
the industry largely unstructured. Networking was not a short-term employment
development which existed only in the burgeoning literature which the subject
generated (Nohira, 1992). Rather, networking – in a period when collective labour
power within the broadcasting industry had suffered a concerted attack by
management – was seen by some commentators as a challenge to the withering of
trade union representation (Millward et al, 2000; Antclif, et al, 2005b).
As a potential bulwark against issues of collectivisation reappearing as an industrial
relations issue, IPC owners continually contrasted their working environment with the
staid environment of the two main terrestrial broadcasters. Often employing very
critical language, IPC owner managers contended that for production staff entering
the industry, the absence of a rigid and formal career structure meant that
opportunities for advancement were greater within the IPC structure than inside the
traditional broadcasting institutions. The IPC Producer Owners (most of whom were
self styled ‘refugees’ from the terrestrial broadcasters) held out the inducement of
promotion to producer (in a shorter period) than with terrestrial broadcasters– often in
lieu of standard industry remuneration. IPC managers strongly rejected any suggestion
that their organizational structure replicated the structure of terrestrial broadcasters.
They argued that they were able to obtain flexibility from employers without resorting
to strict managerialism. Many Broadcast Professionals understood that their career
development was intimately tied up with their company’s health and, consequently,
were prepared to accept lesser remuneration in the short term. While the industry has
been offered as a potential example of a return to partial collectivity for employees, no
real evidence for this claim was found. It appears that with the exception of small
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groups of elite workers, (with skills in great demand), IPC employees were exposed to
very real difficulties in securing something akin to permanent employment.
8.2
Key Findings and Links to LPT.
An outline of four themes of LPT was undertaken in Chapter 1 in an attempt to place
organizational restructuring in a theoretical context and to provide an appropriate
vehicle to consider industry wide workplace change on a case-by-case basis. Thus
LPT was employed in Chapter 1 to study workplace change because of its pre-
eminent theoretical methodology and because of its positioning of case studies as a
fundamental method of applying theoretical concerns to actual workplace issues
(Newsome & Thompson, 2004). Four themes of LPT were adopted – each paralleling
a core element of the restructuring of the UK broadcasting industry over the course of
the previous 25 years. The theoretical development of the four themes of LPT was
continued empirically in sequence between Chapters 4-7.
Smith & Thompson (1989) rightly stress that the systematic qualities of capitalism are
not experienced in the same way across societies because of the diversity of nation
states and firms. Certainly organizational restructuring within the UK broadcasting
industry has varied in intensity and in the depth and breadth of that change. The
difficulty for those seeking to explain work-place change is one of ‘connectivity’, in
short, linkage between qualitative (or case study) treatments of organizational change
and a necessary conceptual framework. It is a fact that LPT has no particular
preference in terms of a suitable methodology. Nevertheless it has been at its most
revealing through the employment of the case study approach – reaching downwards
(towards micro-firm analysis) from debates concerning nation states and industry.
Why then is the UK broadcasting industry an interesting example of LPT ‘in action’?
Indeed it is a fact that attempts to employ market-like relations to assist in the
promotion or delivery of services, which broadly fall under the remit of ‘public
service’ are not new, and have as noted been well documented within, inter alia, the
NHS (see Dixon, et al, 2003). The core reason is that the very substantial restructuring
of the UK television industry in the period after 1979 provided the researcher with a
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‘ready-made’ series of case studies detailing the effects of, inter alia, intensified
competition, deregulation, de-skilling, pressures on occupational identities and the
rise in importance of networking as a form of labour process. While it is tempting to
adopt a partial trend for vague theoretical positions – regarding the effects of new
strategies aimed at securing worker compliance or passivity in relation to the new
reality of the employment relationship – such perspectives offer few clues as to the
actual impact of such change on the shop-floor and to wider societal changes. The
important examples of such theories are those which speak rhetorically of ‘flexibility’
and ‘deregulation’. An attempt has been made here to provide an empirical
development of four critical LPT theories which properly reflected and explained the
change in the nature of work and the impact of deregulation within broadcasting.
Few would deny that the past 25 years have witnessed the development of more
flexible employment relations and a decentralization of collective bargaining.
Appelbaum & Batt (1994) rightly note that the accumulated body of case study work
produced in recent years, provide ample evidence that fundamental changes have
occurred in employment systems. It is also a fact that organizations have become
more decentralized and flatter (Castells, 1996). In short, the period has witnessed a
move away from a clearly structured employment relationship.
Chapter 4 detailed (in conjunction with LPT theme of regulation) the move from a
highly regulated environment of production and employment concerns, to one in
which flexible employment relations became the dominant form of regulation (Supiot,
2001). The work contained therein provided empirical evidence of a very substantial
shift in the landscape of commercial television. In the period before 1979, commercial
television was a benign environment where individual firms – made significant profits
while trade unionists (as Sapper, quoted on page 95) – sold the labour of their
members at the highest possible price. After 1979, employers began to shift labour
strategies away from an acceptance of collective bargaining and National Agreements,
in favour of a full-scale assault on the formal and informal processes of collective
bargaining.
This case has provided evidence of the very real gutting of collective agreements
between the then dominant broadcasting union, ACTT, and the ITV network. The top-
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down regulative structure which had dominated UK broadcasting negotiations over
the regulation of work was being rapidly replaced by bottom-up restructuring which
varied in line with the number of franchises which collectively contributed to ITV.
The firms, which disappeared into the early 1980s discussions aimed at an original
piecemeal attempt to negotiate away some elements of the National Agreements, were
to reappear in the late 1980s as fundamentally different organizations. For ITV,
debates over National Agreements, collective agreements and demarcation lines were
to dissolve – to be forever relegated to industrial relations textbooks.
Chapter 5 linked the key Bravermanian theme of de-skilling to the ambition of the
STV franchise to disabuse itself of what it perceived to be an overwhelmingly
expensive set of costs in relation to programme production. Chapter 1(1.3) has
comprehensively detailed debates around the issue of skill, both in its up-skilling and
de-skilling variants. The STV case study provided some interesting observations
about the reality of de-skilling for a generation of employees who joined the company
after the great deregulatory impulses of the late 1980s and beyond. De-skilling came
alive as a very real process for these workers and the empirical material provides a
real sense of the unchallenging nature of much contemporary work within the
franchise.
Both theoretical and empirical contributions are employed to reinforce the view that
the technology employed has removed the decision-making capabilities of workers
(Agnew et al, 1997). However, the corollary of that view (namely, that responsibility
for creative and productive decision making had been lost forever to creative workers)
was partially rebuffed by the importance attached by management – to the critical role
that post-production employees played in the creative process of television
production.
Chapter 6 traced the comprehensive attack on established notions of occupational
identity within BBC Scotland and a summary of these changes has already been
detailed in this Chapter. As Chapter 1 (1.4) made clear, for most employees of the
BBC any form of attempted retreat into core skilled positions which reflect strong
occupational identities are no longer a valid form of defensive strategy. It was
formerly the case that one could view BBC corporate identity through, at least, two
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distinct layers. Firstly, a commitment to the firm itself – a form of loyalty to the
Corporation and, secondly to the occupational community from which the employee
had emerged. As detailed in Chapter 6 BBC managers have successfully managed the
occupational identity of the greater number of BBC staff. The impact of the
directorate system has had a hugely significant effect on the notion of occupational
identity. Loyalty and identification is now made with the directorate in which the
individual is employed and secondary loyalties are to the BBC itself, the occupational
community from the worker has emerged (if any) and his/her relevant trade union.
While LPT traditionally was concerned with opportunities for workers to adapt to
particular regimes of control – developing strategies aimed at resistance including,
inter alia, absence, sanctions etc. – the evidence produced throughout Chapter 6
provided little comfort for BBC Scotland Production employees (Thompson &
Newsome, 2004:145). Labour control increased in more recent years within BBC
Scotland and the twin directorates of Resources and Production provided substantial
evidence of rigorous management attempts to restructure workplace identity so as to
link that identity with management ambitions.
The final case, Chapter 7 – the independent production sector within the UK –
employed an element of contemporary LPT and which has been little used within LPT
literature. As noted in Chapter 1 (1.5) much of the literature pertaining to networks
and networking does not emanate from the LPT tradition. LPT has tended to ignore,
whether by accident or design, the importance of networking as a method whereby
Producers Owners maintained or obtained a position as suppliers of programming to
broadcasters. It has also paid little attention to the employment by Broadcast
Professionals of strategies of networking to maintain and find employment
opportunities. It is a fact, as noted in Chapter 7, that LPT tended to focus on ‘point of
production’ studies. This has meant that many LPT theorists have ignored networking,
or, rather, have refused to recognize it as a valid form of labour process. It is
contended here that networking is now a fundamental and increasingly important
subject for consideration by students of organizational change within the creative
industries.
In defence of ‘traditional’ LPT most, if not all, networking is conducted discreetly and
hidden from an overt examination by researchers. It has been viewed as an invisible
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form of labour and thus, in contrast to the work of, inter alia, (Edwards & Scullion,
1982:151) is not suitable to illustrate ‘matters at the point of production’. However,
networking is now to a very significant extent, almost on a par with production
amongst those studying the labour process of broadcasting work.
In the introduction to this thesis the point was made that those researchers who had
tended to refer to only ‘texts’ (and by implication programming) in their study of the
broadcasting industry, have begun to consider media institutions and labour process in
a very detailed way (Oswell, 1998:93). It is appropriate now to end this contribution –
having considered the final case study (that of IPCs and networking) – and which
contrasts so profoundly with the rigorously regulated structure of the broadcasting
industry in situ at the outset of the period considered by this work.
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